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 This dissertation analyzes the intricate yet critical link between macroeconomic, 
financial, and social variables, including spatial income distribution, and how the 
income inequalities are affected by certain policies and external shocks. The first 
chapter shows the importance of including the financial sector in today’s economic 
and policy analyses by demonstrating the difference between the computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) model and its extended version that incorporates financial sector, 
the financial computable general equilibrium (FCGE) model. The updated FCGE 
model in the second chapter is then employed to analyze the increased foreign capital 
inflows intermediated through the banking sector, reflecting the current phenomenon 
in Asian emerging countries. Based on the results of simulations, some policies are 
proposed. The upsides and the downsides of each are analyzed in great detail in 
Chapter 3 by using the analytic hierarchy process (AHP) and analytic network process 
(ANP).  
 Chapter 1 analyzes the difference between CGE and FCGE models, from which 
we conclude that serious erroneous implications and inaccuracies arise from CGE’s 
neglect of the financial sector’s role. By simulating both models in scenarios of 
 increased government spending, depending on whether government spending is 
financed through taxes or government bonds, the results clearly show how the 
negative impacts on the social indicators generated by the CGE model can be 
underestimated. Examples of this underestimation are the macroeconomic impact of 
increased government spending and the social impact of financing the spending 
through taxes. I also found that the CGE results underestimated these negative impacts 
of increased capital flows in the same fashion. 
 The analysis in Chapter 2 highlights the negative impact of risky financial 
investment behaviors of the banking sector resulting from the increased capital inflow 
on the economy. This chapter, in particular, stresses that one must consider not only its 
macroeconomic impact but also its negative repercussions on spatial income 
distribution and poverty conditions. Chapter 2 also shows that the risks of a boom and 
bust cycle where the bank-led flows are reversed from inflows to outflows and the 
impact of the change in banks’ behavior from risk-taking to risk-averse. While risk-
averse behavior can produce more favorable macroeconomic and social outcomes, 
there is no reason to expect that such behavior will be maintained by banks when 
capital inflows increase. It is therefore suggested that some measures should be taken 
to limit the size of bank-led flows.   
 Chapter 3 focuses on the policy analysis based on the results of model 
simulations in Chapter 2. From three alternative policies – i.e., aggressive monetary 
policy, assigning a levy on non-core liabilities, and encouraging capital outflows – it is 
suggested that policymakers seriously consider imposing some sort of levy on bank-
 led flows.  Such a conclusion is derived after taking into account the benefits, 
opportunities, costs, and risks of bank-led inflow based on the priority ranking of the 
policies, the components (criteria) and strategic goals that include macroeconomic, 
financial and social considerations. A series of sensitivity analyses confirm that the 
results are robust. In the context of the present situation in many countries, the 
suggested policy is part of what is known as macroprudential policy.  
 Finally, directions for future research are suggested. The analysis in Chapter 2 
could be extended upon by incorporating more financial instruments and other social 
indicators, or by improving the accuracy of the parameters involved in the model. For 
example, rather than calibrating all of the parameters, one could estimate some of the 
parameters by utilizing econometric equations with time series data. Furthermore, for 
Chapter 3, one could conduct the analysis by using direct interviewing with the same 
approach and model. Respondents could include experts or policymakers who would 
express their perceptions regarding the relations among variables in the model. In this 
way, the resulting priority ranking from the model simulation can be compared with, 
or tested against, policymakers’ perceptions, from which new insights may emerge. 
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CHAPTER 1 
THE RISK OF NEGLECTING THE FINANCIAL SECTOR:  
 THE CGE AND FCGE MODELS IN COMPARISON 
1.1. Introduction 
Whether we like it or not, a somewhat disturbing development has occurred in 
many countries around the world. While conceptually the role and development of the 
financial sector is meant to support the real sector of the economy, this has not been 
the case over the last several decades. The growth of the financial sector has far 
exceeded that of real sector. Several studies have sought to explain the reason behind 
such a trend where the key culprit is the combination of financial sector innovation 
with progress in financial technology and minimal regulation. This has happened in 
developed and developing countries alike, and emerging market economies are no 
exception. In fact, most financial crises in emerging market economies can be 
explained in one way or another by such a phenomenon. Financial globalization and 
deregulation further exacerbate the situation because there are no longer restrictions on 
the flows of capital. At any rate, the dynamics of economic growth and development 
in most emerging market economies has been significantly influenced by development 
in the financial sector. 
It is well-known that the current global financial crisis has had negative 
repercussions on the advanced economies including the US economy. These 
repercussions, in turn, have also impacted many developing and emerging market 
economies worldwide. With globalization, where the financial sector has played an 
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increasingly important (if not the most important), the impact that started from the US 
financial market has flowed into the economies of other countries through their 
financial systems. These repercussions affect the real sector in various ways, such as 
high unemployment and a decrease in income, consumption and production as well as 
increased vulnerability of the financial sector. Any analysis omitting this sector, 
therefore, is bound to be misleading. 
This chapter focuses on the comparison between the CGE and FCGE models. 
In particular, we impose some shocks on the two models and evaluate the transmission 
mechanism in each, upon which basis we then analyze the different results produced 
by the two models and argue that neglecting the role of financial sector in CGE can 
produce erroneous results. While the final results are important to compare, the 
transmission mechanism is even more important to understand because it sheds some 
light on the question of where and in which parts the government should intervene 
with its policy if a particular result is targeted. The CGE model itself is comprehensive 
enough to show such a transmission mechanism, and it allows us to implement a more 
accurate method when we wish to analyze the impact of a particular policy.  Without 
this model, we are forced to analyze the policy impact by only examining a set of 
variables prior to the policy shock and then the same variables afterwards. This 
‘before and after’ approach is flawed because it neglects the role of other things which 
occur simultaneously with the shock. A more accurate approach would be an approach 
that examines the situation ‘with and without’ policy shock. This can be done only if 
we have a model representing the economic system being analyzed. The CGE we are 
using in this chapter is an example of such models. In other words, the model is like a 
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laboratory for analyzing policy shock; however, as elaborated in this chapter, using the 
CGE model without incorporating the financial sector would undermine the accuracy 
of the results. Thus, it is in this context that we subsequently use a financial CGE 
(FCGE) model where a fairly detailed financial block is incorporated into the CGE 
model. 
The FCGE model is based on an expanded SAM by merging the flow of funds 
into it. In this way, total investment and total saving in the standard SAM will be 
augmented by investment and saving in financial asset. Hence, the new total 
investment and new total saving basically consist of two components – the real sector 
and the financial sector – maintaining the equilibrium tradition of equivalent 
investment and savings in CGE. In the language of the financial balance sheet, total 
assets ought to equal total liabilities. There are two major components to total assets –
fixed assets and other assets, which include financial assets. Investment in the standard 
CGE model, the data of which are derived from SAM, is nothing but the fixed asset or 
real sector investment. Therefore, the bulk of other assets consists of financial assets 
such as securities, equities, and loans. On the liability side, the saving from the CGE 
model, derived from SAM, is equivalent to the wealth or net worth. For example, in 
the case of banks, these items typically consist of deposits made by the public and in 
some cases also loans from other banks (inter-bank loans) or other institutions. In 
recent years, many banks in emerging market economies have also raised financing 
from external sources. Given the ultra easy money policy in the advanced economies, 
especially after the global financial crisis, the incentive for many banks in emerging 
market economies to acquire external funding has increased significantly because the 
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cost of such funding is very low.  For example, the short-term annual interest rate in 
the United States fell dramatically from in 5.30 in 2007 to 0.43 percent in 2012 (see 
Figure 1.1). Similarly, the short-term interest rate adopted by European Central Bank 
fell from 4.28 in 2007 to 0.57 percent in 2012. This ultra easy money policy combined 
with Quantitative Easing (QE) has sparked massive capital outflows from advanced 
economies, most of which has gone to emerging market economies. Many banks in the 
latter have taken advantage of such an environment, raising the share of non-core 
liabilities (liabilities outside of deposits). At any rate, increased capital inflows have 
become a major phenomenon in most emerging market economies. 
 
Figure 1.1. Short-term Interest Rates: Three-month Interbank Rates: Annual Average 
Percent (Square= Euro Area, Dot = USA) 
 
*Source of data: Eurostat 
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Following of the collapse of Lehman Brothers in the fall of 2008, the US 
economy fell into crisis. Subsequently, the economy of the Euro Zone area also 
encountered trouble. Both resulted in a global financial crisis, which also affected 
many emerging market economies. As a response, policymakers in emerging market 
economies have attempted to counter the downward pressure by implementing a series 
of stimulus policies. While there are several types of stimulus policies, almost all 
countries have used a fiscal stimulus by raising government spending. Given that most 
emerging market economies suffer from the perennial problem of worsening income 
inequality, it is expected that most of the physical stimulus are directed towards 
sectors that they believe will help raise the income of the poor while at the same time 
having a sufficiently large multiplier in the economy. Agriculture, construction 
(building), and trade fall in this category. 
Given what is described above, in this chapter we impose a shock in terms of 
increased capital inflows and increased government spending in these three sectors. In 
raising government spending, we compare three cases: in the first case, no particular 
efforts are made to determine the sources of financing for the increased spending; the 
second case is based on raising direct taxes to finance the increased spending; and the 
last case finances the spending through government bond issuance. 
We examined results from the CGE and FCGE models that demonstrate how 
the transmission mechanisms of the CGE model can be misleading and how the FCGE 
model differs from the real sector model.  In particular, the equations defining the 
income of domestic institutions were modified such that the overall income includes 
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not only the factor income and income transfers from other institutions but also the 
income from financial investment (financial income). The resulting total income that 
includes earnings from financial returns is thus different from the income specified in 
CGE model. 
 
 
1.2. Literature Review 
One of the desirable features of economy-wide models is their ability to 
explicitly capture the link between micro and macro variables such that one can 
evaluate how the behavior of agents can influence and be influenced by the macro 
aggregates.  When banks are taking more risks by investing in securities or 
derivatives instead of lending to the business sector, they will not stimulate real sector 
growth (GDP), which in turn will make banks more vulnerable. On the other hand, 
when the economic growth slows down because of, say, falling exports due to the 
global crisis, firms may decide to postpone their investment, and consumers may cut 
their spending, causing the economy to fall into recession.  The nature and intensity 
of the abovementioned causal effects depend on the model specifications and the exact 
size of the parameters, all of which should reflect the behavior of different agents.  
Arguably, some equations in the model are non-linear.  This is the essence of 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) models. 
The basic theoretical underpinning of CGE frameworks is Walras’ model of a 
competitive economy. The formal statement of a Walrasian economy can be found in 
the classic general equilibrium theory of Arrow and Hahn (1971) and Debreu (1959)
  7 
Scarf (1973) made the determination of the equilibrium of a Walrasian system 
possible. Calibration of the model parameters is based on real data to provide the 
empirical content to the purely axiomatic general equilibrium theory of Arrow-Hahn-
Debreu. 
The lineage of CGE models can be traced to the early work of Johansen 
(1960), who developed a linear model to deal primarily with distributional issues in 
Norway. In the model, quantities and prices are simultaneously determined with 
sectoral reallocation of labor and capital. This early category of CGE was of the neo-
classical type, where producers are assumed to be profit maximizers in perfectly 
competitive markets, consumers are utility maximizers, and production factors are 
paid according to their marginal productivity. The solution of such a system provides a 
set of prices that clears all markets in one single instance, implying the presence of 
resource constraints (e.g., budget constraints) and full employment. The model is 
saving-driven, and no investment function is specified. 
In the 1970s, the popularity of multisectoral analysis and macro models took 
off; most were used for policy analysis in developing countries.  In general, the 
objective of using CGE is to analyze the quantitative effects of exogenous changes on 
the optimal allocation of resources, efficiency and welfare. In retrospect, this seems 
rather peculiar since most assumptions employed in the neo-classical CGE models do 
not hold in developing countries. Prices are not always formed by market clearing, and 
full employment condition is almost non-existent. At the time, the primary goal of the 
model was not to describe actual economies; instead, it was meant for constructing a 
‘mental organizing framework’ that could be used to analyze a set of policy issues. 
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As efforts to reflect the actual economy grew, model conditions became less 
strict.  Although the models are still generally based on optimizing representative 
agents and markets are cleared by endogenous prices, in some sectors the quantity 
clearing markets 
are not required.  Certain production sectors are not modeled (Taylor, 1990). This is a 
departure from the standard neo-classical Walrasian CGE model. 
Further development of CGE models puts the focus on the short-run income 
distribution, sectoral growth and trade balance effects, and less on resource allocation 
effects of exogenous shocks (Thissen, 1998).  Behavior of economic agents is not 
necessarily derived from optimizing behavior. There is clearly a trade-off between 
keeping the internal rigor and the empirical relevance of the model, and the latter 
prevails. At the time, the use of CGE models for trade policy analysis was quite 
popular because most of the effects surrounding trade policy, such as those captured in 
the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem, are general equilibrium in nature. A good early 
survey of CGE models can be found in de Melo (1988) and Francois and Shiells 
(1994). 
Meanwhile, new developments also took place on the data front. In recognition 
of the fact that household income distribution had become politically and 
economically more important than the traditional functional income distribution (i.e., 
between wage earners and capital owners, as traditionally used in the input-output 
framework), efforts were made to construct a comprehensive yet consistent data 
system that depicts the link between production and other blocks of the economy with 
the household income distribution. Such a data system, known as the Social 
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Accounting Matrix (SAM), also captures other sources of income outside factor 
income, such as transfers between different institutions. Clearly, this reflects the 
reality better and hence is more relevant than the input-output data system. 
The SAM data system has other advantages as well.  In the international trade 
context, one may want to analyze the average tax rate on imported goods and the 
proportion of imports of certain goods to the total supply. Often, it is also necessary to 
capture the impact of increased imports, say, due to tariff reduction on household 
incomes. Information of this nature cannot be investigated through input-output 
models. One may also wish to know the shares of non-factor incomes (transfers) 
received by different institutions (firms, government, banks, households) from abroad. 
Such information is absent in input-output but available in SAM. More generally, the 
analysis of capital flows can be made more accurately by using information from 
SAM. Structuralist CGE modelers took advantage of this development on the data 
front. Using SAM data, the structuralist models are demand-driven, unlike the saving-
driven neo-classical model.  A seminal work by Adelman and Robinson (1978) is a 
notable example. They are also among the first to attempt to integrate functional and 
household income accounts in the tradition of a SAM into a CGE model. A 
bibliographic survey of CGE models that have been applied to 26 developing 
countries, including the structuralist models, can be found in Decaluwe and Martens 
(1988). The countries covered by this study vary in their standard of living, policy 
orientations, degree of openness, and stage of industrialization. Another systematized 
account of CGE models can be found in the surveys done by Gunning and Keyzer 
(1995), and Ginsburgh and Keyzer (1997). 
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Among several components, closure in the models plays a critical role as it 
allows us to distinguish among different types of CGE models. Different types of 
closure give different results even when the structures of the two models are the same. 
In the neo-classical models, the closure specifies that aggregate investment is 
determined by aggregate saving, which is in turn determined endogenously through a 
fixed savings rate out of the after-tax income and government deficit. In the Johansen 
model, the closure specifies that aggregate investment is fixed exogenously and the 
savings rate is assumed to adjust in order to generate the required savings. Johansen 
(1974) argues that fiscal and monetary policies need to ensure that the generated 
savings will equal investment. 
In a Keynesian framework, wage is usually set as the numeraire (also common 
in structuralist model, see Taylor, 1983, 1990). Investment is fixed, but labor supply is 
assumed to be endogenous. The adjustment in real wages is the macro equilibrating 
mechanism, while aggregate price is the equilibrating variable. If investment 
increases, savings must increase through rising income, which requires increased 
employment and output by way of falling real wages. To reach an equilibrium point, 
the latter requires an increase in the aggregate price. It is through this mechanism that 
the Keynesian multiplier is derived: an increase in investment yields a new 
equilibrium level of output, which equals to the multiplier [1/(1-mpc)] times the 
investment increase.  The model yields the same results if price level is chosen as the 
numeraire (wages become the macro equilibrating variable). The equilibrating 
mechanism in this case is as follows: real wages will adjust to create the employment 
necessary to generate income, the level of which will ensure that savings are equal to 
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investment. 
Another type of Keynesian closure is where the price level is set as the 
numeraire and real wages are fixed. Labor supply is set free, so employment is not 
fixed. In contrast to the earlier Keynes specification, firms here are not in the demand 
curves for labor.  A labor distortion parameter is hence introduced. This parameter 
measures the degree to which wages deviate from the marginal product of labor, and it 
will adjust until firms are induced to hire labor at fixed wages necessary to generate 
the income that will produce savings equals to investment. 
In interpreting the distortion parameter, Barro and Grossman (1976) argued 
that since product and labor markets are out of equilibrium, firms are forced off their 
labor demand curves. The distortion parameter measures how far off they are. Another 
interpretation by Malinvaud (1977) emphasizes that firms are demand-constrained and 
rationed in the product market, and the distortion parameter measures the degree of 
this rationing. Either way, the equilibrating mechanism will be the same, i.e., 
employment is demand-determined, Keynesian multiplier is at work, and real wages 
remain constant. 
While comprehensive and based on a robust economic theory, there is one important 
component missing from CGE models, i.e., the financial sector. Yet, irrespective of 
the economic system adopted, the role of the financial sector in most countries around 
the world is so great, especially in the post-liberalization period, that all aspects of the 
economy are directly and indirectly affected by the dynamics of this sector. When a 
fairly detailed financial module is incorporated into CGE, the simulation results of any 
shock are likely to be different than those generated by CGE models without a 
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financial module. The distinction between CGE with and without a financial module 
can be better explained by their respective simulation results when a particular shock 
is imposed in both models. In this chapter, I will do precisely that by analyzing the 
case of an emerging market economy – Indonesia. 
Thissen (1999) provided an overview of financial CGE (hereafter ‘FCGE’) 
models. He shows the superiority of FCGE over standard CGE models in analyzing 
the stabilization and structural adjustment (SSA) programs advocated by the World 
Bank and the IMF in the 1980s. He argues that CGE models are inadequate to analyze 
the interactions between the real sector and the financial sector, resulting in inaccurate 
conclusions. Robinson (1991) surveyed FCGE models by emphasizing the role of 
loanable funds in micro and macro CGE models. 
Despite their superiority, FCGE models also have some limitations. Thissen 
(1999) identified the following: (1) the difficulty to acquire financial data, especially 
different types of financial assets held by different agents; (2) the interactions within 
the financial sector as well as between the financial and real sector are often 
simplified; and (3) the parameters may need to be guesstimated, adopted from other 
studies, or assumed, due to the lack of readily available data. 
Goodhart, Sunirand and Tsomocos (2004, 2005) emphasize the modeling of 
international financial flows and its effects, and disaggregate net investments by type 
of investor, banks, firms and the rest of the world. They also take into account the 
possibility of default to depict a financial fragility condition. Maldonado, Tourinho 
and Valli (2007) provide another example of an FCGE model where foreign capital 
flows are treated endogenously. Using the case of Brazil, they link capital flows with 
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the expected rate of loss of foreign reserves. Simulating the model for the case of 
Brazil joining a free trade agreement (FTA) as part of the trade policy, they conclude 
that the impact is significantly larger than without financial flows precisely because 
the financial flows amplify the impact of the policy. 
Azis (2000a, 2000b) used an FCGE model to analyze the impact of the Asian 
financial crisis in 1997 on a set of social variables. By detailing the intricate 
mechanisms within the product and factor markets, and linking them with the financial 
market, he highlighted the role of real wages where urban households suffered more 
than rural households. In his subsequent and related work (Azis, 2001 and 2002), he 
used this structure to explain the phenomenon of reverse migration (from urban to 
rural). One of the key findings of his work is that the financial sector can play a 
significant role in affecting income distribution between different households. By 
adding a poverty module, he was also able to link the financial crisis with the trend of 
poverty where the poverty line and the income of poor households (i.e., the two 
determining variables in poverty measure) are endogenous. 
Morley, Pineiro and Robinson (2011) developed a dynamic real-financial CGE 
model for Honduras. The key feature of their model is the incorporation of working 
capital as an additional factor of production, complementary to physical capital. This 
is considered to be important for short-run macro and trade policy analysis. Based on 
SAM, the model is recursive dynamic with short-run unemployment, where minimum 
wage is fixed and informal sector is treated explicitly.  With the treatment of working 
capital, they examine the impact of monetary shocks that affect the supply of credit on 
the balance of payments, employment, and real income. 
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The use of flow and stock data is another important issue in FCGE modeling. 
Most data are usually denominated in flows, but models that allow for complete 
portfolio restructuring are preferred, in which both the stock and flow data are used 
simultaneously. An example of such models, also used in this chapter, is the portfolio 
model of Tobin (1967). Thorbecke (1991) is among those who used Tobin’s portfolio 
model to analyze various SSA policy scenarios in the case of Indonesia. 
In terms of the time dimension, CGE and FCGE models are generally suitable for 
analyzing medium-run repercussions of policy changes. The extent of model 
simulations should be long enough to allow for prices to adjust but short enough to 
assume that the model parameters are stable. Some also tried to construct dynamic 
CGE models to address various long-term issues ranging from long-term growth to 
environmental problems such as climate change. The dynamic models simulate the 
economic equilibrium for several successive moments in time, which are linked 
recursively though the trajectories of the state variables (see Rutherford and Tarr, 
2005; Azis, 2009). 
The model used by Morley, Pineiro and Robinson (2011) is another example of a 
dynamic CGE model with the financial sector. It is recursive dynamic, solved in two 
stages. First, the model determines a within-period equilibrium, given parameters and 
exogenous variables, then some parameters and exogenous variables are allowed to 
change over time. The model contains transition equations that determine how the 
exogenous variables and parameters relate to past solution values for particular 
endogenous variables. In some cases, these variables are assumed to grow according 
to trends. These transition equations provide values for all exogenous variables and 
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parameters for the next period for the static CGE model, which is then updated and 
solved for a new within-period equilibrium. In essence, they used the model to solve 
forward in a dynamically recursive fashion, with each static solution depending only 
on current and past values of variables and parameters. What is important to note 
about this feature is that the behavior of agents is based on historical information and 
adaptive expectations. It does not need to assume that agents have knowledge of the 
future. As in most dynamic models, the variables and parameters used as linkages 
between periods are the aggregate capital stock, exogenously determined population, 
domestic labor force, supply of working capital, factor productivity, export and import 
prices, export demand, tariff rates, and transfers to and from the rest of the world. 
 
 
1.3. Methodology 
1.3.1. The Dataset of The CGE Model: Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) 
The Computable General Equilibrium model is descendant from the input-
output (I-O) model pioneered by Wassily Leontief. The CGE model is based on the 
SAM dataset that includes the I-O model as a production sector. SAM is an integrated 
dataset consisting of national accounts, balance of payments, government budget, 
input-output table, and socio-economic surveys.  SAM consists of multiple 
production sectors, multiple factors, and multiple institutions in matrix form. Each 
account interacts with the others in a circular fashion, providing a comprehensively 
detailed and quantified description of an economy. The SAM provides snapshots of 
the economy at a single point in time, and each cell of the matrix represents the value 
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of each transaction. There are five steps that form each cycle (see Figure 1.2): (1) 
Production activities captured in the I-O table generate value added  – labor and 
capital – as factor income from the production activities; (2) factor income is 
distributed to the institutional sectors, which decide income distribution among 
households; (3) after paying taxes and transferring the income within different 
institutions; (4) the income is used by each institution to consume commodities from 
the production sectors while excess income is saved; and (5) this consumption pattern 
takes into account production activities affecting the level of output, export, and 
import. The new level of production activities generates a new level of value added 
and so forth. This circular flow represents the interdependency within/among 
production activities, production factors, income distribution, consumption, and 
transfer activities. 
 
Figure 1.2. Structure of Social Accounting Matrix and Its Circular System. 
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The interactions are captured in multipliers (𝑀!"#)  calculated by the following:1 
 y x 
y 𝑫𝒚𝒚 𝑫𝒚𝒙 
y=f(x,y), where y is a set of endogenous variables and x is a set of exogenous 
variables. 
dy =  [𝐼 − 𝐷! ∗ 𝐹 𝑥,𝑦 ]!!𝐷!*  𝐹 𝑥,𝑦   dx 
=    [𝐼 − 𝐷!!]!!𝐷!"  dx 
dy =  𝑀!"#∆𝑥 
Any change in the exogenous variable (∆𝑥) will alter the endogenous variable y by 𝑀!"#. 
As a data system, however, SAM has some limitations in evaluating the 
impacts of the changes in one part of the economy on the rest because SAM as a data 
system assumes excess capacity, perfect elastic supply, linearity and no substitution 
effect. SAM also does not take into account behavioral features, and does not contain 
prices that play an important role as incentives in an economy. In other words, in 
SAM, there is no automatic partition of the transactions into the price and quantity. 
When there is a change, either from exogenous shock or endogenous change in 
demand and supply, the structure decides the magnitude of the change represented by 
the change in quantities but not in the change of prices. Although SAM is useful and 
comprehensive as a data system and modeling tool, a further extension is needed from 
the modeling point of view. One such extension is to endogenize the prices, to capture 
some optimizing behavior of different agents, and to allow the presence of excess 
capacity, different technology and substitution. This is where the computable general 
                                                
1 From Robinson, S., and Roland-Holst D.W., (1998)  
2 The values of excess market demands equals the values of excess market supplies  
3 Sherman Robinson, David W. Roland-Holst, Macroeconomic structure and computable 
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equilibrium (CGE) model is distinguished from the dataset as a model. 
 
1.3.2. The CGE model 
The CGE model is based on the SAM dataset with prices assigned an 
endogenous role.  When economic agents meet in the market, endogenous prices 
arise in the system that satisfy Walras’ law.2 CGE or Jacobian multipliers can show 
the difference between SAM as a data system and the CGE model. 
 
CGE or Jacobian multipliers: 
 y Z x 
Y 𝑫𝒚𝒚 𝑫𝒚𝒛 𝑫𝒚𝒙 
Z 𝑫𝒛𝒚 𝑫𝒛𝒛 𝑫𝒛𝒙 
 
With the endogenous prices, the following system applies to the CGE framework. 
y=J(x,y,z), where y (quantity) and z (price) are both endogenous, and x is a vector of 
exogenous variables. A Jacobian multiplier can be derived:3 
dy =  [𝐼 − 𝐷!! + 𝐷!"(𝐼 − 𝐷!!)!!𝐷!"]!! 𝐷!" + 𝐷!" 𝐼 − 𝐷!! !!𝐷!" 𝑑𝑥 ∗ 𝐽(𝑥,𝑦)]!! 
=𝑀!!"#∆𝑥 
dz =  𝑀!!"#∆𝑥 
The Jacobian multiplier (MzCGE and MyCGE) captures the equilibrium 
dependence of the endogenous variables on one another as well as on exogenous 
                                                
2 The values of excess market demands equals the values of excess market supplies  
3 Sherman Robinson, David W. Roland-Holst, Macroeconomic structure and computable 
general equilibrium models, Journal of Policy Modeling, Volume 10, Issue 3, Autumn 1988, 
pp. 353-375. 
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shock. If the three components (Dyz, Dzz and Dzy ) in CGE are set to zero, then the 
above Jacobian multiplier becomes the SAM multiplier (Msam). The SAM multiplier 
does not include prices, whereas the Jacobian multiplier takes prices in the system into 
account. The off-diagonal elements (Dyz, Dzy) denote linkages with prices. Dzz reflects 
the price interaction in the system, e.g., a policy lowering prices of some upstream 
industries has a favorable effect on the prices of some downstream industries. Hence, 
while the elements in the SAM multiplier matrix are positive numbers, the elements in 
the Jacobian have negative values reflecting the changes in prices. For example, 
demand increase for food processing industry will have a favorable impact on some 
agriculture sectors, which generates a positive multiplier; however, the increasing 
demand in agriculture products may have a negative impact on food processing 
because it raises prices of the forward industry's input market, which gives the 
multipliers negative values. Therefore, while the SAM multiplier results from an 
assumption of the excess demand, the Jacobian multiplier is adjusted according to 
price changes that extinguish the excess demand. 
The CGE model is a deterministic model, not stochastic like most econometric 
models. It calibrates parameters and consists of a set of simultaneous equations. Thus, 
the CGE model has no pre-determined objective functions, while econometric models 
allow the error term (residual).  Instead, the CGE model contains a set of equations 
that are numerically solvable and facilitate the ability of economic agents to find the 
best solutions given various macro and accounting constraints: the budget constraints 
of households and governments, the balance between trade balances, and the balance 
of payments. The CGE model is structured by equation blocks containing 
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characteristics of the economy: (1) production block; (2) price block; (3) income 
block; (4) expenditure block; (5) market clearing block; (6) GDP & utility block; (7) 
distortion block; (8) subsidy block; and (9) transfer block.  Each block contains a set 
of corresponding equations. These blocks will be explained in detail in the FCGE 
model section. 
The CGE model consists only of real sector variables mentioned above as the 
SAM dataset deals with real sector savings and investment in one combined account. 
Treating each real sector saving and investment as one capital account misses one of 
the most dynamic sectors in the economy – namely, the financial sector. One might 
argue that in SAM, the relationship between real sector and financial sector 
performance might be somehow explained by using one capital account that contains 
gross savings and investment information of institutions. Given that real sector 
investment depends not only on economic agents’ own savings but also on bank loans 
and other financial assets, in reality, savings are not only spent on physical assets but 
also on financial assets. In particular, the source of funds for investments can also 
come from other sources, such as loans, deposits, and savings. Such transactions 
became very critical since the Financial Sector Liberalization (FSL) in the 1980s. In 
almost all developing countries, financial assets play an important role as an 
alternative source of financing for banks. As financial institutions and instruments 
have been developed, the asset markets have become a crucial means for the 
investments and savings of economic agents. Therefore, the transactions cannot be 
bundled into one account and cannot be analyzed in the same way that SAM treats the 
capital accounts. Without the financial sector in the system, the analysis may be 
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biased, especially for social issues such as poverty analysis. While every investment is 
assumed to generate employment in models without the financial sector, investment in 
financial assets may in fact not be generating employment.  Also, a financial boom 
may inflate asset prices and hence affect other social indicators – the poverty line and 
income – through inflation, while the effects maybe underestimated in the CGE model 
without this explicit channel. In addition, the absence of the financial sector excludes 
the fact that investors in financial assets are not poor households and hence income 
distribution may be worsened when financial assets are incorporated into their income. 
Given the critical role of the financial sector in modeling and in reality, the sector 
should be specified and allowed in the model to acquire accurate economy-wide 
impacts from any shocks or policies.  When it comes to policy analysis related to the 
financial sector, the CGE model without any financial accounts is not adequate. 
 
1.3.3. The Dataset of The FCGE Model: Financial Social Accounting Matrix 
(FSAM) 
As mentioned earlier, although the CGE model is useful to analyze economic 
impacts on the real sector, neglecting the behavior and specifications of the financial 
asset market can mislead the analysis of any economic impact. 
The Financial Computable General Equilibrium model introduces asset 
markets and loanable funds markets by disaggregating the capital account in SAM and 
incorporating the flow of funds (FOF) table into the dataset, which now becomes the 
Financial Social Accounting Matrix (FSAM). The FOF contains most flows of 
investments and savings occurring from simultaneous decisions of economic agents, 
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which allows us to track where the different assets of various institutions are being 
spent and used. Based on the FOF, the savings and investments in the capital account 
of SAM are disintegrated into investments for the real sector (investment), 
investments for the financial sector (assets), savings from the real sector (savings), and 
savings from the financial sector (liability), (see Figure 1.3).  In SAM with the FOF, 
thus, it can be elaborated that saving consists of saving and wealth, while total 
investment consists of physical investment and financial investment. 
 
 
Figure 1.3. Structure of FSAM Matrix and Its Circular System. 
 
 
Table 1.1. An Example of Balance Sheets Built According to FSAM 
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By incorporating FOF, the FSAM can elaborate information on the assets and 
liabilities of the financial sector as well as savings and investments of the real sector. 
The model based on the FSAM finally is able to specify the loanable funds markets 
with a variety of different assets, such as currency, demand deposits, saving deposits, 
time deposits, central bank certificates, government debt (bonds), other long-term 
securities, short-term securities, working capital credit, investment credit, 
consumption credit, non-bank credit, trade credit, equity and shares, and insurance 
pension fund reserves. This information appears to be the balance of payment for each 
institution as shown in Table 1. FSAM can provide a consistent and coherent 
statistical framework for both the real and financial sides of the economy.  Hence, 
whereas most macro-econometric models imperfectly specify flows of income among 
agents, the FCGE gives a comprehensive and detailed quantified description of the 
macro-economic and financial interrelations by linking the real sector, the social 
sector, and the financial sector. 
 
1.3.4. The FCGE model 
The FCGE model takes into account endogenous prices in the system like the 
CGE model. In addition to the prices in the real sector, the FCGE model includes 
financial asset prices, allowing us to analyze the impact associated with asset prices, 
such as price bubbles, which precluded many past crises. 
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Figure 1.3. Interrelationship among the blocks in the FCGE Model 
 
Table 1.2. Variables in Each Block in CGE and FCGE Models 
(Social indicators written in bold) 
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With detailed information on the financial activities of each institution, the 
FCGE model is structured both by CGE blocks containing real sector variables (1 to 9) 
and by FCGE blocks containing financial sector variables (10 and 11): (1) production 
block; (2) price block; (3) income block; (4) expenditure block; (5) market clearing 
block; (6) GDP and utility block; (7) distortion block; (8) subsidy block; (9) transfer 
block; (10) financial block; and (11) currency and demand deposit block as shown in 
Table 1.2. Each block includes a set of equations and its corresponding variables. The 
production block contains export (E), import (M), factor demand (FACDEM), supply 
(Q), value added (VA), intermediate inputs (INTM), and taxes. The price block 
consists of each price of the production variables and price index (PINDEX). The 
income block has variables and equations for factor income (YF) and total income 
(INC) after transfers. The expenditure blocks are for the relationships among 
consumption (CD, GD), saving (SAV), foreign saving (FSAV), investment (INVEST), 
expenditures (EXP), investment demand (ID), and exchange rate (EXR). The 
unemployment variable (UEMP) is in the market-clearing block. GDP and utility 
blocks contain variables and equations regarding yield GDP and RGDP. The distortion 
block is for tariffs (TARIFF), indirect taxes (IDTAX), and imperfect competition 
(IMPERFECT). The subsidy block contains subsidies to export, import, and 
households given by government. Transfer variables and equations are included in the 
transfer block. Government transfers (GTRAN) is included in income transfers 
(ITRAN). Financial blocks show the relations through the equations for financial 
assets (Asset, AssetSLag, and AssetS), liabilities (Liab, LiabSlag, and LiabS) and 
corresponding financial returns (RN and AvgRN). The money demand (MD) of 
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institutions, consisting of currency and demand deposit, is included in the currency 
and demand deposit block. All blocks dynamically interact with each other in the 
FCGE model. Especially, (10) financial block and (11) currency and demand block 
only exist in the FCGE model, taking into account the transactions from FOF 
information. The connections between real sector blocks (1 to 9) and financial sector 
blocks (10 to 11) represent the interaction between real and financial sectors in an 
economy. In the income block of the FCGE model, financial income – defined as 
return (RN) multiplied by financial asset (Assets) – is added to the total income (INC). 
As part of the income (INC) of each institution, any changes in the financial sector 
will alter financial income, resulting in changes in total income. Also, part of the 
investment originally intended for financial sector (Asset) can be used for real sector 
investment (INVEST) – secondary investment channel. The increase of financial 
wealth therefore can lead to real sector investment increases in the real sector. In 
addition, money demand (MD) of the economic agents as part of financial assets plays 
an important role in the economy. Affected by income and interest rates, the money 
demand also subsequently affects the income of the institutions through changing 
financial return (RN) and asset composition, affecting consumption (CD) and 
production activities sequentially, i.e., central bank’s income. Furthermore, the FCGE 
model incorporates behavioral aspects associated with the investment of each 
institution in financial assets. Economic agents’ decisions as to how much to invest in 
which financial assets affects their wealth and thus the entire economy. The decision 
criteria whereby economic agents allocate their wealth (money) to various financial 
assets, in particular, are essential to the income of households, as well as profits of 
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firms and the government. Furthermore, the criteria can often be influenced by shocks 
or policies. Although the FCGE model is a bridge between the real sector and the 
financial sector, the model itself does not provide a complete explanation of the actual 
behavior of economic agents in allocating their wealth in financial assets. The FCGE 
used in this thesis takes into account Tobin’s theory to incorporate the behaviors of 
institutions into financial asset allocation. In this model, only the allocation theory for 
rural households is applied. 
According to Tobin, the decisions of economic agents or investors depend not 
only on the relative returns on financial assets but also on risk factors in investing the 
financial assets. In other words, the risk factors involved in possessing the asset 
influence investors' decisions. Tobin’s theory captures both criteria as follows: 𝑔ℎ1!!1− 𝑔ℎ1!! = 𝑝ℎ𝑖ℎ1!! ∗ ( 1+ 𝑅𝑁𝐷𝑃1+ 𝑅𝑁𝑁𝐷𝑃)!"#!!!! 𝑔ℎ1!! is an allocation variable as to how much rural households allocate their money 
to demand deposit.  𝑝ℎ𝑖ℎ1!! and 𝑒𝑠𝑝ℎ1!! are risk parameters. RNDP is the return 
on demand deposit, and RNNDP is the return on other assets excluding demand 
deposit. 𝑒𝑠𝑝ℎ1!! is a risk that is embeded in the return on the asset, in this case 
demand deposit; whereas 𝑝ℎ𝑖ℎ1!!  is a external risk that exists other than the 
financial asset, i.e., regulations, and financial crises from other countries. If there is a 
case of no risk in the financial asset, then the risk parameter, esph1rh, is set to zero, 
leaving the right-hand side  one. In reality, however, other external inflences exist to 
keep the investors from putting money in demand deposit accounts.  𝑝ℎ𝑖ℎ1!! 
reflects this external risk. 
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The model with detailed information about the financial assets and liabilities of 
institutions, thus, is empirically more reliable. Furthermore, given the interplay 
between the real sector and the financial sector in reality, any policy and/or impact 
analysis that does not consider the impact of the financial sector will be misleading. 
Therefore, especially for policy analysis with financial variables, a financial CGE 
model where the financial sector is specified in greater detail is preferable to a 
standard CGE model. 
 
1.3.5. Comparing The CGE and FCGE models4 
In the previous section, the presence of a financial block and demand deposit 
block distinguishes the FCGE model from the CGE model as shown in Table 1.2. This 
section articulates and compares the channels and their effects –Feature 1.1, Feature 
1.2, and Feature 1.3 – these effects distinguish the FCGE model from the CGE model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
4 See Appendix in Chapter 2 for the description of equations, variables, and parameters. 
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Figure 1.3. The Interrelationship Among the Variables in The CGE Model 
 
 
 
Figure 1.4. The Interrelationship Among The Variables in The FCGE Model5 
 
                                                
5 See Appendix I for the description of the variable names. 
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Feature 1.1. Quantity effect: total investment = total saving 
CGE:   𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇!" =  𝑆𝐴𝑉𝐼𝑁𝐺!" 
Total physical investment = Total saving from real sector 
 
FCGE: 𝑇𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇 = (𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑆!",!")!" + 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇!" 
Total investment = Total financial sector investment + Total real sector investment 
 
TSAVING= (𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑆!",!"!" )+ 𝑆𝐴𝑉𝐼𝑁𝐺!" 
Total saving = Total financial liability + Total real sector saving 
 𝑇𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇 = 𝑇𝑆𝐴𝑉𝐼𝑁𝐺 
 
 
Feature 1.1.1. Investment 
CGE: Physical investment alone 
• 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇 = 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆!,!"!"!            (Eq. 1) 
Total Physical Investment by all institutions 
•   𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆!,!"# = 𝑙𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑑𝑎0!,!"#$ ∗ 𝑉𝐴!!"#$%"!! ∗ 𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑅𝑁 !"#$%"!! ∗ 𝐸𝑋𝑅!"#$%"!!                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  (Eq. 2) 
Real sector investment by firms is affected by value added, interest rate, and exchange rate. avgRN 
is an average asset of the returns on 17 financial assets. VAi is the value added in sector i (output 
accelerator). EXR is the exchange rate, and AvgRN is the average return rate. 𝜆!! , 𝜆!!,𝜆!!, 𝜆!! are 
constant (positive, positive, negative and negative, respectively). 
 
FCGE: Physical + financial investment 
• 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝐴!" = 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆!,!"!            (Eq. 3) 
Total flow of physical investment by the institutions, which is the same as Eq. 1 
 
• 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝐴𝑆!" = 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝐴𝑆𝐿𝑎𝑔!" + 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝐴!"             (Eq. 4) 
Total physical investment at the end of period consists of the real sector investment at the 
beginning of period and the change between two periods. 
 
• 𝑇𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇 = ( (𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑆!",!")!" + 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝐴𝑆!")!"          (Eq. 5)        
Total investment that occurred both in the real and financial sector in an economy 
 
• 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆!,!"#$ = 𝑙𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑑𝑎0!,!"#$ ∗ 𝑉𝐴!!"!"#$!! ∗ 𝑎𝑣𝑔𝑅𝑁 !"#$%"!! ∗ 𝐸𝑋𝑅!"#$%"!!     
                                                                                                                                             
                                                                (Eq. 6) 
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In the CGE model, ‘investment’ means investment in the real sector or 
physical investment as shown in Eq. 1; however, in reality, economic agents invest not 
only in physical products such as land, building, and machines but also in financial 
instruments. In the FCGE model, investment (Eq. 5) includes financial investments, 
such as investment in stocks as well as physical investment. The total investment box 
in Figure 2 includes both. Both physical and financial assets consist of the stock at the 
beginning of the period and changes within the period, yielding a total stock value at 
the end of the period. Furthermore, the investment of firms (Eqs. 2 and 6) in both 
models depends on the value added (VA), average interest rate (AvgRN), and 
exchange rate (EXR). The average interest rate in the CGE model is an equilibrating 
factor to adjust the level of real sector investment of financial institutions, whereas the 
AvgRN in the FCGE model is an average weighted return on all financial assets (Eq. 
25). The domestic investment depends on the economic cycle – value added –
 positively, interest rate negatively, and exchange rate negatively. If EXR collapses, as 
it often does during crises, institutions with high leverage on short-term and un-hedged 
foreign debt experience magnified debt burdens. Also, since the returns are 
endogenously weighted in the FCGE model, any changes either from real or financial 
sectors in the economy can alter the rates. The interaction through returns will be 
explained in detail in Feature 1.2. 
 
Feature 1.1.2. Savings 
CGE: Saving solely from real sector activities 
•   𝑆𝐴𝑉!"# = 𝐼𝑁𝐶!"# − 𝐸𝑋𝑃!"#         (Eq. 7) 
Saving by domestic institutions is their income after taking into account expenditures 
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such as consumptions and transfers. 
 
• 𝐹𝑆𝐴𝑉 ∗ 𝐸𝑋𝑅 = 𝑆𝐴𝑉!"!"            (Eq. 8) 
Foreign saving is in domestic currency  by taking into account exchange rate. 
 
•   𝑆𝐴𝑉!" = 𝑆𝐴𝑉!" + 𝑆𝐴𝑉!"       (Eq. 9) 
Total saving is the saving from real sector activities of all institutions. 
FCGE: Savings from real sector activities + Financial liability 
• 𝑊𝐸𝐴𝐿𝐹!" = 𝑆𝐴𝑉!"          (Eq. 10) 
WEALF is a different name for saving in the FCGE model 
 
• 𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ!" = 𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝐿𝑎𝑔!" +𝑊𝐸𝐴𝐿𝐹!"     (Eq. 11) 
Real sector saving at the end of period equals the saving at the beginning of period 
plus the changes between the two periods. 
 
• 𝐹𝑆𝐴𝑉 ∗ 𝐸𝑋𝑅 = 𝑆𝐴𝑉!"!"  
 
• 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑆!",!" = 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑆𝐿𝑎𝑔!!,!" + 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏!",!"     (Eq. 12) 
Financial liability at the end of period is the liability at the beginning of period plus the 
changes between the two periods. 
 
• TSAVING= (𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑆!",!"!" ) +𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ!"     (Eq. 14) 
Total saving is the financial liability and saving from real sector activities at the end of      
period. 
 
In the CGE model, savings indicate the remaining income after spending 
through transfers and consumption (Eq. 7). Savings (TSAVING) in the FCGE model, 
however, includes not only the savings from real sector activities (𝑊𝐸𝐴𝐿𝐹!") but also 
savings from financial sector activities, such as debt and issued bonds. These savings 
are from the liabilities on the balance sheet of an economy (Eq. 12). Total savings in 
the FCGE model, thus, consist of the savings at the beginning of 
period  ( (𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑆!",!"!" )) and the changes within the period (𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ!"), yielding the 
total saving at the end of period (Eq. 14). 
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Feature 1.1.3. Money demand 
CGE: Money demand channel does not exist. 
FCGE: Money demand is a part of financial assets. 
• 𝑀𝐷!" = 𝑎𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎1!" ∗ 𝐼𝑁𝐶!"!"#!!!!" ∗ (𝑟𝑛𝑣1!"!!"#!!!!")     (Eq. 15) 
The money demand is a function of income and average interest rate on non-money assets. 
 
• 𝑟𝑛𝑣1!" = ( (𝑟𝑛!"#$% ∗ 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑆𝐿𝑎𝑔!"#$%,!"!"#!" ))/( 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑆𝐿𝑎𝑔!"#$%,!"!"#$% ) 
                                                                (Eq. 16) 
The average interest rate used in the money demand function equals interest rates on non-
money demand. 
• 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑆𝐿𝑎𝑔!"#$,!" = 𝑚𝑑𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒!"#$,!" ∗𝑀𝐷!"       (Eq. 17) 
Money demand is a part of the financial assets of the institutions. 
 
• 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑆!",!"#$ = 𝑚𝑑𝑠ℎ𝑟!",!"#$ ∗ ( 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑆!"#$,!"!!"! )    (Eq. 18) 
Money demand is a part of the financial liability of the institutions. 
 
Money demand in reality is the demand for currency and demand deposit, and 
is part of financial assets; however, the money demand in the CGE model can only be 
implicitly assumed by the trend of the interest rates and output. If interest rates 
increase, the money demand in the CGE model is assumed to lower. Also, if output 
increases, the money demand in the CGE model is assumed to increase; however the 
model does not yield money demand or anything associated with the demand of the 
economy since there is no such equation or data for the analysis in the model. In the 
FCGE model, in contrast, money demand, as part of financial assets, is explicitly 
expressed as a function of income and the average interest rate (Eq. 15). Therefore, 
changes in the demand for money (MD) due to changes in income and/or interest rates 
will form a new financial asset composition of institutions (Eq. 17, and see Figure1.4). 
The new compositions of assets determine the financial asset size and, in turn, the 
level of both financial and real investment in the economy. The change in money 
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demand (MD) will also affect the average interest rate (AvgRN) through the changed 
interest rate on money demand (Eq. 16). In the CGE model, however, such a money 
demand equation is not specified to analyze the impact of any policy on money 
demand and its subsequent effect in the economy as shown in Figure 1.3. 
Without the financial sector, therefore, investment in the CGE model – solely 
real sector investment – will generate employment, but the resulting number can be 
overestimated because when excess savings are spent on financial assets, the 
employment elasticity tends to be lower than if the savings are invested in the real 
sector. Therefore, any event in real sector investment (FixA) will affect financial 
assets (Asset) and vice versa through changes in the amount of investment as well as 
the prices (returns). 
 
Feature 1.1.4. Secondary Investment 
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• (𝐹𝑖𝑥𝐴!"#$!"#$ )   = (𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆!,!"#$)!,!"#$  + (𝑗𝑘1!"#$ ∗ ( ( 𝑅𝑁𝑆𝐸𝐶. 𝐿 − 𝑅𝑁𝑆𝐸𝐶0 ∗ 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡!""#$,!"#$)!""#$,!"#$!"#$  + ( 𝑅𝑁𝐶𝑅. 𝐿 − 𝑅𝑁𝐶𝑅0 ∗ 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡!"!",!"#$)!"#$,!"#$  + ( 𝑅𝑁𝐸𝑄. 𝐿 − 𝑅𝑁𝐸𝑄0 ∗ 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡!"#$,!"#$)!"#$,!"#$ ))     (Eq. 19) 
Real sector investments of the firms consist of the investment originally intended for the real sector, 
and the real sector investment apportioned from financial sector investment – secondary 
investment. 
 
• (𝐹𝑖𝑥𝐴𝑁0!"#$!"#$ )   = (𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆0!,!"#$)!,!"#$  + (𝑗𝑘10!"#$ ∗ ( ( 𝑅𝑁𝑆𝐸𝐶. 𝐿 − 𝑅𝑁𝑆𝐸𝐶0 ∗ 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡0!""#$,!"#!)!""#$,!"#$!"#$  + ( 𝑅𝑁𝐶𝑅. 𝐿 − 𝑅𝑁𝐶𝑅0 ∗ 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡0!"#$,!"#$)!"#$,!"#$  + ( 𝑅𝑁𝐸𝑄. 𝐿 − 𝑅𝑁𝐸𝑄0 ∗ 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡0!"#$,!"#$)!"#$,!"#$ ))    (Eq. 20) 
The name of the variable representing EQ is FixAN. 
 
• (𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡!",!"#$!",!"#$ )   = (𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡!",!"#$) − 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝐴𝑁 + (𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆!,!"#$)!,!"#$!",!"#$  
(Eq. 21) 
The financial investment of a firm equals the investment originally intended for the financial sector 
minus the amount of real sector investment apportioned from the financial sector investment. 
 
• 
!"!!"#$!!!"!!"#$!"#$   = 𝑝𝑎𝑗𝑘1 ∗ ( !!!"#!!!!""#!)!"#$!     (Eq. 22) 
The secondary investment depends on the real sector interest rates represented by the interest rates 
on credit assets and returns from financial investment. The amount of the real sector investment is 
negatively associated with the credit interest rate and interest rates for financial assets. 
 
• (𝑗𝑘0!"#$!"#$ )   =(!""#$!!""#$,!"#$)!""#$,!"#$ ! (!""#$!!"#$,!"#$)!"#$,!"#$ ! (!""#$!!"#$,!"#$)!"#$,!"#$(!""#$!!",!"#$)!",!"#$  (Eq. 23) 
The secondary investment is initially equivalent to the amount of liquid-able financial assets, such 
as security, credit and equity assets in the case of firms. The proportion of liquid financial assets to 
total financial assets affects the secondary investment. 
 
The parameter weighing how much the ratio of real sector to financial sector interest rate affects the 
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ratio of secondary to financial investment is as follows: 
• 𝑝𝑎𝑗𝑘1 = ( !"!.!!"#$!!!"!.!!"#$!"#$ ) ∗ (!!!""#!.!!!!"#!.! )!"#$!       (Eq. 24) 
 
Total real and financial sector investment is: 
 
• 𝑇𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇!" = (𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑆!",!")!" + 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝐴𝑆!" 
 
In reality, the interaction between the financial sector and real sector can occur 
through apportioning the financial assets between real and financial sector investment 
as well as through transferring the earnings from financial investments. For example, 
someone's stock purchase can allow the firm to have more capital to invest in the real 
sector either to expand the business or to open a new one. Thus, while real sector 
investment is solely intended for the real sector and therefore remains in the real 
sector, financial investment can be divided into two types: (1) financial investment 
remaining in the financial sector 
( (𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡!",!"#$)− 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝐴𝑁 + (𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆!,!"#$)!,!"#$!",!"#$ ) , and (2) real sector 
investment, which is apportioned from the financial investment: ( (𝑗𝑘1!"#$ ∗!"#$( ( 𝑅𝑁𝑆𝐸𝐶. 𝐿 − 𝑅𝑁𝑆𝐸𝐶0 ∗ 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡!""#$,!"#$)!""#$,!"#$ + ( 𝑅𝑁𝐶𝑅. 𝐿 −!"#$,!"#$𝑅𝑁𝐶𝑅0 ∗ 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡!"#$,!"#$)+ ( 𝑅𝑁𝐸𝑄. 𝐿 − 𝑅𝑁𝐸𝑄0 ∗!"#$,!"#!𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡!"#$,!"#$))))  )). Assuming that 30% of the entire investment in the economy is 
invested in the real sector and the remainder in the financial sector, some of the 
financial investment can be allocated to real sectors, depending on the investment 
decision of economic agents. The decision can depend on the composition of the 
financial assets: whether it is liquid-able or not, and the earning difference between 
real and financial investments (Eqs. 22 and 23). Thus, an increase in financial 
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investment can also help expand real sector investment although the direct and indirect 
contribution of this are likely less than direct investment in the real sector (Eq. 19). 
In order to incorporate this mechanism into the model, the equations in the 
financial block of the FCGE model were added and modified. In the model, a variable 
(jk1) decides the proportion of financial investment between secondary investment 
and the investment remaining in financial sector. The allocation depends on the type 
of asset –whether liquid-able or not – and the relative interest rates of the real (RNCR) 
and the financial sectors (RNNCR). 
 
Feature 1.2. Price Effect 
Feature 1.2.1.  Interest Rate and Financial Returns 
CGE: An endogenous variable 
• AvgRN0=interest rate 
• 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆!,!"# = 𝑙𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑑𝑎0!,!"# ∗ 𝑉𝐴!!"#$%"!! ∗ 𝑎𝑣𝑔𝑅𝑁 !"#$%"!! ∗ 𝐸𝑋𝑅!"#$%"!! (Eq. 2) 
Real sector investment by financial institutions affected by value added, interest rate, and exchange 
rate. AvgRN is an average asset of the returns on 17 financial assets. 
 
FCGE: A set of endogenous variables for each financial asset 
PARAMETER RN0(as) interest rate 
FINA1        0.0338         Government’s Forex Reserves 
FINA2        0.0001         Currency 
FINA3        0.0342         Demand deposit 
FINA4        0.0432  Saving deposit 
FINA5        0.0813  Time deposit 
FINA6        0.0918  Central Bank Certificate (SBI) 
FINA7        0.0909  Government Bonds 
FINA8        0.1259  Other Long-term Securities 
FINA9        0.0812  Short-term Securities 
FINA10       0.1405  Working Capital Credit 
FINA11       0.1420  Investment Credit 
FINA12       0.1628  Consumption Credit 
FINA13       0.1942  Non-bank Credit 
FINA14       0.0227  Trade Credit 
FINA15       0.1422  Equity & Share 
FINA16       0.1058  Insurance, Pension Fund Reserves 
FINA17       0.0995  Others 
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• 𝑎𝑣𝑔𝑅𝑁 = !"!"∗!"!" !""#$%&'(!",!"!""#$%&'(!",!"!"!"           (Eq. 25) 
The return on total financial asset 
 
•   𝑅𝑁𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒!" = !"!"#$∗!""#$%&'(!"#$,!"!"#$ (!"!"#$!"!!"#$ ∗!""#$%&'(!"#$,!"!)       (Eq. 26) 
Asset share of institutions 
 
• 𝑟𝑛𝑎1!" = ( (𝑟𝑛!"#$ ∗ 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑆𝐿𝑎𝑔!"#$,!"!"#$ ))/( 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑆𝐿𝑎𝑔!"#$,!"!"#$ )     (Eq. 27) 
 
The return on demand deposit; currency and demand deposit 
 
• 𝑟𝑛𝑎2!" = ( (𝑟𝑛!"#$ ∗ 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑆𝐿𝑎𝑔!"#$,!"!"#$ ))/( 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑆𝐿𝑎𝑔!"#$,!"!"#$ )     (Eq. 28) 
The return on government bond 
 
• 𝑟𝑛𝑎3!" = ( (𝑟𝑛!""#$ ∗ 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑆𝐿𝑎𝑔!""#$,!"!""#$ ))/( 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑆𝐿𝑎𝑔!""#$,!"!""#$ )  (Eq. 29) 
•  
The return on securities: short-term and other long-term securities 
• 𝑟𝑛𝑎4!" = ( (𝑟𝑛!"#$ ∗ 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑆𝐿𝑎𝑔!"#$,!"!"#$ ))/( 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑆𝐿𝑎𝑔!"#$,!"!"#$ )       (Eq. 30) 
The return on credit assets: working capital, investment, consumption, non-bank, and trade     
credits 
 
• 𝑟𝑛𝑎5!" = ( (𝑟𝑛!"#$ ∗ 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑆𝐿𝑎𝑔!"#$,!"!"#$ ))/( 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑆𝐿𝑎𝑔!"#$,!"!"#$ )           
(Eq. 31) 
The return on equity 
 
• 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆!,!"#$ = 𝑙𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑑𝑎0!,!"#$ ∗ 𝑉𝐴!!"#$%"!! ∗ 𝑎𝑣𝑔𝑅𝑁 !"#$%"!! ∗ 𝐸𝑋𝑅!"#$%"!!  (Eq. 6) 
 
In the CGE model, the interest rate exists as an equilibrating factor. It is the only 
interest rate in the model used to adjust the level of real sector investment of financial 
institutions (Eq. 2). In contrast, in the FCGE model, the interest rate is specified as a 
weighted variable where the weights depend on the changes in the asset values (Eq. 
25). The various initial interest rates (RN0(as)) for each financial asset are determined 
by the flow equilibrium in the lendable funds market. That is, the interest rates 
(AvgRN  and  RN) are endogenously determined along with changes of the financial 
asset values (Eqs. 27-31) given any shock (see AvgRN and RN in Figure 1.4). 
Therefore, the level of inflation in a standard CGE model without the financial sector 
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is likely to be underestimated as it is completely isolated from asset price increase 
(during a boom period) or decrease (during a crisis). Yet, the price level is the most 
critical factor in determining not only the aggregate level of the economy but more 
importantly social indicators such as the level of poverty (PL), income, and regional 
disparity (YDIST) (Figure 1.4). 
 
Feature 1.2.2. Exchange rate 
CGE & FCGE 
•   𝑃𝑀! = 𝑃𝑊𝑀! ∗ 𝐸𝑋𝑅 ∗ (1 + 𝑡𝑚! + 𝑡𝑡𝑓! − 𝑝𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑚!)               (Eq. 32) 
Domestic prices of import goods depend on the world prices of import goods, taxes, tariffs, 
subsidies, and exchange rate. 
 
•   𝑃𝐸! = (!"#!∗!"#)(!!!!"#$!)                 (Eq. 33) 
Domestic prices of exports depend on the world price of export goods, subsidies, and exchange 
rate. 
 
• 𝐹𝑆𝐴𝑉 ∗ 𝐸𝑋𝑅 = 𝑆𝐴𝑉!"!"                     (Eq. 8) 
Foreign saving in domestic currency value is the foreign saving in dollar value multiplied by 
exchange rate. 
 
• 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆!,!"#$ = 𝑙𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑑𝑎0!,!"#"$ ∗ 𝑉𝐴!!"#$%"!! ∗ 𝑎𝑣𝑔𝑅𝑁 !"#$%"!! ∗ 𝐸𝑋𝑅!"#$%"!!  
(Eq. 6) 
Real sector investment by firms depends also on exchange rate. 
 
The presence of financial markets in the FCGE model is critical in analyzing any 
changes in the exchange rate. The exchange rate plays an important role not only in 
export and import (Eqs. 32 and 33) but also in financial markets. For export-led 
countries such as those in East Asia, it plays a critical role in influencing the profit of 
firms, which in turn influence production and real sector investment. Although this 
effect can be analyzed through the investment equation (Eq. 6) in the CGE model, the 
balance sheet effect, which is highly associated with exchange rate, can only be 
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elaborated under the availability of information on the balance of payments of each 
institution. For example, the CGE model can show that firms’ investment is affected 
negatively by exchange rates as shown in Eq. 6. However, it does not elaborate how 
the negative effect is transmitted through the institution’s balance sheet, also shown in 
Figure 1.3. In the FCGE model, domestic investment is affected negatively by 
exchange rates through the balance sheet effect. When EXR is depreciated, the 
balance sheet of institutions – especially those highly leveraged in foreign currency – 
will be damaged. The debt denominated by foreign currency will be increased on the 
liability side of the institution. This magnified debt burden due to the depreciated 
exchange rate has a negative impact on investment decisions of the institution. Highly 
leveraged institutions tend to decrease investment during this period, and vice versa 
for the EXR appreciated case. The negative balance sheet effect that is due to the EXR 
depreciation will actually be analyzed through the changes in the composition of 
financial liability and assets as well as in its physical investment in the model. The 
changes in the composition of financial liability and assets can also have various 
impacts on the economy. Although the depreciated exchange rate can be helpful for 
export in the case of export-led countries, the decline in investment might be large 
enough to outweigh the export effect through the balance sheet effect. Although the 
CGE model can show the effect of the exchange rate on investment, the outcome 
under the absence of a specified balance sheet can be smaller than it is supposed to be. 
Thus, the impact of EXR depreciation or appreciation can be underestimated by 
excluding the financial markets because the impact reaches only the real economy 
through changes in the volume and price of exports and imports and changes in 
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physical investment. 
 
Feature 1.3. Distribution Effect (Income Distribution) 
CGE: Financial income does not exist in the model. 
• 𝐼𝑁𝐶!"# = (𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑖𝑛!"#,!! ∗ 𝑌𝐹!) + 𝐼𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁!"#,!"!!"!           (Eq. 34) 
Incomes of non-government institutions consist of their salary and income transfers. Return 
earnings are transferred to income. 
 
• 𝐼𝑁𝐶!"# = (𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑖𝑛!"#,!! ∗ 𝑌𝐹!) + 𝐼𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁!"#,!"!!"! + (𝑔𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑟!"# ∗ (𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑇𝐴𝑋!! +𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐼𝐹𝐹!)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        (Eq. 35) 
Income of government consists of factor income, income transfers, indirect taxes. Return earnings are 
transferred to income. 
 
FCGE: The earnings from financial activities (financial income) are included in the 
total income of each institution. 
• 𝐼𝑁𝐶!"# = (𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑖𝑛!"#,!! ∗ 𝑌𝐹!) + 𝐼𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁!"#,!"!!"! + 𝑨𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒕𝒂𝒔,𝒏𝒈𝒊 ∗ 𝑹𝑵𝒂𝒔𝒂𝒔  
(Eq. 36) 
• 𝐼𝑁𝐶!"# = (𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑖𝑛!"#,!! ∗ 𝑌𝐹!) + 𝐼𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁!"#,!"!!"! + (𝑔𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑟!"# ∗ (𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑇𝐴𝑋!! +𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐼𝐹𝐹!) + 𝑨𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒕𝒂𝒔,𝒈𝒊𝒏 ∗ 𝑹𝑵𝒂𝒔𝒂𝒔       (Eq. 37) 
• 𝑌𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝐿𝐻 = (!"#!!!!!!"#!!!!)(!"#!!!!!!"#!!!!)       (Eq. 38) 
• 𝑌𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑈 = (!"#!!!!!!"#!!!!)(!"#!!!!!!"#!!!!)       (Eq. 39) 
 
In the CGE model, the income is comprised of factor income and income transfers 
received from other institutions.  This does not include any financial income, which 
is financial asset multiplied by financial returns (Eq. 34). In the FCGE model, 
however, financial income should be part of the income of any economic agents given 
the availability of detailed information on who has which financial asset. As the 
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financial income is included in the income equation, the income is now affected by 
any changes in the financial sector (Eqs. 36 and 37). This, in turn, will cause a series 
of changes in both the real and financial sectors as the economic agents with new 
income levels will respond accordingly. The new income level that is due to the 
changes in the financial returns or the volume of financial assets will affect real sector 
variables, such as consumption, savings, investment, production, and price. All of 
these changes subsequently affect financial variables, including wealth, returns, and 
asset compositions, resulting in an amplified impact again on real sector variables. 
More importantly, it will affect social indicators, in particular, improving or worsening 
income and regional inequalities (Eqs. 38 and 39). The two models will, therefore, 
yield two different values of income distributions under the same shock. Subsequently, 
the impact of any shocks not only on the income distribution but also of income 
distribution on the economy will differ. This difference between the two income 
distributions in the CGE model and in the FCGE model given a shock will be 
demonstrated in the following section. The summary of the comparisons is provided in 
Table 1.3. 
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Table 1.3. Summary of Three Different Key Channels in CGE and FCGE models 
 
 
 
 
 
1.4. Analysis 
As shown in Table 1.4, four different scenarios are explored by using the CGE 
and FCGE models: three cases under fiscal expansionary policy – (1) government 
spending increased without source specification, (2) increased by 30% through tax, 
and (3) increased through government bonds; and (4) capital inflows increased by 
20%.  Exactly the same closures are applied to the four models.6 The scenario where 
the government increases the spending through government bonds is applied only to 
the FCGE model, as government bonds is one of the financial assets that does not exist 
in the CGE model. It is assumed that government increases the spending on 
agriculture, building, and trade sectors. These are the sectors that often involve either 
public projects or small-scale activities. Government in particular raises funds through 
increasing direct taxes on factor income, or through issuing more government bonds. 
                                                
6 See Appendix II. 
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In the case of increasing capital inflow, FSAV shock is used in which foreign saving is 
increased (see Figures 1.3 and 1.4). In this chapter, we compared each corresponding 
scenario from the CGE and FCGE as shown in Table 4: (Section 1.4.1) comparing the 
results from the CGE and FCGE models under the scenario where the government 
increases spending, though the source is not specified; (Section 1.4.2) comparing the 
results from the CGE and FCGE models under the scenario where the government 
increases the spending through tax under CGE model; (Section 1.4.3) comparing the 
results from the baseline economy and FCGE models under the scenario where the 
government increases spending through government bonds, and comparing results 
from the FCGE models under tax and under government bond issuance (GD); and 
(Section 1.4.4) comparing the results from the CGE and FCGE under the scenario 
where the economy experiences capital inflows. 
 
Table 1.4. Analysis Conducted in This Chapter7 
 
 
 
                                                
7 See Appendix II for closures used in each scenario. 
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In the FCGE case, we specifically distinguish household incomes from factor 
income and income generated through the return of financial assets (financial income). 
Such distinction is important in order to trace the sources of income. Even when the 
shock originates in the real sector, the resulting incomes from these three sources will 
not be the same. 
 
1.4.1. GD Increase Without A Specified Source 
 
Figure 1.5. Immediate Transmission Channels by GD Increase in CGE Model 
 
In the CGE model, as shown in Figure 1.5, the immediate transmission 
channels from GD that increased by 30% are as follows: (1) an increase in GD will 
immediately change the level of government’s expenditure (EXP), income (INC), and 
saving (SAV), resulting in a change in total saving (SAVING) in the economy; (2) an 
increase in GD will change real GDP (RGDP) as a component of RGDP;8 (3) an 
increase in GD will increase the demand for products, increasing supply (Q) and 
affecting price index (PINDEX).  In turn, changes in SAVING, RGDP, Q, and 
PINDEX affect the entire economy through various channels. For example, increased 
supply will also increase the demand for intermediate inputs (INTM), value added 
                                                
8              𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃 = (𝐶𝐷! + 𝐼𝐷! + 𝐺𝐷! + 𝐸!! − (1 − 𝑇𝑀𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐿0!) ∗𝑀!! )!  
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(VA), and factor demand (FACDEM). This, in turn, increases total real sector 
investment (INVEST), consumption (CD), and income (INC) of the agents; however, 
some transmission channels are limited in the CGE model, and they rely only on the 
interactions within SAM, not FSAM, implying that any dynamic interactions 
involving financial variables and equations are neglected. 
 
 
Figure 1.6. Immediate Transmission Channels by GD Increase in The FCGE Model 
 
In addition to the transmission mechanisms described above, in the FCGE 
model, the impact of increased GD is further extended (Figure 1.6). Asset and liability 
compositions of economic agents will be changed as real sector investment (INVEST 
or FixA) and saving (SAVING or Wealth) change. As part of asset and liability in the 
balance sheet, changes in the amount of FixA and Wealth will affect the financial 
investment behavior of agents. For example, investors can invest their extra wealth by 
purchasing more stocks and/or government bonds. This will change returns on those 
and other financial assets, and these earnings will be transmitted into income through 
                                                                                                                                       
RGDP is a function of consumption (CD), investment (ID), GD, export (E), import (M), and tariff and 
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the return transfer channel. Through the economy-wide impact, the new income 
distribution will also alter the consumption and saving pattern. 
 
 
Figure 1.7. Comparing the Results from CGE and FCGE Simulations of GD Increase 
 
As shown in Figure 1.7, under the fiscal expansionary scenario, the size of 
growth effect in the CGE model is smaller than that in the FCGE model. The growth 
would reflect the trend of other macro-economic variables, such as employment and 
investment. Although the investment of the private sector declines in both models, the 
fall in the FCGE is less than in the CGE model. The fall of investment is due partially 
to the crowding-out effect and the balance sheet effect as the exchange rate depreciates 
under this scenario (more depreciation causes less investment, see Eq. 6 in the 
previous section). While the exchange rate in the CGE model primarily affects export, 
                                                                                                                                       
trade and transportation margin (TMREAL). 
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import, and investment, in the FCGE model it goes further by affecting also the 
balance sheet and wealth of different agents. 
Using this channel, one can distinguish the sources of financing of increased 
government spending in more detail, including from government’s financial assets. 
For example, if the government issues bonds to finance the 30% increase in spending, 
this will appear in the liability side of the balance sheet of government (section 1.4.2). 
Alternatively, another source of financing may come from an increase in direct taxes 
as described in this section. 
 
1.4.2. GD Increase Through Tax 
 
 
Figure 1.8. Immediate Transmission Channels by GD Increase Through an Increase in 
Direct Tax in CGE Model 
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Figure 1.9. Immediate Transmission Channels by GD Increase Through an Increase in 
Direct Tax in CGE Model 
 
Government spending increases through taxes will affect the income of 
households (INC), changing the level of consumption (CD) and income distributions 
(YDIST). The negative effect of the income tax increase is directed to rich households 
because rich people, including the middle class, are those whose income is targeted for 
the tax collecting. This contributes to reducing the income gap between the poor and 
the rich in the CGE model, improving income inequalities as shown in Figure 1.8; 
however, in the FCGE model as shown in Figure 1.9, although it remains the same 
that the rich have to pay more taxes on their factor income than before, it will not be 
negative to their capital income (i.e., financial income) as much as the factor income,9 
especially if the economy (including the financial sector) is doing well. The 
                                                
9 WSJ reported about the low tax that the rich, like Warren Buffett and Bill Gates, are paying 
because tax is collected based on their factor income not on their capital income. As long as 
they have little factor income, despite the tremendous amount of wealth they earn from capital 
income, the tax bracket is based on their factor income. The highest tax bracket on the capital 
gain is only 20%. 
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simulations indeed yield different outcomes depending on the presence of the financial 
channel. The results with the presence of financial income in the FCGE show 
worsening income distributions as shown in Figure 1.10. 
 
Figure 1.10. Comparing the Results from the CGE and FCGE Simulations of GD 
Increase Through Tax 
 
When the government raises funds for spending increases through tax, GDP 
decreases while RGDP increases as the price declines in both CGE and FCGE 
simulations (see left chart in Figure 1.10). Investment increases in both models 
because government spending induces real sector investment by the private sectors, 
i.e., building industry. The domestic firms’ investment (Eq. 6) captures that the firms 
experience a positive balance sheet effect when the exchange rate appreciates. 
Since the appreciated EXR lowers the foreign currency debt burden of the 
private sector, the latter is in a better position to pursue investment in the real sector. 
In both models, export and consumption decrease due to exchange rate appreciation 
and falling income, respectively. Real sector investment in the FCGE is less than that 
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in the CGE because of the presence of financial investment in the FCGE model. The 
economy supported by the increase in GD also boosts financial sector investment, 
which cannot be captured in the CGE model. Incomes of all non-government 
institutions decrease in the CGE model. With the exception of the banking sector, the 
same applies to the simulation results using the FCGE model. Although the tax 
increase has a negative effect on the income of agents in both models, the effect is 
larger in the CGE simulation; however, in terms of the resulting relative income 
distribution, the FCGE simulation is worse than in the CGE simulation. This 
difference in income distribution demonstrates the importance of incorporating the 
financial sector. The CGE model underestimates the income distribution because it 
excludes the dynamics of distribution that works through financial sector channels. 
The results of increased tax to support government spending turn out to be 
more unfavorable to poor than to rich households. While the tax increase has a 
negative effect on the factor income, which is a critical source of income for the poor, 
it has little impact on the poor’s financial income. Since rich households have much 
higher financial incomes, the resulting financial income distribution between the poor 
and the rich worsens. In the CGE model, the absence of inflation has created a 
favorable effect on the poverty line (measured by the quantity of basic needs 
multiplied by the price of those commodities); however, to determine the precise 
effect on poverty, one must also examine the impact on the income of the poor (Azis, 
2008). As depicted in Table 1.5, the total incomes of both rural and urban poor 
households decrease even more than the poverty line. Since the percentage decline of 
the poverty line is less than the percentage decline of the income of the poor, it is 
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likely that the incidence of poverty increases.10 Therefore, the presence of the 
financial sector under the GD and tax increases exacerbates the income inequality and 
poverty. 
 
Table 1.5. Comparing Household Incomes under Different Scenarios in FCGE Model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
10 The incidence of poverty measured as a headcount of poverty is the number of people 
living below the poverty line. Therefore, lower poverty line and higher income of the poor 
implies a lower headcount of poverty. 
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1.4.3. GD Financed Through Government Bond (GB) Issuance 
 
 
Figure 1.11.  Comparing Results from FCGE Simulation of GD Increase Through 
Tax Increase and GB Issuance 
 
When the government increases their spending through the issuing of 
government bonds, this gives better results in the economy overall. If one focuses on 
improving the income distribution and poverty, increasing government spending 
through government bond issuance might be the right policy. 
Under the scenario where the spending is financed through the issuance of 
government bonds, the economic growth is higher than when financed through an 
increase in taxes (Figure 1.11). The inflation is also higher and the exchange rate is 
depreciated more. While the spending increase through tax is negative to the income 
of the economic agents, spending increase through the issuance of bonds is positive to 
the income of the economic agents. The RGDP, however, is decreased because of 
inflation. Investment here is even less increased than the tax increase cases in the 
FCGE model because of the increased availability of government bonds as financial 
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assets. This will direct some investment to the financial sector and away from real 
sector investment.  The decrease in the consumption is the mildest option when 
compared to the other two. Notice that the income distribution between poor and rich 
and between rural and urban areas improves. Income distributions here are generally 
better, except for financial income distribution between rural and urban areas. 
 
 
Figure 1.12. Immediate Transmission Channels by GD Increase through GB Issuance 
in FCGE model 
 
Under the scenario where the spending is financed through the issuance of 
government bonds, the transmission channels in the FCGE model under a tax increase 
are even further extended (Figure 1.12). Government bonds appear as a liability on the 
balance sheet of the government, and as an asset on the balance sheet of other agents 
who purchased it.  When government increases the supply of government bonds, its 
demand and supply will be both changed, resulting in its return also being changed. 
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Therefore, the issuance of the government bond itself already results in a series of 
changes in the financial sector by changing the composition, investment, returns on 
other assets, and wealth of other agents. The changes of asset composition in the 
balance sheet include the changes in fixed investment (INVEST or FixA) and money 
demand, affecting real sector variables such as investment, consumption, and so forth. 
As shown in Chart 4, the level of growth under this scenario is higher than in 
the CGE and FCGE model with a tax increase. Compared with the CGE model, this 
scenario in the FCGE models shows that the income distributions between poor and 
rich, and between rural and urban areas, have not been improved as much. It might be 
that the financial sector corrects the overestimated income of rural and poor 
households. The real sector investment is, however, smallest when the government 
finances it through government bonds as compared to the case of tax in the CGE and 
FCGE. From the FCGE simulations under these two sources of financing, it was found 
that the economy would experience less inflation than in the CGE model simulation. 
Although, compared to the results in the baseline, the income distribution between 
rural and urban regions improves, it is worse than the results in the CGE simulation. 
Government investment is only associated with real sector investment in the 
CGE model, while in reality government invests in financial assets as well as real 
sector. The government finances the funds by issuing bonds, stocks or borrowing 
money from banks. The FCGE thus can show how the government finances in order to 
boost economy or where the money is coming from; however, in the CGE model, the 
money can only come from a tax increase, which will require decreasing other 
variables due to the equilibrating process given the exogenous government spending. 
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1.4.4. Capital Inflows 
 
Figure 1.13. Comparing Results from CGE and FCGE Simulations of Capital Inflows 
 
The results from the FCGE model show that an increase in capital inflows has 
an expansionary effect on the overall economy as shown in left chart in Figure 1.13. 
The real GDP, investment, consumption, and import all increase such that the labor 
market is benefited as indicated by the decline in unemployment rate. Given the 
critical role of non-financial firms in real sector investment, the increase in their 
income, particularly financial income, might facilitate an increase in real sector 
investment.  The capital inflows that favor the balance sheets of lenders and 
borrowers also tend to raise the domestic financial assets. This is demonstrated by an 
increase in the financial returns, short-term securities, and equity and share. The rising 
return of financial assets along with the growing economy would have placed pressure 
on price levels; however, the endogenously determined interests rates in the model 
play a role as one of the equilibrating factors. As shown in Figure 1.13, the interest 
rates (AVGRN) increase, countering the inflationary pressure. The resulting 
appreciated EXR provides an additional countermeasure on prices such that the price 
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level declines. Overall, therefore, the economy expands without inflationary pressure, 
although export declines. The absence of inflation has created another favorable effect 
on the poverty line as measured by the quantity of basic needs multiplied by the price 
of those commodities; however, to determine the precise effect on poverty, one must 
also examine the impact on the income of the poor (Azis, 2008). The total income of 
both the rural and urban poor decrease slightly (0.0081% and 0.00189% respectively); 
however, since the percentage increase of the poverty line (1.1065%) is greater than 
the percentage increase of the income of the poor, it is likely that the incidence of 
poverty declines as well.11 Therefore, overall, the capital flows have been beneficial 
to the economy when macro and micro economic indicators are considered; however, 
the results show a different story when it comes to income inequality between the poor 
and rich. Along with the decreases in financial income of the poor in rural and urban 
areas, the income distribution between poor and rich, and between rural and urban 
areas, worsened, especially the financial income distribution between poor and rich. 
This supports my hypothesis that the beneficiaries from the financial sector 
development will be those who possess the financial assets – namely, the rich. 
Furthermore, while the total incomes of non-financial firms, government, banks, and 
urban rich household are increased (particularly their financial income), the total 
incomes of the rural poor, urban poor, and rural rich households are decreased. This 
even strengthens the argument that the benefits of financial booms are directed mostly 
toward rich agents in the economy. 
                                                
11 The incidence of poverty, measured as a headcount of poverty, is the number of people 
living below the poverty line. Therefore, lower poverty line and higher income of the poor 
implies a lower headcount of poverty. 
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The results from the CGE show that increase in capital inflows has some 
negative effect on the overall economy, while the FCGE economy was better off due 
to the financial sector boom. Under the CGE model, GDP is underestimated because 
the model neglects the dynamics of the financial sector such that prices and exchange 
rate are incorrectly estimated.  The RGDP, investment, and imports in the CGE 
model are all decreased while inflationary pressure persists. The un-weighted interest 
rate without the information about each return on financial assets was unable to 
quench the inflationary pressure. The exchange rate here was even depreciated in 
order to increase the import prices. Notice that the exchange rate here is depreciated 
although inflow causes EXR appreciation. This is because price plays a critical role in 
the direction of the EXR in the model.  The price increase due to the capital inflow 
keeps the exchange rate from appreciating and even pushes it upward to depreciate. 
The poverty line is raised, showing the increase in poverty incidence. As observed 
already in the FCGE model, however, since the percentage decline of the poverty line 
is greater than that of the income of the poor, it is likely that poverty incidence does 
not increase. The difference between the CGE model and the FCGE model stands out 
when it comes to income disparities (Figure 1.13). The income level of all agents, 
particularly the rural poor and rich, and urban poor are inflated because the financial 
income effect was not taken into account. In the FCGE model, the income of the poor 
was decreased due to the decline in the financial income of the poor (Figure 1.14). 
This financial income does not exist in the CGE model, resulting in an inflation of the 
income of the poor and other institutions. Furthermore, this CGE model shows 
improved income distributions between poor and rich, and between rural and urban 
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areas. This is precisely why the CGE model misses the financial channel that plays a 
critical role in determining the income inequality between the poor and rich in the 
economy. Thus, if one tries to analyze the impact of capital inflows based on the 
outcome from the CGE model, the analysis can be misleading, especially in terms of 
income changes and income distributions. 
 
 
Figure 1.14. % Changes in Financial Income (left) and Income Distribution Under 
Capital Inflow Shock in FCGE Model 
 
 
 
1.5. Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, we argue that the financial sector should not be neglected in the 
analysis based on an economy-wide general equilibrium model. By comparing CGE 
with and without the financial sector (FCGE versus CGE), we show that the results of 
CGE model simulations without the financial sector could be underestimated. This is 
clearly detected when we shock the two models with increased government spending. 
The macroeconomic outcomes of the shock are not encouraging primarily because the 
price level tends to rise, but the results from the FCGE model show much worse 
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outcomes than those of the CGE model. More seriously, the social indicators 
generated from the shock are diametrically opposing; the CGE model produces 
unfavorable social conditions, while the results from the FCGE model simulations are 
more favorable than before the shock. When it is further assumed that the increased 
spending is financed by taxes, changes in the social outcomes are also in opposite 
directions, i.e., income distribution improves under the CGE and worsens under the 
FCGE. Clearly, ignoring the financial sector in CGE may lead to inaccurate results. 
The derived policy implications could therefore be mistaken. 
Sharply distinct outcomes are also detected when the models are shocked with 
increased capital inflows. The social conditions improve under the CGE model but 
worsen under the FCGE model. Even when both models produce some improvements 
in macroeconomic variables, the improvements under the CGE model are much lower 
than under the FCGE model, because the macro and financial channels that are 
directly influenced by the increased capital inflows are activated under the latter 
model, where many macro and social variables are eventually affected. 
The superiority of the FCGE over the CGE model can be clearly seen from the 
transmission mechanisms when a particular shock is imposed. To demonstrate the 
complete mechanisms of the FCGE model, two alternative financing models for 
increased government spending are compared – one through taxes and the other 
through the issuance of government bonds. The macroeconomic results of the latter 
are more favorable than those of the former because financing spending through the 
issuance of bonds hardly causes changes (increases) in prices. Since price changes 
play a key role in the transmission mechanisms, improvements in most variables due 
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to increased spending are essentially not costly. Looking more closely at the 
simulation results of the FCGE and CGE models, one can see that an increase in 
government spending financed through the issuance of bonds causes the exchange rate 
to appreciate less in the FCGE model, consumption to fall less, and the nominal GDP 
to increase although it falls in the real term. The endogenously-determined interest rate 
also falls, although the resulting inflation is likely higher. The social variables are 
clearly better when increased spending is funded through the issuance of government 
bonds. The poverty line increases much less, while the income of the poor increases, 
suggesting that poverty incidence declines. Furthermore, the relative income 
distribution is also better. 
On the shock of increased capital inflows, without any policy response, the 
scenario will worsen the spatial income distribution (between rural and urban areas) 
under the FCGE model but not under the CGE model. Most financial benefits of 
capital inflows are enjoyed by high-income urban-based households through increased 
returns from financial assets, while the rural-based households lack access to financial 
assets and hence cannot reap the benefits of the growing financial sector associated 
with increased capital inflows. It is expected that the resulting rural-urban income 
inequality will deteriorate. The absence of mechanisms that cause changes in income 
and returns from financial assets, as is the case in the CGE model, prevents us from 
incorporating such a critical channel that yields more realistic measurements of 
income distribution. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix I: Description of the Names Used in the Flowcharts 
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Appendix II: Closure 
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CHAPTER 2 
BANK-LED INFLOWS AND THEIR WELFARE IMPACTS: AN ANALYSIS 
OF RURAL-URBAN INCOME INEQUALITY USING A FCGE MODEL 
 
2.1. Introduction  
With growing concern among the researchers and policy makers about the 
increasing inequality between rich and poor, a considerable amount of policy interest 
has sprung up as well. In emerging and developing countries where such income 
inequality has already widened, and where economic activities are becoming 
increasingly concentrated within urban areas, this inequality is often accompanied by 
additional disparities in income, jobs or general standard of living. With globalization, 
where the financial sector has played an increasingly important role in the economy, 
income and regional disparities tend to be even wider. In addition to the fact that the 
liberalized system makes the economy more vulnerable to a crisis, such widened 
disparities can also potentially hinder economic and social development (Stiglitz, 
2013). A case in point is the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997, where the fast-growing 
economy suddenly fell into a deep recession (a boom and bust cycle), causing 
unemployment and poverty to soar. The global financial crisis in 2008 serves as yet 
another example. Having originated in the US financial sector, in the subprime 
mortgage market in particular, the crisis quickly spread to the real sector of the 
economy, affecting trade, banking, and the labor market. This can also be observed in 
the Euro Zone crisis in 2012; the resulting recession widened the disparity of income 
and other social development indicators. More importantly, though, such 
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repercussions go worldwide, impacting many other developing and emerging 
economies. As a result, income disparity and the urban-rural gap also widen in 
emerging countries. Furthermore, the impact of the negative shock is often 
exacerbated given the interplay between the financial sector and the real sector along 
with the development of financial instruments. In reality, the shock can affect the 
economy and social indicators more than originally expected (amplification effect). 
  
Observing several financial crises in developed and developing countries alike, 
one cannot help but wonder whether something is wrong or missing in our 
understanding of the role and influence of the financial sector on real sector variables. 
One emerging idea in the new monetary theory is the role of the credit channel 
mechanism that augments the effect on the standard transmission of monetary policy 
(Stiglitz and Greenwald, 2003). Thus, if the standard theory predicts that a particular 
policy or/and a external shock will have a negative effect by a certain amount, then the 
credit channel hypothesis argues that such amount will be amplified. At the extreme, a 
crisis can be the outcome of the policy or/and shock. One of the reasons is that the 
credit channel mechanism treats the role of agency cost and the availability of credit 
explicitly, such that the level of credit cannot be explained simply by the movement in 
the interest rates or by the size of loanable funds.   
The credit channel involves two types of mechanism: a balance sheet channel 
and a bank-lending channel (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995). The balance sheet channel 
focuses on the impact of monetary policy or shocks on credit through changes in 
borrowers’ balance sheet positions, whereas the bank-lending channel identifies the 
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impact of monetary policy or shocks on credit through changes in banks’ loanable 
funds. The effect of any policy or/and shock can work through a credit channel, 
causing changes in firms’ and households’ balance sheet and bank-lending practices. 
In this respect, the effect of a policy or/and shock can be distortionary, especially 
during a crisis. In the interrelations between the financial sector and the real sector, the 
distortionary results can have a negative impact not only on the aggregate 
macroeconomic variables but also on income and spatial disparity.   
Many studies that attempt to test the presence of a credit channel often treat the 
channel as an independent variable; yet, credit does not drive the economic impact of 
monetary policy or any shock – it is endogenously determined by the economic 
impacts. Thus, there is a complex two-way interaction between credit and economic 
condition. Based on the Indonesian FCGE model developed by Azis (2008), its 
updated version used in this study seeks to take into account such a complex 
interaction and to validate the credit channel mechanism by treating banks’ credit 
endogenously in a dynamic context. It also expands the crucial financial mechanism 
by making the connection between the financial sector and social development 
indicators more explicit, e.g., income distribution and rural-urban disparity. The FCGE 
model is to be simulated under bank-led capital inflows and outflows, as these 
scenarios are currently happening in many emerging market economies. Based on 
these simulation results, we discuss how dynamics of the bank-led inflows and 
outflows, and activities in the financial sector under the dynamic credit channel, 
eventually affect the poverty and income disparity between poor and rich, and between 
rural and urban regions. 
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2.2. Theoretical Framework 
In ‘Towards a New Paradigm in Monetary Economics’, Stiglitz and Greenwald 
(2004) highlight the critical role of the credit channel in an economy and the 
importance of a dynamic mechanism by which the behaviors of economic agents 
affect the credit availability and economy.  They point out flaws in the traditional 
monetary economics and show how monetary and financial regulatory policy can be 
distortionary when it involves credit constraints. They especially emphasize the role of 
the banks that issue terms of credits, which in turn affect the investment decisions 
made by private sectors (Figure 2.1). They also argue that banks’ willingness to supply 
credits depends on the banks’ asset value, net worth and asset composition – all of 
which are endogenous, as they are affected by the dynamic interplay of newly created 
asymmetric information, risk, and uncertainty. Banks and firms are assumed to act in a 
risk-averse or risk-taking manner depending on the circumstances created by a given 
shock.  
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Figure 2.1. Framework of Credit Channel Mechanism 
 
The shock changes the behavior of the agents – i.e., the banks and firms – 
through which the shock alters other micro and macro economic indicators, in 
particular, asset composition and net worth of the banks and firms.  This changed 
behavior – risk-averse or risk-taking – with new information will in turn decide the 
level of loan in the economy. Finally, the level of loan availability decides the level of 
economic growth, which later affects the asset composition and net worth of the 
agents. This series of changes form a new economic status by changing banks' 
behavior. At this point, it forms a cycle – i.e., a vicious cycle. To deal with risk-averse 
or risk-taking agents in this dynamic context, the impacts of policies and any shock 
could be even more intensified and distortionary, especially during a recession or 
financial crisis. Furthermore, since in reality the decision to extend credit is based on 
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information that is specific and local, thus immobile. 12  Information about the 
borrowers is not general but applied only to them. For example, when Samsung 
electronics asks a bank to borrow some money, the bank has to decide how much of 
their funds the firm deserves to borrow and at which interest rate. Based on the net 
worth – quantitative and value-qualitative – of the firm, the bank judges the value of 
Samsung Electronics to decide the amount of loan and interest rate. This information 
will not be shared with other banks and will not be applied to other firms. The bank 
will prefer those firms that have more information available, such as a big firm, in 
terms of giving credits. Because extending the loan is based on the specific 
information (the more information available, the better), small firms are often 
discriminated against when seeking to borrow money from banks. In poor regions 
where credit is generally limited, borrowers lack immediate access to funds from 
banks, especially banks in other regions that have no specific information about the 
borrowers. When banks become stingy in extending loans for whatever reason, those 
poor regions suffer from a credit crunch and their balance sheet deteriorates. If the 
credit allocation and investment decisions are made mainly by national banks, then the 
effect is even more severe. Since national banks and foreign firms have limited 
information about local conditions of the region, they tend to allocate capital to firms 
and households in regions where they are familiar. This tends to exacerbate the spatial 
disparity.  
Empirical studies by both Borensztein and Lee (2002), and by Kim (1998), 
show the important role of the credit channel mechanism as a key monetary 
                                                
12 In perfect information theory, it is assumed that capital is more mobile between regions 
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transmission mechanism in the post-crisis of South Korea. While Kim focuses on 
finding the characteristics of the credit channel and its practical effect, Borensztein 
and Lee further analyze the impact of the channel on entrepreneurs and its 
implications for the economy. In accordance with Kim’s finding that a substantial 
excess demand for bank loans is caused by a sharp loan decline, which in turn is 
driven mostly by a pervasive and stringent rule on bank capitalization, Borensztein 
and Lee suggest that a credit crunch can lessen the inequality of loan distribution 
between chaebol (conglomerates) and small to medium-sized entrepreneurs (SMEs) in 
the post-crisis period, during which time profitability becomes a critical criterion for 
banks to determine the amount of credit to be allocated. Despite the reduced 
inequality, however, Borensztein and Lee also stress that the impact of credit decline 
on SMEs could be more severe than on chaebol firms due to access constraints that are 
higher for SMEs, especially in a country like Korea where chaebols are given an 
advantageous position in terms of access to credit.  
Chida and Tamegawa (2004) argue that credit friction has played a pivotal role 
in explaining the volatility of the Japanese economy since the 1990s. As they 
incorporate shocks of nominal interest rates and agency costs into their dynamic 
general equilibrium model, they find that wealth level determines the effectiveness of 
monetary policy.  
Azis (2004) argues that credit market frictions have played an important role in 
the seemingly disconnected monetary and investment growth in Indonesia, reducing 
the effectiveness of any policy.  By incorporating balance sheet effects, monopolistic 
                                                                                                                                       
than labor. Thus, capital flows from capital-abundant to capital-deprived regions. 
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competition and credit availability into financial computable general equilibrium 
(FCGE), Azis not only analyzes the importance of credit allocation but also 
demonstrates the role of integrated flow of fund (FOF) and social accounting matrix 
(SAM) data for capturing a more complete and better linkage among financial sector, 
real sector, income distribution and poverty. 
 
2.2.1. Traditional Theory of Monetary Transmission Mechanism 
To explain the transmission mechanism in the real sector by the cost of capital 
or interest rate, the standard monetary transmission theory focuses on demand for 
credit as the channel. In the traditional theory, the effect of tightening monetary policy 
on the components of GDP involves the following mechanism: when a tightening of 
monetary policy is anticipated, real GDP and price decrease. The final demand 
decreases, and a decline in production will follow, as will an inventory decline. This 
will lower consumer spending, and eventually fixed investment as well. The effect of 
monetary policy is transmitted through the demand for credit by the following 
alternative mechanisms: (1) flexible prices, as the expectation of inflation changes the 
opportunity cost of holding money, and (2) sticky prices. It is difficult to explain the 
actual monetary mechanism that affects the real economy when one uses a standard 
model of credit that depends solely on interest rates. Even the interest-sensitive 
components of aggregate demand are, in reality, only weakly affected by the policy 
shock. The opposite scenario where the interest rate is close to zero was not successful 
in boosting real sector investment during GFC in the United States. Thus, other factors 
must have played a role in explaining the mechanisms through which the shock affects 
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actual credit allocation, the real sector, and social indicators.  
Bernenke and Gertler (1995) point out the failure of traditional monetary 
theory to explain the transmission mechanism of the conventional interest rate effects.  
Their conclusions are based on the following arguments: (1) monetary policy is 
intended for a short-term effect by which the central bank’s rate is the overnight rate. 
Although the policy should have a weaker effect on real long-term rates, the monetary 
policy apparently has large impacts on long-lived asset purchases. Also, after the 
interest rates turn to normal track, other components of spending still do not respond 
to the policy change (i.e., fixed investment). (2) Although monetary policy itself is 
expected to have powerful effects on the real sector, the interest rate alone may have 
no strong effect on various components of spending. In addition, the experiences of a 
series of crises, especially in the last two decades or so, may have taught us the lesson 
that the standard theory of monetary transmission mechanism (i.e., cost of capital 
effect) has some serious limitations if not flaws when it comes to explaining what has 
been happening in the real world. Thus, the model with only this traditional monetary 
transmission theory would be incapable of explaining what is going on in the world. 
Even with FED’s policy – i.e., the interest rate was almost zero – the investment was 
not revived after GFC. 
 
2.2.2. The Credit Channel Theory of Monetary Transmission  
The credit channel theory fills the gap between traditional monetary theory and 
the actual allocation of banks’ credit. The credit channel involves two types of 
mechanism: a balance sheet channel and a banking-lending channel (Bernanke and 
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Gertler, 1995). The balance sheet channel focuses on the impact of monetary policy on 
credit through changes in borrowers’ balance sheet positions. The banking-lending 
channel, on the other hand, explains the impact of monetary policy on credit through 
the changes in banks’ loanable funds. Depending on the behaviors of borrowers and 
lenders, thus, the policy effect might be distortionary. Unlike the assumption used in 
neo-classical theory (i.e., perfect credit information), the presence of asymmetric 
information in the credit channel theory creates borrowers’ opportunity costs between 
internal financing and external financing. Thus, changes in balance sheet channel 
affect the cost of external finance and the opportunity cost of internal finance. In a 
tight monetary policy, firms that usually have a heavy short-term debt on their balance 
sheet will suffer from rising debt burden. Also, their asset prices decrease as the 
collateral value declines due to the high cost of capital. In addition, the increased 
interest rates indirectly reduce firms’ revenue, which will eventually affect consumer 
spending adversely. The short-cash flow can be compromised by the borrowing if 
firms still have free access to credit markets; however, since the tightening of 
monetary policy often weakens the sources of internal finance and decreases the net 
worth of borrowers, this will increase the borrowing costs while at the same time 
increasing the need for external financing (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995). SMEs are 
more limited in terms of their access to credit. In a credit crunch situation, they suffer 
more from the squeeze than do large firms. Furthermore, in a monetary tightening, 
banks also suffer from the high cost of capital (i.e., drop in the value of securities), 
resulting in a weaker balance sheet. Thus, given the banks’ weak financial structure 
and a decrease in borrowers’ credit worthiness, the policy effect of monetary 
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tightening is intensified, resulting in a sharp fall of credits, sharper than the fall 
predicted by a standard monetary model that relies only on the effect of interest rate 
changes. Banks’ access to loanable funds is usually reduced, and the actual supply of 
credit significantly declines (Figure 2.2).  
 
 
 
Figure 2.2. Impact of A Tightening Monetary Policy with A Dynamic Credit Channel 
Mechanism 
 
In addition, the negative effect of the tightening policy can even be prolonged 
by decreases in household and consumer expenditures. Decreased income-to-interest-
payment ratio and increased down payments impair the balance sheets of households. 
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Boldin (1994) also argued that mortgage burden is transmitted into a decrease in 
housing demand, which in turn affects households’ ability to access banks’ credit. In 
credit channel theory, the assumption of imperfect information along with the explicit 
treatment of risk and uncertainty are critical in explaining the behaviors of borrowers 
and lenders. While the balance sheet channel (i.e., borrowers) and banking-lending 
channel (i.e., lenders) play important roles in determining credit availability during a 
normal period of the economic cycle, they will be even more relevant during a crisis.  
When the monetary policy changes the balance sheet position (through 
changes in real wealth and cash flow), information about the new balance sheet 
position can cause additional costs for lenders. The asymmetry of the information 
magnifies the risk factors and uncertainties, resulting in higher lending costs (i.e., 
screening borrowers’ portfolios). Thus, the contractionary effect of the policy is easily 
magnified, thereby increasing the possibility of a recession. The increased lending cost 
and the increased cost of borrowers’ internal financing compel banks to lower the 
supply of loans while borrowers increase the demand for loans. This prevents the 
interest rates from functioning as an equilibrating factor as specified in neo-classical 
theory. Instead, banks set the loan interest rates at the banks’ optimal level where they 
maximize returns yet at rates that should not lead to the problems of ‘adverse 
selection,’ where high risk-taking borrowers are those who can afford to and who 
actually do borrow at very high interest rates. In effect, banks will do credit rationing.  
In this context, the supply of loans becomes more important than the demand. 
Increased risks and uncertainties associated with asset values and bankruptcy will 
induce lenders to allocate their portfolio more to safe assets by reducing risky lending 
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(i.e., substitution effect). It is also important to note that the lenders’ ability to issue a 
loan may become secondary to their willingness to do so. Even if banks have ample 
liquidity (i.e., loanable funds), they may be unwilling to lend due to the high risks 
involved. Thus, the shock that increases asymmetric information with risks and 
uncertainty is likely to decrease the loan supply given the specific characteristics of 
credit. The overall effect on the economy can be significant because the falling 
amount of credit extended by one lender may not be fully offset by increased lending 
from others. A similar effect can be created by regulations (i.e., a non-monetary policy 
per se). For example, regulators’ excessive reliance on the Capital Adequacy 
Requirement (CAR) can increase lenders’ incentives not to lend, and they may instead 
prefer to invest in safe assets, such as government bonds, to compensate for the high 
cost of capital. The impacts of monetary policy and regulations during a crisis can be 
even more intensified and distortionary given the presence of the credit channel. When 
the crisis arrived, typical policy advice suggested by the international organization like 
the IMF was to raise the interest rates.  When weakness in the banking sector was 
considered the most important source of vulnerability and crisis, like what happened 
during the Asian Financial Crisis in 2007, policymakers were advised to strengthen the 
banking sector by raising the CAR.  As described above, though, both policies can 
yield counterproductive impacts on the already negative economic conditions. 
Worsening aggregate economic conditions will harm social welfare, widening the 
income and spatial disparity as well. This worsening social condition can, in turn, 
further damage the economic prospect.  
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2.2.3. Bank-led Inflows  
Furthermore, the effect explained above can be created under the phenomenon 
of capital inflow intermediated through banking sector. During this financial boom, 
the banking sector can be inclined to invest in other profitable financial assets instead 
of extending a loan that might be less profitable. This behavior of the banking sector 
has a variety of repercussions in the economy, ranging from increased vulnerability to 
a widening of income inequality. Tong and Wei (2009) argued that what mattered to 
manufacturing firms in terms of the level of credit crunch during the global financial 
crisis (GFC) was not the volume of international capital flows but their composition. 
Azis (2013) and Forbes and Warnock (2012) examine the composition of capital flows 
in more detail by classifying the trend and type of capital flows that are more relevant 
to the recent development in emerging market economies. First, the trend of flows was 
divided into four types: surges and stops, when there is a sharp increase or decrease in 
inflows, respectively; and flight and retrenchment, when there is a sharp increase or 
decrease in gross outflows, respectively. Then, the flows are broken down into three 
types: (1) equities, which consist of direct investment and equity portfolios; (2) debts, 
which consist of debt securities and others including derivatives; and (3) banks, which 
have inflows coming through the banking sector. Flows are considered as equities-led, 
debt-led, or bank-led depending if the increase in inflows is mainly through equities, 
debt, or bank, respectively. This analysis focuses on bank-led flows since these are the 
fastest-growing flows in recent years, especially after the GFC, and the most volatile 
(Azis, 2013). 
The FCGE model is simulated with the shock applied to the financial sector yet 
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affecting the real sector economy, in order to show the real and financial sector 
transmission mechanism. Also, based on the theoretical framework explained earlier, 
this chapter reflects what is going on right now in emerging markets in the midst of 
easy money policy in the developed countries: i.e., capital inflows to emerging 
countries. The relatively favorable interest rates and expected returns in these 
countries have attracted EU and US investors. Capital inflows can be beneficial to the 
recipient countries with limited financial investment options since they can provide 
more liquidity and investment opportunities to develop the financial sector. Investors 
can take advantage of a developed financial sector that allows them to have more 
options or greater access to finance. Also, the influx of foreign capital allows domestic 
investors to enjoy higher returns on their financial assets. A variety of financing 
sources and positive income effect boost investment and consumption. Under the 
current environment where the world’s financial and real sector are highly 
interconnected, the foreign capital invested in the financial sector may take the form of 
short-term securities that can potentially affect the real sector too; however, short-term 
portfolio investment can also create costs and risks, causing vulnerability and even 
crisis in the recipient countries. Capital inflow causes foreign currency supply to rise, 
pushing its price lower and its local currency to become more expensive (appreciate). 
For emerging economies that rely heavily on export, appreciation of the exchange rate 
can lead to a trade account deficit, but the effect of capital inflows goes beyond just 
making the exchange rate stronger. When intermediated by banks (i.e., ‘bank-led 
flows’), the recipient banks may extend credits more than normal and create credit 
bubbles as the funds they use are relatively cheap. This can lead to a crisis when 
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eventually the bubble bursts. Alternatively, instead of extending loans, banks can go 
into risky investments given the higher financial returns. This can create an asset 
bubble, making the banking sector and the entire economy vulnerable. The case in 
point is what happened in 2012 when most of the EU banks had to withdraw their 
funds from operations abroad, including Asia. This is part of the deleveraging process 
related to the Euro zone crisis. As a result, the volatility of capital flows in Asia have 
increased. One worrisome scenario is that, if the process of deleveraging continues, 
banks will cut a lot of credit, which could potentially lead to a credit crunch. If, on the 
other hand, most of the inflows are used by banks to invest in highly risky financial 
assets, that would increase the vulnerability of the banking sector (i.e., falling capital 
adequacy ratio), thereby causing a banking crisis and eventually an economic crisis. 
Hence, the impact of debt-led inflows can be negative.  
When the interactions of various factors as a result of bank-led inflows and 
outflows are transmitted through the behavior of banks and firms, the consequence of 
the dynamic interactions in the economy are often difficult to anticipate. Therefore, 
the effect of the flows will be evaluated through the credit channel theory of monetary 
transmission explicitly and implicitly by incorporating a dynamic credit channel into 
the FCGE model. When the banking sector is expanding its operations, as reflected in 
the increased size of its balance sheet, the financial sector usually grows as well. 
While this contributes positively to the economic growth, only a certain segment of 
society that has access and therefore can benefit from the financial sector will enjoy 
wealth and increased income. Depending on the breadth of the impact of any shock in 
the economy, including shock emanating from capital inflows, the income distribution 
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is likely to worsen. 
Although some studies using CGE models have investigated the positive and 
negative effects of capital flows, to the best of my knowledge, none has been able to 
show explicitly the mechanism by which interaction between the financial and the real 
sector takes into account the role of a dynamic credit channel. Also, most studies 
neglect to delineate the effect of bank-led inflows and outflows on social indicators 
such as poverty and regional income disparities. This study attempts to fill these gaps. 
In addition to explaining how bank-led inflows and outflows raise volatility and how 
such volatility is exacerbated, the analysis can also shed some light on the impacts of 
bank-led inflows on poverty and income inequality.  
 
 
2.3. Methodology 
In this chapter, the existing FCGE model used in Chapter 1 is updated to 
explicitly incorporate bank-led capital inflow and dynamic behavior of the banking 
sector. First, a new set of equations is added to incorporate the credit channel, and to 
make the model operate in a recursive dynamic way by applying the equation of 
motion where the depreciation value of capital stock in the current period affects the 
level of capital stock in the next period. Second, we specify the shock that we will 
impose on the model to explicitly reflect the recent phenomenon of capital flows that 
are specifically intermediated through the banking sector (bank-led flows). This 
process begins by specifying the capital flow channel that indirectly affected banks’ 
financial structure through FSAV in the previous chapter: foreign capital flows go into 
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the banking sector and, depending on banks’ behavior, subsequently affect the 
economy. Thus, bank-led flows in this chapter directly increase the liability side of a 
bank’s balance sheet as well as foreign saving in the FCGE model specification. Third, 
we modify the existing credit channel equation in Azis (2004) by allowing it to 
operate under dynamic simulation. The credit channel equation is modified to take into 
account the dynamic characteristic of banks in making decisions about extending loans 
to firms. When the exchange rate appreciates due to capital inflows, the relative value 
of the assets of firms and banks improve, affecting favorably the banks’ decisions to 
extend loans; however, this decision can only be made in the next period since there is 
a time lag for applying the new financial structure of borrowers and banks themselves 
in the decision. The impact on banks through the financial structure of borrowers will 
be disclosed only in the next period. Under this dynamic credit channel specification, 
the financial structures of borrowers and lenders are multiplied by the ratio of the 
initial exchange rate to the change in exchange rate that is due to the shock. The 
changes in the financial structure of firms along with financial structure of banks 
thereby determine the level of loan that will be available in the next period. Such 
important channels and transmission mechanisms tend to be overlooked by most 
analysts. Consequently, the policy response or the impacts of capital flow through the 
financial sector can be worse than expected.  
In summary, the following features distinguish this chapter from the previous 
one: (1) here, we activate the equation of motion to represent the recursive dynamic 
nature of the simulation – Equation of motion; (2) the nature of the shock focuses 
specifically on bank-led inflow (CFLOW) rather than overall inflow through the 
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increase in foreign saving (FSAV) as done in the previous chapter – Bank-led inflow 
channel; and (3) finally we include the exchange rate effect in the credit channel 
equation-dynamic credit channel – Dynamic credit channel. These features are 
reflected in the interactions among all real and financial sector variables, as well as 
income inequality and poverty line, given a shock of bank-led flows.  
 
2.3.1. Equation of Motion 
The FCGE model in the previous chapter was static, measuring the steady-state 
outcome from controlled changes. In this chapter, I employ a dynamic FCGE model, 
explicitly tracing the cumulative impact on each variable given the dynamics in the 
economy. Such a model takes into account the changes over time by allowing capital 
to be adjusted (i.e., equation of motion).  Even without a shock or any policy 
changes, capital stock will keep changing as a result of the economic process and 
capital depreciation. Thus, the amount of capital stock this year differs from the capital 
stock of the previous year.  The capital stock in the model is depreciated by 𝛿. The 
capital stock next year represents this year’s capital stock after depreciation plus new 
capital generated by some investment activities.  Thus, the equation of motion is as 
follows: 𝐾!!! = 𝐾! 1 − 𝛿 + 𝐼!                  (Eq. 1) 
where K is capital, t is the corresponding time, 𝛿is the depreciation factor, and I is the 
new stock created. This is expressed in the FCGE model as follows:  
 𝐾𝑆𝑇𝑂𝐶𝐾!$ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑡 𝑔𝑒  2 = 1 − 𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐶 ∗ 𝐹𝑆!"#$! + 0.1 ∗ 𝑠𝑢𝑚(𝑖,𝐷𝐾!,)     (Eq. 2) 𝐹𝑆.𝐹𝑋!"#$!$ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑡 𝑔𝑒  2 = 𝐾𝑆𝑇𝑂𝐶𝐾                 (Eq. 3) 
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𝐹𝑆! = 𝑠𝑢𝑚(𝑖,𝐹𝐴𝐶𝐷𝐸𝑀!,!)          (Eq. 4) 
𝑉𝐴! = 𝑎𝑣𝑥! ∗ 𝑎𝑣! ∗ ( 𝑏𝑣!,! ∗ 𝐹𝐴𝐶𝐷𝐸𝑀!,!!!!!"!)! !!/!!!"!     (Eq. 5) 
 
Capital stock in the next period (𝐾𝑆𝑇𝑂𝐶𝐾!$ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑡 𝑔𝑒  2 ) is capital supply 
in the previous period after its depreciation (DEPREC), and new stock created (DK). 
The new capital stock (𝐾!!!) will be reflected as an input in the following year’s 
value added. The latter will in turn determine the level of output. The results from the 
recursive-dynamic model can be interpreted as a representation of the future economy 
irrespective of whether or not there are some external shocks or policy changes. The 
specified FCGE model, therefore, offers more flexibility to handle a wide range of 
issues in order to capture the impact of the external shocks that are mediated through 
relative prices and market forces. In this sense, the dynamic model is more useful than 
the static model when estimating the effect of changes in one part of the economy 
upon the rest.  
 
2.3.2. Bank-led Inflow Channel  
This specification reflects increased foreign capital flowing into the economy 
through the banking sector. The banking sector receives the foreign capital in the 
liability side of the bank’s balance sheet while the economy accounts for this as 
foreign savings, thereby increasing the bank’s liability and total saving in the 
economy. The bank-led inflows (CFLOW(bank)) are added to the existing foreign 
saving (𝑆𝐴𝑉!") equation by subtracting CFLOW from 𝑆𝐴𝑉!" because foreign saving 
itself is a negative value (see equation below). 
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𝑆𝐴𝑉!" = 𝑔𝑔𝑠ℎ𝑟!"# (𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑛!",! ∗ 𝑌𝐹!)! + 𝐼𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁!",!"! +!"! 𝑚𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑟!" ∗ (𝑃𝑊𝑀!! ∗𝐸𝑋𝑅 ∗𝑀!) − (𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑟!" ∗ (𝑃𝑊𝐸!! ∗ 𝐸𝑋𝑅 ∗ 𝐸!) + 𝑌𝐹𝑅𝑂𝑊!,!" + 𝐼𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁!",!"!"! ) −𝑪𝑭𝑳𝑶𝑾𝒃𝒂𝒏𝒌𝒃𝒂𝒏𝒌          (Eq. 6) 
CFLOW into the emerging country occurs through the banking sector as a 
form of financial liability. In the FCGE model, this means the bank’s total liability 
must include CFLOW: 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏!"#$,!" = 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏!"#$,!" +!" 𝐶𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊!"#$!"     (Eq. 7) 
 
While the FCGE model in the previous chapter illustrates how capital inflows 
indirectly affect the banking sector and other sectors through an increase in foreign 
saving (FSAV), this CFLOW channel illustrates more specifically capital inflows 
intermediated through the banking sector. The impact of the two capital inflows will 
differ.  
 
2.3.3. Dynamic Credit Channel 
This channel now can illustrate a dynamic characteristic of banks in their 
making of decisions to extend loans to firms. The exchange rate appreciation due to 
capital inflows affects the decision given changes in the banks’ and borrower’s 
balance sheet positions. When a firm and bank have ample amounts of assets in local 
currency, the exchange rate appreciation will improve their financial structure; 
however, this decision can only be made in the next period since there is a lag for 
applying the new financial structure of borrowers and banks themselves. This is also 
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explicitly expressed through the credit channel equation in the dynamic FCGE.  
Bank’s loanable funds are the funds available for lending; however, 
availability does not necessarily imply that loans will actually be extended. According 
to the credit channel hypothesis, not all loanable funds will be made into loans; it 
depends on the balance sheet positions of lenders and borrowers. The financial 
structure of these agents determines how much banks are willing to lend. If the bank 
decides to issue 50% of loanable funds as loans to firms, and also purchases 
government bonds with the rest of their loanable funds, then only 50% will be 
available as actual credit in the economy. The more a bank tries to possess safe assets 
such as government bonds, the less loans will be available in the market. During an 
economic downturn, banks tend to become more risk-averse. In a booming economy, 
on the other hand, bank’s behavior becomes more risk-taking, purchasing risky assets 
such as short-term securities. Either way, the economy ends up with reduced 
availability of funds for credit. Thus, banks’ decision whether or not to extend loans 
matters. In fact, this decision depends on the balance sheet position of the lenders 
themselves as well as the borrowers. Banks are reluctant to lend their funds to firms 
whose balance sheet is weak, no matter how ample the bank’s available funds. This is 
related to the bank’s perception of the low probability of repayment.  
The balance sheet position (i.e., financial structure) of firms depends on the 
exchange rate as well. Firms with abundant local currency-denominated assets will 
perceive the appreciation of exchange rate positively. In the model, we specify the 
impact of the exchange rate in a dynamic manner such that the new balance sheet 
position, which has been affected by the exchange rate, is taken into account in the 
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next period along with the new asset values.  The same logic is applied to banks. 
Exchange rate appreciation will also have a positive effect on their balance sheets in 
the next period. Under this dynamic credit channel specification, the financial 
structure of borrowers and lenders is multiplied by the ratio of the initial level of the 
exchange rate to the exchange rate changes following the shock. These changes will 
thus determine the level of loan in the next period (Eq. 8). BANKLOAN$ years t ge  2
= ss ∗ BANKF!"#$ ∗ 𝐸𝑋𝑅0𝐸𝑋𝑅 ∗ WEALF!"#$!"#$Asset!",!"#$!",!"#$ + FixA!"#$!"#$ !!! 
∗ !""#$!"#$,!"#$!"#$,!"#$!""#$!",!"#$!",!"#$ ! !"#$!"#$!"#$ !!! ∗ [ !""#$!""#$,!"#$!""#$,!"#$( !""#$!",!"#$!",!"#$ ! !"#$!"#$!"#$!""#$ ]!!! ∗[!"#!!"# ∗ !"#$%%!"#$!"#$!""#$!",!"#$!",!"#$ ! !"#$!"#$!"#$ ]!!!                  
(Eq. 8)   BANKLOAN$ years t ge  2 = Asset!"#$,!"#$!"#$,!"#$     (Eq. 9) 
 
where ss, ss1, ss3 are positive values and ss2 is negative value. The different 
parameters as a result of the presence of asymmetric information represent the 
channels by which credit availability affects income distribution and unequal 
development. This behavioral equation illustrates the explicit channel by which capital 
flows affect institutions’ behaviors. 
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2.3.4. Flowchart of The Dynamic FCGE Model 
 
 
Figure 2.3. Flowchart Showing The Interrelationship of Variables in the FCGE Model  
 
The transmission mechanism of the bank-led flows is depicted in Figure 2.3.  
The flow (labeled ‘CFLOW’) is one form of foreign saving (FSAV). It is part of the 
liabilities on the recipient's balance sheet. The bank-led inflows (CFLOW) thus will 
not only augment total saving of the economy but also directly increase the liability of 
bank, potentially raising the share of a bank's non-core liability. The growing 
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liabilities, especially originating in non-core sources, provide opportunities for the 
bank to extend loans, in which case bankloan is extended to firms and households. 
The loan extended to households is shown in the liability side of their balance sheet. 
The increased bankloan also augment the asset side of banking sector in its balance 
sheet. The behavior of the banks in terms of extending loans or not is affected by the 
balance sheet condition of the borrowers (i.e., the firms), the quality of which is 
captured in the model by the ratio of wealth to total assets. Bank's decision to extend 
loans is also determined by the balance sheet positions of the banks themselves. The 
indicators that are used to reflect the bank's balance sheet condition are the ratio of 
wealth to the total assets of the lender and borrower, and the ratio of safe assets to the 
total assets of the lender; the latter reflects the size of the government bonds held by 
the banking sector. The higher the ratio, the higher the bank's CAR. These three 
indicators play a role in determining the size of loan extended by the banks. Clearly, 
this is different from what the standard monetary economic theory suggests, i.e., that 
interest rate and the amount of loanable funds are the determining factors.  
This core premise of credit channel theory is taken explicitly in the FCGE 
model. This is one of the important extensions from the FCGE model used in the 
previous chapter. This credit channel specification clearly highlights the importance of 
financial structure (balance sheet analysis) in understanding the growth and 
development process in many countries where the role and size of the financial sector 
are relatively big. More critically, this shifts the whole analysis of macro policy and 
micro prudential policy into a merging of the two, i.e., macro prudential policy, where 
the financial structure of each agent in the economy is at the center of the policy 
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analysis.13  The size of the financial assets that the economic agents have is directly 
associated with the financial asset price, forming a dynamic relationship between the 
volume and price. Given a particular shock, the asset price increase will raise the 
domestic asset prices. In my model, there are 14 interest-bearing financial assets, each 
of which has its own prices (return on financial asset-RN). Three of these assets (i.e., 
working capital credits, equity and share, and short-term securities) are determined 
endogenously in the model. Thus, an increase in bank-led inflows can inflate the asset 
prices. Being the weighted average of all of these financial returns, the interest rates 
depend on the dynamics of the financial sector. The interest rates and financial 
structure of agents will in turn jointly determine the level of real sector investment. 
While the effect of financial structure on investment works through the level of credit 
as described earlier, the interest rates work more directly as the rates appear in the 
investment equation. The real sector investment also depends on the exchange rate. 
Given that, in most emerging market economies, exchange rates are no longer fixed, 
and fluctuate according to changes in the macro condition, including capital flows, the 
inflows can also pose some risks (e.g., exchange rate risk). For example, if firms have 
foreign currency loans in the liability side of their balance sheet and for some reason 
the exchange rate depreciates, then the size of the loan measured in local currency will 
multiply, deteriorating the balance sheet of the firm. In such circumstances, firms will 
                                                
13 Many countries in recent years have tried to link the goal of maintaining price stability and 
securing financial stability. In some countries, they even amended the central bank law, which 
typically only stresses the importance of price stability, by explicitly adding financial stability 
as another goal.  Korea is one such example – in 2011, the Bank of Korea (central bank) 
amended its law by explicitly specifying the importance of achieving financial stability in 
addition to price stability. See Bruno, V., and Shin, H.S., 2013; and Kim, Changsoo, 2013 in 
Bibliography. 
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not invest and banks will be reluctant to issue new loans. If, on the other hand, foreign 
loans are in the banking sector, when the exchange rate depreciates, the bank's balance 
sheet will deteriorate, in which case banks will be equally reluctant to expand by 
extending credit. Either way, exchange rate depreciation will have a dampening effect 
on credit and investment. As shown in the investment equation (Eq9), the exchange 
rate appears on the right-hand side of the equation. On the contrary, if the exchange 
rate appreciates, as is usually the case when there is an increase of capital inflows, the 
relative position of firms’ balance sheet will tend to improve. This is explicitly treated 
in the credit channel equation as well (Eq8). As such, the exchange rate also plays a 
critical role in determining the level of investment directly through the investment 
equation as well as indirectly through the credit channel equation.  With this 
specification, the size of the effect of any shock tends to be amplified. The resulting 
level of investment feeds into the real sector through ID before eventually affecting 
the level of RGDP.  In the process, income generation is established in which total 
supply (Q), total output (X) and value added (VA) interact before resulting in factor 
income (YF).  
 The feedback effect from the real sector to the financial sector is also at work. 
The rising income of different institutions, after tax payments, determines the level of 
expenditure (EXP) and real consumption (CD). The remaining portion of the income 
forms savings. This change in saving alters the wealth, including financial assets and 
price. Hence, the balance sheets of different institutions are affected.  
 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆!,!"# = 𝑙𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑑𝑎0!,!"# ∗ 𝑉𝐴!!"#$%"!! ∗ 1+ 𝑎𝑣𝑔𝑅𝑁 !"#$%"!! ∗ 𝐸𝑋𝑅!"#$%"!! 
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(Eq. 9) 
 
Another channel from the real sector to the financial sector works through the 
money market. The level of money demand (MD) depends on interest rate (AvgRN) 
and level of income (INC). Thus, financial channels through AvgRN and the real 
sector channel through income jointly determine the level of money demand. In turn, 
MD as part of financial assets determines the volume of assets and liability (i.e., the 
balance sheet) of different institutions, establishing another two-way link between the 
real and financial sectors in the model.   
An alternative way to describe the mechanism is by distinguishing between 
price effect and quantity effect of the bank-led flows. Increasing MD amplifies the 
rising volume of liability and assets due to CFLOW. Along with the direct effect of 
FSAV on saving and the link between MD and institutional balance sheet, this 
represents the quantity effect of the bank-led flows on the financial sector. In the chart, 
this quantitative effect is shown through the dotted arrow line. The price effect (shown 
by the thick solid arrow line), on the other hand, is captured through the link between 
the endogenously determined asset price (RN), which includes the interest rate 
(AvgRN) and income of different institutions (INC) and investments (INVEST). The 
effect of changes in the size of asset and liability on the returns of financial asset (RN) 
is another channel that shows the price effect. Both the quantity and price effects 
determine the nature and intensify of the interaction between the financial sector and 
the real sector in the model. In this chapter, I utilize such interactions to capture the 
role of the credit channel in simulating the effect of bank-led flows.  
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To summarize, the easy money policy in industrial countries that led to 
massive capital inflows to emerging market economies also led to potential capital 
inflows intermediated through the banking sector (bank-led flows). These flows 
increase the liquidity and size of the balance sheet of the banking sector and, in turn, 
those of firms and households. The resulting appreciated exchange rate that is due to 
the inflows improves the relative position of the firm’s financial structure.  
According to the credit channel equation specified in Eq8, this will augment the firms’ 
wealth in that banks’ incentive to issue credit also increases. The way the model 
captures this mechanism is through a recursive dynamic manner (dynamic credit 
channel) in which the change in the exchange rate is incorporated into the calculation 
of firm’s wealth, and this firm’s wealth is then activated in the credit channel equation 
in the subsequent period (Eq8).  
Incomes are generated from factor income, income transfers, and financial 
income – all of which determine the income distribution between poor and rich 
households, and the between households in rural and urban areas.  In the next section, 
I discuss the results of model simulations by examining the economy-wide impact of 
bank-led flows, including impacts on income distribution and poverty. 
 
 
2.4. Analysis 
Five different scenarios are analyzed in this section. The first two scenarios 
validate two critical specifications: the credit channel and its dynamic feature. Each 
scenario compares the result from the models including and excluding each feature. 
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The third and fifth scenarios investigate the socio-economic impact of prudent and 
non-prudent behaviors of the banking sector under the increased bank-led inflow. The 
third scenario also includes the impact of the different behaviors of firms when the 
banking sector is involved in risky, or non-prudent, financial behavior. The fourth 
scenario deals with a boom and bust cycle and its implication.  
 
2.4.1. The Comparison of Non-credit and Credit models 
In order to highlight the role of credit channel in the model, this section starts 
by comparing the simulation results from the FCGE model without the credit channel 
(non-credit model), and the FCGE model with the credit channel (credit model). The 
equation of motion is activated and CFLOW shock is used in the two models. The 
result shows that the credit assets of banking sector in the credit model are less than 
those in the non-credit model (Table 2.1). As a result of the increased inflows, the 
wealth of bank and firm decrease in both models; however, when it comes to bank 
loans available in the economy, bank loans in the non-credit model do not change, 
whereas those in the credit model decrease. This shows the negative balance sheet 
effect on bank loans in the presence of credit channel. In other words, the credit model 
takes into account the fact that the availability of credit in the economy depends not 
only on interest rates but also on the financial structure of the lenders and borrowers. 
Furthermore, in the credit model, the income distribution of the households worsens 
(Figure 2.4). This suggests that the non-credit model underestimates the income 
inequality effect. The decrease in bank loans involving the credit channel mechanism 
can create distortion in the income distributed to the rich and poor households and to 
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rural and urban areas, thus worsening the income and regional disparities.  
 
 
Table 2.1. Wealth and Bank’s Loan in Non-credit and Credit Models 
Wealth	  
CFLOW	  shock	   Baseline	   Without	  credit	  channel	  
With	   	  
credit	  channel	  
Change	  
Absolute	   	   %	  
Bank's	  Wealth	   23655738.00	   23656945.00	   23655359.00	   -­‐1586.00	   	   -­‐0.0067042	   	  
Financial	  Firm's	  
Wealth	   52103470.00	   52104116.00	   52103159.00	   -­‐957.00	   	   -­‐0.0018367	   	  
Non-­‐Financial	  Firm's	  
Wealth	   -­‐608528100.00	   -­‐608517400.00	   -­‐608533200.00	   -­‐15800.0	   	   -­‐0.0025965	   	  
Bank’s	  Credit	  Asset	  
CFLOW	  shock	   Baseline	  
Without	  
Credit	  
channel	  
With	   	  
Credit	  
channel	  
Change	  
Absolut
e	   	   %	  
Bank	  Loan	   576144310.0	   576144310.0	   576138010.0	   -­‐6300.0	   -­‐0.0010935	   	  
 
 
 
Figure 2.4. Household Income Distributions: % Changes Between Non-credit and 
Credit Models 
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2.4.2. The Dynamic Credit Channel  
Table 2.2. Changes in Bank’s Balance Sheet Between the Static and Dynamic Models 
 
*The numbers (in million Indonesian rupiah) represent absolute changes in each value  
 
The dynamic credit channel model (dynamic model) reflects the role of 
exchange rate appreciation or depreciation in the determination of bank loans by 
affecting the balance sheets of borrowers and lenders. The exchange rate appreciation 
due to the massive capital inflow inflates asset values in domestic currency. This is 
favorable to the asset holders, providing better financial structure of lenders and 
borrowers. The banks, however, focus instead on risky investments, buying short-term 
securities and equity and shares while decreasing their issuing of credit (Table 2.2). 
This shows that banks are inclined to be more profitable by having more security and 
equity assets, which provides higher returns than having credit assets. According to 
credit channel theory, the banks are supposed to increase lending given the favorable 
balance sheet effect; however, banks decided to allocate their capital more to 
securities, and equity and share while decreasing their loans because of bank’s strong 
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preference for the excessive risk-taking investments in the midst of increased liquidity 
from the capital inflow. This behavior of the banking sector supports Tobin’s theory of 
portfolio allocation.14 This investment pattern will later make the return on such 
assets even more increased. Indeed, financial income of both banks and firms are 
further increased, increasing their total income despite the decline in factor income 
under the dynamic credit channel analysis. It turns out that this excessive risk-taking 
behavior of the banking sector further worsens the income distributions, as shown in 
Figure 2.6. Interestingly however by incorporating exchange rate changes in the 
behavior of banking sector the magnitude of the income decline of all categories of 
households are smaller than the case when the exchange rate does not play a role in 
bank’s behavior. See Figure 2.5. This implies that the household income and income 
distributions can be overestimated if the dynamic feature is not incorporated into the 
analysis. For such reason, the dynamic credit channel is used to analyze the behavior 
of the banking sector after section 2.4.3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
14 According to Tobin, investors allocate their financial asset based on risk and the returns on 
financial assets. In this case, the benefit from the returns on securities and equity and shares 
might outweigh the risk embedded in the financial asset investment given the booming 
environment. 
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Figure 2.5. Income of Domestic Institutions: % Changes Between Static and Dynamic 
Models 
 
 
Figure 2.6. Household Income Distributions: % Changes Between Static and Dynamic 
Models 
  103 
2.4.3. Risky Behavior of Banking Sector Under Bank-led Inflow 
This scenario analyzes the impact of the non-prudent behavior of the banking 
sector under CFLOW rather than the banking sector playing a traditional role as an 
intermediary. The results are compared with the baseline. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.7. % Changes in Real Sector Variables and Financial Returns under Risk-
taking Behavior 
 
 
The results show that an increase in bank-led flows has an expansionary effect 
on the overall economy. As shown in Figure 2.7, the real GDP, investment, export, 
and import all increase such that the labor market is benefited as indicated by the 
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decline in unemployment rate. The bank-led flows that augment the balance sheet of 
lenders and borrowers also tend to raise the domestic financial assets. In Table 2.3, 
this is shown by an increase in the financial returns, short-term securities, and equity 
and share. The rising return of financial assets along with growing economy would 
have placed pressure on price level; however, the endogenously determined interests 
rates in the model play a role as one of the equilibrating factors. As shown in Figure 
2.7, the interest rates increase, countering the inflationary pressure. The resulting 
appreciated EXR provides an additional countermeasure on prices such that the price 
level declines. Overall, therefore, the economy expanded without inflationary 
pressure, although export declines. The absence of inflation has created another 
favorable effect on poverty line measured by the quantity of basic needs multiplied by 
the price of those commodities; however, to determine the precise effect on poverty, 
one must also examine the impact on the income of the poor (Azis, 2008). As depicted 
in Figure 2.8, the total income of both the rural and urban poor decrease slightly; 
however since the percentage decline of the poverty line is greater than the percentage 
decline of income of the poor, it is likely that poverty incidence declines.15 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
15 The incidence of poverty measured as a headcount of poverty is the number of people living below 
the poverty line. Therefore, lower poverty line and higher income of the poor implies a lower headcount 
of poverty. 
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Figure 2.8. % Changes in Income of Domestic Institutions under Bank’s Risk-taking 
Behavior 
 
The real sector investment increases given the increased availability of bank 
loans. The 30% increase in investment in response to only a 3% increase in bank loans 
shows that the firms rely not only on banks’ loans but also on other sources of 
financing as well.  For example, borrowing agents can finance their investment 
through funds raised in equity, share and securities markets. This argument is 
supported by the increase in equity and short-term securities in firm’s liability (Table 
2.3). The augmented income of firms is solely due to their financial income. Despite 
the sharp decrease of their factor income, the total income is increased due to the 
earnings from the financial activities (Figure 2.8). This sector plays a critical role in 
total investment, and their income share among all agents is the biggest in the 
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economy. Thus, the booming financial sector can have a positive impact on them and 
the overall investment in the economy.  
The consumption decrease is supported by the decrease in total income of all 
households. Their factor income decreases due to falling wages, and rural rich and 
urban poor households experience the sharpest decline in their income and 
consumption. Only the financial income of urban rich households is recorded to be 
rising (0.1%). This increase, which is due to higher financial returns supported by the 
capital inflows, makes the rich households less affected by the income loss. 
 
Table 2.3. Absolute Changes in Bank’s and Firm’s Balance Sheets Showing Banks’ 
Risk-taking Behavior  
*The numbers (in million Indonesian rupiah) represent absolute changes in each value during 
bank-led inflow from baseline 
 
Banks in this economy, and in this analysis, play an important role especially 
as an intermediary; however, the results show that the banking sector plays a role more 
as an investor in the financial sector than as an intermediary during this inflow. In 
response to the increased foreign capital in their balance sheet, the banking sector 
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issues short-term securities, equity and shares while borrowing money (see the 
liability side of bank’s balance sheet in Table 2.3). This behavior of the banking sector 
drives down the prices of those financial assets by increasing the supply in the market. 
This, in turn, increases the financial returns on the short-term securities, equity, and 
share assets. The high returns on those assets lure the investors, which include the 
banking sector. The banking sector increases short-term security and equity and share 
assets while decreasing money demand and even sacrificing their wealth.  This 
indicates that they are involved in risky financial investments given the abundance of 
foreign capital. This can create volatility and even vulnerability in the economy. The 
capital adequacy ratio (CAR) -- capital/risky assets -- is indeed decreased.  
 
 
Figure 2.9. % Changes in Household Income Distributions under Bank’s Risk-taking 
Behavior 
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Some might argue that this behavior of the banking sector has a minor impact 
on the economy based on the favorable macro-economic performance described 
earlier; however, what is still missing from the above analysis is the impact of the 
behavior of the banking sector on income inequality. As described above, there are 
three main sources of household income: factor income (YF), income transfer 
(ITRAN), and financial income (ASSETS*RN). The growing economy led to growing 
income of most institutions, particularly banks, non-financial firms, and government. 
The total income of all institutions indeed increases although incomes of the 
households decline. This suggests that since the bank-led flows are more connected 
with banks and the modern sector, the latter benefits more from the flows. In the 
model specification, I assume that there is no change in the income transfer between 
institutions. The resulting total income, however, still needs to be added to the 
financial income. As shown in figure 2.8, the increase in bank-led flows generates a 
higher increase in financial income for the rich urban households. This implies a 
worsening rural-urban income disparity16 (see Figure 2.9). From Figure 2.9, we can 
also see that the total income distribution between the poor and rich has worsened and 
as has distribution between rural and urban regions. Within rural areas, the factor 
income distribution is expected to be most dominant. Thus, the worsening of 
distribution in that category of income leads to the worsening of total income 
distribution. In the urban area, since only the urban rich have access to financial assets 
and hence benefit from bank-led inflows, the financial income inequality worsens. 
Along with the worsening of factor income distribution, this causes the total relative 
                                                
16 For complete set of the balance sheet of each of the institutions before and after the shock, 
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income distribution to deteriorate. As one of the highlights of the welfare measures, 
the rural urban income shows an interesting trend. In both urban and rural areas, the 
rich and the poor households suffer from factor income loss tracing the sources of the 
income fall the declining price level holds the key as wages specified as positive 
functions of price level17. However, in percentage term largest fall occurs in factor 
income of urban poor, followed by factor income of rural poor. This is obviously not a 
favorable outcome given the fact that even the same size of income decline between 
the rich and poor the real affect fell more by the poor. Among the rich, the percentage 
decline in rural and urban household income is almost the same. But the fall in their 
total income is rather different. Among the urban rich the percentage fall is much less 
than that of the rural rich. The primary reason of this is precisely the presence of 
financial income. The financial income of the urban rich actually increases whereas 
the financial income of the rural rich declines (see Figure 2.8). It is clear that the role 
of financial income modeled in the FCGE is so critical that such an opposite trend can 
be exposed. Without considering the financial sector in the model any financial trend 
including that of financial income cannot be disclosed. In this particular scenario, 
when bank’s behavior is shifting towards investing in more risky assets, those who 
benefit from it are the urban rich who have access on financial investment. Therefore, 
with the inclusion of financial sector in the model one can explicitly link the behavior 
of economic agents, in this particular case the agent is the banking sector, and rural-
urban income disparity. Hardily any economic models can explicate such a link. 
                                                                                                                                       
see appendix. 
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As discussed earlier, firms are also a significant economic agent that decide the 
level of real sector investment, similar to the what banking sector does, affecting the 
economy and society. As shown in Table 2.3, firms follow a financial investment 
pattern similar to that of the banking sector, pursuing high returns in the financial 
market. Firms, however, also help the real sector economy by increasing their physical 
investment (RUP 176,412 million). The money borrowed from banks and financed 
through issuing more equity and security debts  (RUP 499,830 million), allows firms 
to invest more in not only financial assets (RUP 154,599 million) but also in 
expanding the businesses. The real sector investment as a ratio to the total investment 
is increased by 4.5% while financial investment is increased by 0.1%. Indeed the real 
sector investment made by firms has grown 29% during increased bank-led inflow, 
resulting in high growth18. We should, however, not forget that the growth failed to 
improve the income inequalities between the rich and the poor, or between the rural 
and the urban. As shown in Figure 2.9, it worsens income inequalities although shortly 
generating high economic growth due to the increased liquidity and the financial 
boom. As discussed earlier, the behavior, which heavily focuses on financial 
investment, can also generate vulnerability and volatility in the economy. The 
economic boom can turn out to be a disaster if a massive capital reversal happens, as 
                                                                                                                                       
17 𝑊𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑆! = 𝑃𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑋!"! ∗ !"!!"!! (!!!"!) ∗ !!!"#$%!!,!"!" !"#!! !!!!; Wage is a function of price index 
18 In a different model simulation where firms invest more in financial assets while decreasing 
the real sector investment given the less availability of bank loan, the economy experienced 
less growth than the case where firms increase the real sector investment by 29% -- the 
prudent firm case. This shows that the level of physical investment and economic growth 
depends not only on firm’s behavior but also banking sector, deciding the availability of loan. 
Again, however, this does not guarantee improving poverty conditions and income inequalities. 
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many countries have experienced before falling into a financial crisis. This will be 
explained in section 2.4.5.  
 
 
2.4.5. Outflow 
 
Table 2.4. Changes in Bank’s Balance Sheet Showing Bank’s Risk-taking Behavior 
during Bank-led Inflows  
 
*The numbers (in million Indonesian rupiah) represent absolute changes in each value during 
bank-led inflow from baseline 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Banking sector* Firm*
Asset Liability Asset Liability
Fixed investment 0.00 -735.00 Wealth Fixed investment 176412.05 610503.00 Wealth
Money demand -50986.00 -146570.00 Money demand Money demand 6437242.70 0.00 Money demand
Saving deposit 0.00 0.00 Saving deposit Saving deposit 0.00 0.00 Saving deposit
Central bank certificate 0.00 0.00 Central bank certificate Central bank certificate 0.00 0.00 Central bank certificate
Government bond 0.00 0.00 Government bond Government bond 0.00 6595108.37 Government bond
Short-term securities 180393.00 72367.00 Short-term securities Short-term securities 8798.17 120288.29 Short-term securities
Credits 3080.00 98.10 Credits Credits 109.00 7210.00 Credits
Equity&share 12364.10 219680.00 Equity&share Equity&share 145692.33 371882.00 Equity&share
Others 0.00 0.00 Others Others 0.00 0.00 Others
144900.00 144900.00 6106230.00 6106230.00
*Firms invested more in real sector to expand their business with the money 
borrowed from banks and financed through issuing more equity and security 
debts compared to the financial investment. the real sector investment as a 
ratio to the total investment is increased by 4.5% while financial investment is 
increased by 0.1%. Indeed the real sector investment made by firm has 
grown 29% under the increased foreign capital inflows through banking 
sector. The prudent behavior of firms helps the economy grow. the growth , 
however, failed to improve the income inequalities between rich and poor, 
and between rural and urban. The role of banking sector is quite significant in 
this economy.
**bank risky and firm risky 
 
fixa.fx("fin4")=fixa.l("fin4");"
  FS.LO(nfl) = -inf ;"
  FS.UP(nfl)= +inf ;
Banking sector** Firm**
Asset Liability Asset Liability
Fixed investment 0.00 6411.00 Wealth Fixed investment 61.81 65838.00 Wealth
Money demand 628496.00 6215120.00 Money demand Money demand 6243637.30 0.00 Money demand
Saving deposit 0.00 0.00 Saving deposit Saving deposit 0.00 0.00 Saving deposit
Central bank certificate 0.00 0.00 Central bank certificate Central bank certificate 0.00 0.00 Central bank certificate
Government bond 0.00 0.00 Government bond Government bond 0.00 6701242.94 Government bond
Short-term securities 203583.00 81670.00 Short-term securities Short-term securities 9929.22 135752.83 Short-term securities
Credits 180.00 5.60 Credits Credits 6.20 412.00 Credits
Equity&share 18435.40 327550.00 Equity&share Equity&share 217231.68 554492.00 Equity&share
Others 0.00 0.00 Others Others 0.00 0.00 Others
193700.00 193700.00 616460.00 616460.00
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Table 2.5. Changes in Bank’s Balance Sheet during Outflow Compared to Bank-led 
Inflow  
 
*The numbers (in million Indonesian rupiah) represent absolute changes in each value during 
outflow from the period when bank-led capital flows into the economy 
 
While bank-led inflows can stimulate the economy, they can also generate 
vulnerability in the banking sector that can adversely impact the economy through the 
resulting systemic risks. As discussed above, the flows of cheap money alter the 
behavior of banks, moving them more towards risk-taking. If most capital from the 
inflows is used to invest in highly risky financial assets, it will increase bank’s 
vulnerability by lowering the CAR. This can potentially lead to a banking crisis and 
eventually an economic crisis. The risky investment after bank-led inflows is shown in 
the balance sheet of the banking sector (Table 2.4).  The volume and prices of short-
term securities and equity and shares increase, as shown in the asset side of bank’s 
balance sheet. The short-term portfolios and debts consisting mainly of bank-led flows 
pose a great risk of abrupt outflows when there is an external shock. This causes the 
balance sheet of agents to deteriorate. The sudden outflows put pressure on the 
exchange rate to depreciate sharply, damaging the balance sheets of firms or 
Banking sector*(inflow compared)
Asset Liability
Fixed investment 0.00 196.00 Wealth
Money demand 13653.00 99600.00 Money demand
Saving deposit 0.00 0.00 Saving deposit
Central bank certificate 0.00 0.00 Central bank certificate
Government bond 0.00 0.00 Government bond
Short-term securities -94732.00 -38003.00 Short-term securities
Credits -200.00 -6.20 Credits
Equity&share -8531.70 -151590.00 Equity&share
Others 0.00 0.00 Others
-89800.00 -89800.00
Banking sector*(baseline compared)
Asset Liability
Fixed investment 0.00 -539.00 Wealth
Money demand -37333.00 -46970.00 Money demand
Saving deposit 0.00 0.00 Saving deposit
Central bank certificate 0.00 0.00 Central bank certificate
Government bond 0.00 0.00 Government bond
Short-term securities 85661.00 34364.00 Short-term securities
Credits 2880.00 91.90 Credits
Equity&share 3832.40 68090.00 Equity&share
Others 0.00 0.00 Others
55100.00 55100.00
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borrowers that are heavily indebted in foreign currency. This damage done to the 
balance sheet of firms is incorporated into the bank loan equation in which wealth is 
affected by the changes in exchange rate. In the event of external shocks, the negative 
impacts can be much larger due to the systemic role of the financial sector. The recent 
episode of capital reversal in emerging markets when most of the EU banks had to 
withdraw their funding serves as a notable example. When bank-led inflows took such 
an opposite direction, flow volatility increased. Therefore, despite the growth-
enhancing advantages of bank-led inflows, its overall effect must be cautiously 
evaluated in the presence of credit channel.   
 By analyzing the economy-wide impact, including the balance sheet effect on 
the banking sector under the scenario of capital flow reversal, one can recognize that 
the first immediate impact was the opposite direction of equity and securities assets 
held by the banking sector. As outflows occur, these risky assets decline, causing the 
total assets of banks also to fall despite the fact that the money demand and amount of 
currency increases (Table 2.5). One can think of a situation where, given the outflows, 
a bank may need to adjust its portfolio. This implies the deteriorating bank’s balance 
sheet.  Fearful of worsening liquidity condition, banks tend to hold more currency 
(MD), while continuing to lend in order to avoid worsening economic conditions.  
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Table 2.6. Changes in Bank’s Balance Sheet during Outflow Compared to Baseline 
 
*The numbers (in million Indonesian rupiah) represent absolute changes in each value during 
outflow from baseline 
 
 
To what extent has this new equilibrium outcome changed from the baseline 
(i.e., before the bank-led flows took place)? It is clear that the amount of loans 
extended from the banking sector is lower and the overall wealth of the bank in 
nominal terms as well as ratio terms is also lower (see Table 2.6). 
 
Figure 2.10. Changes in Bank’s Income Composition During Outflow Compared to 
Baseline 
Banking sector*(inflow compared)
Asset Liability
Fixed investment 0.00 196.00 Wealth
Money demand 13653.00 99600.00 Money demand
Saving deposit 0.00 0.00 Saving deposit
Central bank certificate 0.00 0.00 Central bank certificate
Government bond 0.00 0.00 Government bond
Short-term securities -94732.00 -38003.00 Short-term securities
Credits -200.00 -6.20 Credits
Equity&share -8531.70 -151590.00 Equity&share
Others 0.00 0.00 Others
-89800.00 -89800.00
Banking sector*(baseline compared)
Asset Liability
Fixed investment 0.00 -539.00 Wealth
Money demand -37333.00 -46970.00 Money demand
Saving deposit 0.00 0.00 Saving deposit
Central bank certificate 0.00 0.00 Central bank certificate
Government bond 0.00 0.00 Government bond
Short-term securities 85661.00 34364.00 Short-term securities
Credits 2880.00 91.90 Credits
Equity&share 3832.40 68090.00 Equity&share
Others 0.00 0.00 Others
55100.00 55100.00
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The total income of the banking sector decreases by as much as the fall in its 
financial income (Figure 2.10), highlighting the critical role of financial assets in 
determining the income or capital of the sector. The outflows also negatively affect the 
income of non-financial firms, banks, and financial firms (Figure 2.11). Although their 
factor incomes are all increasing, the total incomes decrease due to a decline in the 
financial income. This shows how financial income can hold the key to the 
determining the level of income. Non-financial firms, financial firms, and banks all 
experience negative effects of outflows. The economy as a whole thus experiences a 
decline in total and financial income. In the case of rural rich and poor households, 
and urban poor households, the decrease in prices of assets has little (if any) influence 
on their income, while the increase in factor income enables them to enjoy income 
increase. This is due to the fact that they do not possess much securities and equity and 
share assets (the rural rich have few while others have none). The dependency of poor 
and rich households in rural areas, and poor households in urban areas, on factor 
income is greater than their dependency on financial income. Therefore, what happens 
in terms of financial assets barely affects their income because they own limited 
financial assets. The negative financial income effect on rich households in urban 
areas and lack of effect on other households thus generates an improvement in the 
overall relative income distribution. However, this welfare results under the scenario 
of capital outflows should not be considered as favorable because when we compare 
with the baseline results prior to capital inflows the incomes of all category of 
households are lowered. More seriously, the percentage income fall of the rural poor 
and rural rich is larger than the percentage income fall of urban poor and urban rich, 
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respectively (see Figure 2.14). Hence the inflow and outflow sequence (also know as 
boom and bust) is damaging when the rural urban household income is used as the key 
measure of welfare.  
 
 
Figure 2.11. % Changes in Income of Domestic Institutions during Outflow Compared 
to the Bank-led Inflow 
 
 
 
Figure 2.12. % Changes in Household Income Distributions During Outflow 
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Compared to Increased Bank-led Inflow 
 
 The impacts of capital flow reversal on the macro-economy are as expected. 
The immediate one is on the exchange rate. In both nominal and real terms, the 
exchange rate depreciates (Figure 2.13). As described in the model structure earlier, a 
depreciation of exchange rate has a negative impact on investment. As a result, total 
investment declines despite the fact that value added has increased due to increased 
export, and interest rates decline. The latter is caused by the falling return on financial 
assets after capital outflows take place. The increase in export along with higher 
consumption, however, leads to higher GDP, which in turn raises the factor income 
and household income. Notice that real GDP is slightly decreased because the 
exchange rate depreciation puts upward pressure on prices and it cancels the positive 
effect of the increased export and consumption on RGDP. With higher factor income 
across all households and relatively unchanged financial income, the overall income 
distribution is relatively favorable; however, the poverty line tends to increase since 
the price index also increases. As discussed earlier, it is impossible to determine 
precisely what happens with the incidence of poverty, especially when the income of 
the poor increases. If we compare this scenario of post-capital outflows with the 
baseline scenario before the bank-led inflows, we can see that income distribution has 
worsened although the poverty line declined. In particular, financial incomes of the 
urban rich, banks, non-financial firms, and government decrease sharply, as shown in 
Figure 2.14. This shows that, during outflows, those who have financial assets suffer 
more than those who do not. This, along with the worsening of firm’s wealth, clearly 
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indicates that the boom-and-bust scenario, i.e., from bank-led inflows to bank-led 
outflows, does not result in improved welfare. It is also clear that the vulnerability I 
have shown in the previous scenario is proven to be a determining factor. Therefore, 
the risks associated with bank-led inflows can overshadow its benefits.  
 
 
Figure 2.13. % Changes in Real Sector Variables During Outflow Compared to Bank-
led Inflow 
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Figure 2.14. % Changes in Income of Domestic Institutions during Outflow 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.15. % Changes in Household Income Distributions during Outflow 
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Figure 2.16. Changes in Financial Incomes of Domestic Institutions during Outflow 
 
 
2.4.6. Prudent Behavior of Banking Sector Under Bank-led Inflow 
 
Figure 2.17. % Changes in Real Sector Variables under Bank’s Prudent Behavior 
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There are two possible categories of bank behavior given the foreign capital 
available in their liability side: risky and non-risky. Previously in the model, the bank 
behavior was such that the increase in liquidity due to CFLOW was mostly allocated 
to risky assets, such as equity and short-term securities.19 Such investments will 
decrease CAR (capital/risky asset). The other category is bank’s non-risky behavior 
where the banks become risk-averse, i.e., increasing money demand (capital). The 
impact of such different behaviors on the economy will also differ. What would 
happen if the bank behavior were to favor non-risky assets, in particular, allocating 
most of the additional liquidity into more liquid money demand (Table 2.7)?  
The results indicate that the economy would also be growing (15%); however, 
unlike before, the capital inflows through the banking sector would lead to increased 
liquidity prices. Usually, when there is a capital inflow, the demand for domestic 
assets will rise, causing the price to increase. The result in the current scenario seems 
to be in line with such a scenario. The general price index is also higher. The size of 
the equity price also indicates that increased CFLOW may lead to a price bubble 
(Figure 2.17). Precisely because of this, unlike before, the resulting exchange rate is 
depreciating20. Also, the prices in real sector and financial sector had upward pressure 
as banks and other institutions increased money demand. Thus, unlike in the scenario 
of risky behavior, both the macro and social issues improve; however, the risk of asset 
                                                
19 Increasing credit assets alternatively is a risky behavior of banks, especially during an 
economic downturn, thereby decreasing CAR as it forms a vicious cycle as mentioned in 
Section 2. 
20 This is confirmed by conducting another model simulation excluding credit channel and 
equation of motion, given the same constraints and CFLOW shock. These simulation results 
show that the exchange rate is appreciated while price is decreased. Price plays a critical role 
in the direction of the EXR in the model. 
  122 
bubble creation emerges.  
 
Table 2.7. Changes in Bank’s Balance Sheet Showing Bank’s Prudent Behavior 
 
*The numbers (in million Indonesian rupiah) represent absolute changes in each value during 
bank-led inflow from baseline 
 
The fact that most of the increased liquidity goes to non-risky assets of the 
bank also implies that the bank’s vulnerability is reduced. As shown in Table 2.7, the 
foreign capital is invested in the form of demand deposits in banks. In response to the 
increased money demand, the banking sector tries to secure cash for any withdrawal 
requests on demand deposits. The banking sector buys back the equity and share assets 
to deposit them in checking accounts (money demand is increased by Rup 425197 
million in the asset side).  This behavior of the banking sector drives up the price of 
the equity and share assets by decreasing the supply in the market, which in turn, 
decreases the financial returns on the equity and share assets. The low returns make 
investors, including the banking sector, lose the motivation to invest. The banking 
Banking sector* Firm
Asset Liability Asset Liability
Fixed investment 0.00 6264.00 Wealth Fixed investment 86695.76 89434.00 Wealth
Money demand 425197.00 3153240.00 Money demand Money demand 3433843.40 0.00 Money demand
Saving deposit 0.00 0.00 Saving deposit Saving deposit 0.00 0.00 Saving deposit
Central bank certificate 0.00 0.00 Central bank certificate Central bank certificate 0.00 0.00 Central bank certificate
Government bond 0.00 1772842.90 Government bond Government bond 0.00 8362960.36 Government bond
Short-term securities 0.00 0.00 Short-term securities Short-term securities 0.00 0.00 Short-term securities
Credits -4300.00 -137.30 Credits Credits 6152.60 610092.00 Credits
Equity&share -269046.80 -4780360.00 Equity&share Equity&share 63170268.76 68092163.00 Equity&share
Others 0.00 0.00 Others Others 0.00 0.00 Others
151900.00 151900.00 350120.00 350120.00
Under the increased capital inflows and prudent behavior of banking sector, firm 
increases physical investment (2%) while deceases financial investment 
(-1.9%). While credit is less available, firm is wealthy enough to invest with their 
saving and cash (money demand is increased by  1.51%  as a ratio to the total 
investment).
The investment decision of firm 
depends on the availability of loan 
when invest in real sector. When 
banking sector is lending more money, 
they increased real sector investment 
by 4.5% while firms increased real 
sector investment by 2% in this case. 
Firms in this scenario reduced financial 
investment due to the decreased 
profitability with the same risk 
embedded in financial sector (Tobin’s 
portfolio theory).
In both cases, firms are more being 
prudent as they help the economy to 
grow by investing more in real sector. 
What if firm instead rigorously invest in 
financial sector? What would be the 
repercussion to the economy?
Banking sector* Firm
Asset Liability Asset Liability
Fixed investment 0.00 6264.00 Wealth Fixed investment 86695.76 89434.00 Wealth
Money demand 425197.00 3153240.00 Money demand Money demand 3433843.40 0.00 Money demand
Saving deposit 0.00 0.00 Saving deposit Saving deposit 0.00 0.00 Saving deposit
Central bank certificate 0.00 0.00 Central bank certificate Central bank certificate 0.00 0.00 Central bank certificate
Government bond 0.00 1772842.90 Government bond Government bond 0.00 8362960.36 Government bond
Short-term securities 0.00 0.00 Short-term securities Short-term securities 0.00 0.00 Short-term securities
Credits -4300.00 -137.30 Credits Credits 6152.60 610092.00 Credits
Equity&share -269046.80 -4780360.00 Equity&share Equity&share 63170268.76 68092163.00 Equity&share
Others 0.00 0.00 Others Others 0.00 0.00 Others
151900.00 151900.00 350120.00 350120.00
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sector sells the equity and share assets while increasing the money demand and 
wealth.  In an extreme risk-aversion case, the banking sector even calls the credits 
that it issued. This risk-aversion behavior of the banking sector yields different 
implications on the economy and society when compared with the case of banks 
become risk-taking. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.18. % Changes in Income of Domestic Institutions under Bank’s Prudent 
Behavior 
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Figure 2.19. % Changes in Household Income Distributions under Bank’s Prudent 
Behavior 
 
 
 
Based on the household income shown in Figure 2.18, the growing economy 
produces higher factor income for all categories of households, the largest percentage 
increases of which are for the poor (i.e., rural and urban); however, the non-risky 
behavior of the banks, combined with the fact that return on financial assets declines, 
alter the distribution of financial income for rural poor and rich, while the financial 
income of the urban poor increases, although their ownership volume is relatively 
small, and the financial income of the large holders of the financial asset (i.e., urban 
rich) decreases (0.3%). Which such a trend the overall income distribution between 
rural and urban households improves the largest percentage improvements of which 
occurs in financial income distribution (see Figure 2.19). It is also interesting to note 
that the percentage improvement in rural rich income is much higher than the one in 
the rural poor such that the financial income inequality among rural households 
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worsens. The poverty line under the current scenario is increasing, which suggests that 
the improved income inequality should be analyzed in more detail in terms of whose 
income has decreased or increased (Figure 2.17 and 2.18). Judging from the 
simulation results, the total income of the rural and urban poor increases the most. 
Combined with the increase of the poverty line, which is less than the rate of the 
increase of the income of the poor, this suggests that the incidence of poverty tends to 
decrease.   
Under the non-prudent behavior of the banking sector, the economy 
experiences a higher growth rate (18% vs. 15%) than the economy under the prudent 
behavior of banking sector. The economy, however, suffers from worsening poverty 
conditions and income inequalities that can harm the sustainability of growth in the 
medium and long term21, while social conditions improve under the prudent behavior 
of banking sector. Thus, overall the prudent behavior of the banking sector can not 
only help the growth of the economy in the medium and long run but also help 
improve social conditions.  
 
 
2.5. Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, we investigated the role of the banking sector in determining 
the availability of loans in emerging markets that experience massive capital inflows. 
For that purpose, we incorporated credit channel theory into the FCGE model. As this 
theory places heavy emphasis on the role of the banking sector in the availability of 
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loans, the FCGE model is specified in such a way that loan availability does not 
depend solely on interest rate but also on the financial structures of banks and 
borrowers – i.e., the credit channel. In the model, thus, banks’ behavior or any 
phenomena that can alter banks’ behavior, such as changes in banks’ balance sheet 
and borrowers’ financial structure, matter more than the interest rate that is believed to 
be the main driving force of loan availability. We update the credit channel such that 
changes in exchange rate in the previous period also affect the financial structure of 
lenders and borrowers by inflating or deflating asset values in the next period, thereby 
changing banks’ behavior in lending.  
 Another important focus of this chapter is the implications of policy shocks on 
urban-rural income inequality, which is highlighted as the most important measure of 
welfare. To the extent that the total income received by urban and rural households 
comes from factor income, income transfer, and financial income, the dynamics of 
these categories of income determine the total as well as the distribution of income. 
When the focus of investment leans towards financial assets that are usually more 
risky, the resulting growth of the financial sector does not necessarily imply improved 
welfare because only those who have more access to the financial market, i.e., usually 
the urban rich households, will gain. This worsens the income inequality between the 
rich and the poor as well as between rural and urban households. Thus, the seemingly 
unrelated phenomena of capital flows (in this case, bank-led flows) and household 
spatial income distribution actually have a clear relation, as shown by the FCGE 
model simulations. When bank-led flows led to more investment in risky financial 
                                                                                                                                       
21 Stiglitz (2013) in his book “The Price of Inequality:..” illustrates why and how inequalities 
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assets, relatively wealthy households living in urban areas can gain much more than 
the rest of the society. If the increased financial assets also lead to growing output 
(real sector), then the resulting factor income will improve the relative position of the 
non-rich because a large share of the latter’s income comes from factor income; 
however, if the financial assets do not translate into real sector and instead re-circulate 
in the financial market with limited spillover to the real sector, then the benefits of the 
growing economy go largely to the urban rich. Unfortunately, this latter scenario 
seems to be more common in most emerging market economies.            
 The above conjectures are supported by the results of model simulations under 
different scenarios. Four types of scenarios were simulated using the FCGE model. 
The first scenario is to analyze the role of dynamic credit channel where changes in 
the exchange rate affect the local currency value of the balance sheets of lenders and 
borrowers. It was found that incorporating the effect of exchange rate changes on the 
balance sheets exacerbates the macro and social impacts of increased bank-led flows. 
While the macro impact is better, the social repercussions are even worse than in the 
static credit channel model. The second scenario is an increase in bank-led flows 
(banks’ non-core liabilities). Given the specification of the model, most of the increase 
is used by banks to invest in risky assets, such as securities and equities. This reflects 
the risk-taking behavior of banks. The results suggest that although, from the 
macroeconomic perspective, the economy will improve due to stronger liquidity, the 
social indicators such as income inequality and poverty condition will worsen. The 
firms follow a financial investment pattern similar to that of the banking sector, 
                                                                                                                                       
can hinder growth. 
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pursuing high returns in the financial market. Firms, however, also help the real sector 
economy by increasing their physical investment. The money borrowed from banks 
and financed through issuing more equity and security debts, allows firms to invest 
more, not only in financial assets, but also in expanding the businesses. Although this 
allows the economy to grow, this behavior of firms did not help improve the income 
distributions. This implies the behavior of the banking sector plays a more important 
role in the economy than that of firms. Third, following the common boom and bust 
trend in many countries, we investigate a scenario of capital flow reversal – i.e., 
increased bank-led flows followed by capital outflows. All the risks that emerged 
during the rising bank-led flows either disappear or shrink; however, when the results 
are compared with the baseline (before the boom and bust), the social indicators 
worsen. The last scenario analyzes what happens if the additional funds raised from 
increased non-core liabilities are spent by banks more prudently rather than being 
invested in risky assets. This reflects a risk-averse behavior of banks. This scenario 
turns out to be most favorable as both the macro conditions and social indicators 
improve. In particular, the spatial income inequality between rural and urban areas 
decreases, and the incidence of poverty tends to decline.  
 From these four scenarios, two major conclusions can be derived. First, 
ignoring the role of exchange rate changes in banks’ behavior (i.e., the dynamic 
component of credit channel) can yield an inaccurate picture of the impact of 
increased bank-led flows. The macroeconomic outcome is underestimated, so are the 
negative effects on social indicators. Secondly, boom and bust cycle can be 
detrimental to the economy.  One should especially not overlook the social impacts 
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of such cycle. Unless banks are prudent in using the additional funds that come from 
increased bank-led flows, attempts must be made to avoid such a boom and bust cycle. 
The analysis in the next chapter will focus specifically on what kind of policies would 
support such attempts.  
The most important contribution of the exercise in this chapter is that it shows 
how the FCGE model is capable of capturing the transmission mechanisms between 
the seemingly unrelated phenomena of macro-financial shock and spatial or rural-
urban income disparity, which is highlighted as the most important measure of 
welfare. While many studies have elaborated the mechanism and impact of capital 
flows, as far as we know, they seldom draw an explicit link between macro-financial 
shock and spatial welfare measure.  For future studies, it would be useful to extend 
upon this analysis by incorporating more financial instruments and other social 
indicators, or improving the accuracy of the parameters involved in the model. For 
example, rather than calibrating all of the parameters, one could estimate at least some 
of them by utilizing econometric equations with time series data.  
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APPENDIX 
Description Of The FCGE Model 
 
EQUATIONS 
 
Price Block 
 
1. PMDEF(i)$M0(i)..        PM(i)  =E= PWM(i)*EXR*(1 + tm(i) + ttf(i) - psubm(i)) ; 
               𝑃𝑀! = 𝑃𝑊𝑀! ∗ 𝐸𝑋𝑅 ∗ (1 + 𝑡𝑚! + 𝑡𝑡𝑓! − 𝑝𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑚!)  
 
2. PEDEF(i)$E0(i)..        PE(i)  =E= PWE(i)*EXR/(1-psube(i)) ; 
               𝑃𝐸! = (!"#!∗!"#)(!!!"#$%!)    
3. ABSORPTION(i)..         PQ(i)*Q(i)  =E= PD(i)*D(i) + (PM(i)*M(i))$M0(i) ; 
               𝑃𝑄! ∗ 𝑄! = 𝑃𝐷! ∗ 𝐷! + 𝑃𝑀! ∗𝑀!   
4. SALES(i)..              PX(i)*X(i)  =E= (1-tdom(i)-ttd(i)-impf(i))*PD(i)*D(i) + 
PE(i)*E(i) + SUB(i) ; 
               𝑃𝑋! ∗ 𝑋! = 1 − 𝑡𝑑𝑜𝑚! − 𝑡𝑡𝑑! − 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑓! ∗ 𝑃𝐷! ∗ 𝐷! + (𝑃𝐸! ∗ 𝐸!) + 𝑆𝑈𝐵!   
5. ACTP(i)..               PV(i)*VA(i) =E= PX(i)*X(i) - PINTM(i)*INTM(i) ; 
               𝑃𝑉! ∗ 𝑉𝐴! = (𝑃𝑋! ∗ 𝑋!) − (𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑀! ∗ 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑀!)   
6. PINTDEF(i)..            PINTM(i)*INTM(i) =E= ( PDINTM(i)*DINTM(i) + 
PFINTM(i)*FINTM(i) ) ; 
               𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑀! ∗ 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑀! = (𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑀! ∗ 𝐷𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑀!) + (𝑃𝐹𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑀! ∗ 𝐹𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑀!)  
 
7. PDINTDEF(i)..           PDINTM(i)  =E= SUM(j,aad(j,i)*PQ(j)) ; 
               𝑃𝐷𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑀! = (𝑎𝑎𝑑!,! ∗ 𝑃𝑄!! )  
 
8. PFINTDEF(i)..           PFINTM(i)  =E= SUM(j,aaf(j,i)*PQ(j)) ; 
               𝑃𝐹𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑀! = (𝑎𝑎𝑓!,! ∗ 𝑃𝑄!! )  
 
9. PKDEF(i)..              PK(i)  =E= SUM(j, PQ(j)*capmat(j,i)) ; 
                 𝑃𝐾! = (𝑃𝑄! ∗ 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑚𝑎𝑡!,!! )  
 
 
10. PINDEXDEF..             PINDEX  =E= GDP/RGDP ; 
               𝑃𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑋 = !"#!"#$   
 
11. WTQEQ(i)..              wtq(i)  =E= Q(i)/SUM(j, Q(j)) ; 
               𝑤𝑡𝑞! = !!!!!   
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Distortion Block 
 
1. DTTMEQ(i)..             DTTM(i)   =E= ttd(i)*PD(i)*D(i) ; 
               𝐷𝑇𝑇𝑀! = 𝑡𝑡𝑑! ∗ 𝑃𝐷! ∗ 𝐷!   
2. FTTMEQ(i)..             FTTM(i)   =E= ttf(i)*PWM(i)*EXR*M(i) ; 
               𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑀! = 𝑡𝑡𝑓! ∗ 𝑃𝑊𝑀! ∗ 𝐸𝑋𝑅 ∗𝑀!   
3. ITAXEQ(i)..             INDTAX(i) =E= tdom(i)*PD(i)*D(i) ; 
                 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑇𝐴𝑋! = 𝑡𝑑𝑜𝑚! ∗ 𝑃𝐷! ∗ 𝐷!   
4. TRIFEQ(i)..             TARIFF(i) =E= tm(i)*PWM(i)*EXR*M(i) ; 
               𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐼𝐹𝐹! = 𝑡𝑚! ∗ 𝑃𝑊𝑀! ∗ 𝐸𝑋𝑅 ∗𝑀!   
5. IMPERQ(i)..             IMPERFECT(i) =E= impf(i)*PD(i)*D(i) ; 
               𝐼𝑀𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝐸𝐶𝑇! = 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑓! ∗ 𝑃𝐷! ∗ 𝐷!   
6. SUBEQ(i)..              SUBE(i) =E= psube(i)*PE(i)*E(i) ; 
               𝑆𝑈𝐵𝐸! = 𝑝𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑒! ∗ 𝑃𝐸! ∗ 𝐸!   
7. SUBMQ(i)..              SUBM(i) =E= psubm(i)*PWM(i)*EXR*M(i) ; 
               𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑀! = 𝑝𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑚! ∗ 𝑃𝑊𝑀! ∗ 𝐸𝑋𝑅 ∗𝑀!   
 
 
 
Production Block 
 
1. OUTPUT(i)..     X(i)    =E= ai(i)*( bi(i)*VA(i)**(-rhoi(i)) + (1-bi(i))*INTM(i)**(-
rhoi(i)) )**(-1/rhoi(i)) ; 
               𝑋! = 𝑎𝑖! ∗ (𝑏𝑖! ∗ 𝑉𝐴!!!!!"! + 1 − 𝑏𝑖! ∗ 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑀!!!!!"!)!!/!!!"!   
2. INTEQ(i)..      INTM(i) =E= VA(i)*( (PV(i)/PINTM(i))*((1-bi(i))/bi(i)) 
)**(1/(1+rhoi(i))) ; 
                 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑀! = 𝑉𝐴! ∗ !"!!"#$%! ∗ !!!"!!"! !/(!!!!!"!)   
3. VADEF(i)..      VA(i)   =E= avx(i)*av(i)*(SUM(f, bv(i,f)*FACDEM(i,f)**(-
rhov(i))))**(-1/rhov(i)) ; 
                 𝑉𝐴! = 𝑎𝑣𝑥! ∗ 𝑎𝑣! ∗ ( 𝑏𝑣!,! ∗ 𝐹𝐴𝐶𝐷𝐸𝑀!,!!!!!"!)! !!/!!!"!  
 
4. FACTDEQ(i,f)$WFDIST0(i,f).. FACDEM(i,f) =E= VA(i)*(( (bv(i,f)*PV(i)) 
                                 
/(WF(f)*WFDIST(i,f)*(avx(i)*av(i))**rhov(i))))**(1/(1+rhov(i))) ; 
               𝐹𝐴𝐶𝐷𝐸𝑀!,! = 𝑉𝐴! ∗ !"!,!∗!"!!"!∗!"#$%&!,!∗(!"#!∗!"!)!!!"! !/(!!!!!"!)  
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5. WAGEEQ(i)..     WAGES(i) =E= (PINDEX**vp(i))*((PV(i)/PV0(i))**(1-
vp(i)))*(((X(i)/SUM(fl, FACDEM(i,fl)))/PDL0(i))**phi(i)) ; 
               𝑊𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑆! = 𝑃𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑋!"! ∗ !"!!"!! (!!!"!) ∗ !!!"#!"#!,!"!" !"#!! !!!!  
 
6. WFLABOR(fl)..   WF(fl)   =E= WF0(fl)*SUM(i, WAGES(i)*wlshare(i,fl)) ; 
               𝑊𝐹!" = 𝑊𝐹0!" ∗ (𝑊𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑆! ∗ 𝑤𝑙𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒!,!"! )  
 
7. INTERM(i)$FINTM0(i)..          INTM(i) =E= at(i)*( bt(i)*DINTM(i)**(-rhot(i)) + (1-
bt(i))*FINTM(i)**(-rhot(i)) )**(-1/rhot(i)) ; 
             𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑀! = 𝑎𝑡! ∗ 𝑏𝑡! ∗ 𝐷𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑀!!!!!"! + 1 − 𝑏𝑡! ∗ 𝐹𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑀!!!!!"! !!/!!!"!   
8. INTERM2(i)$(FINTM0(i)=0)..     INTM(i) =E= DINTM(i) ; 
               𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑀! = 𝐷𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑀!  
 
9. INTEREQ(i)$FINTM0(i)..        FINTM(i) =E= DINTM(i)*( (PDINTM(i)/PFINTM(i))*((1-
bt(i))/bt(i)) )**(1/(1+rhot(i))) ; 
               𝐹𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑀! = 𝐷𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑀! ∗ !"#$%&!!"#$%&! ∗ !!!"!!"! !/(!!!!!"!)   
 
10. ARMINGTON(i)$M0(i)..       Q(i)  =E= aq(i)*( bq(i)*D(i)**(-rhoq(i)) 
                                  +(1-bq(i))*M(i)**(-rhoq(i)) )**(-1/rhoq(i)) ; 
               𝑄! = 𝑎𝑞! ∗ (𝑏𝑞! ∗ 𝐷!!!!!"! + 1 − 𝑏𝑞! ∗𝑀!!!!!"!)!!/!!!"!   
 
 
11. COSTMIN(i)$M0(i)..         M(i) =E= D(i)*((PD(i)/PM(i))*((1-
bq(i))/bq(i)))**(1/(1+rhoq(i))) ; 
               𝑀! = 𝐷! ∗ !"!!"! ∗ !!!"!!"! !/(!!!!!"!)   
12. CET(i)$E0(i)..             X(i) =E= ax(i)*( bx(i)*D(i)**(rhox(i)) 
                                  +(1-bx(i))*E(i)**(rhox(i)) )**(1/rhox(i)) ; 
                 𝑋! = 𝑎𝑥! ∗ (𝑏𝑥! ∗ 𝐷!!!!"! + 1 − 𝑏𝑥! ∗ 𝐸!!!!"!)!/!!!"!   
 
13. MAXREV(i)$E0(i)..          E(i)  =E= D(i)*( (PE(i)/((1-tdom(i)-ttd(i)-
impf(i))*PD(i))) 
                                          *(bx(i)/(1-bx(i))))**(1/(rhox(i)-1) ) ; 
                 𝐸! = 𝐷! ∗ !"!!!!"#$!!!!"!!!"#$! ∗ !"!!!!!! !/(!!!"!!!)  
 
14. INTQEQ(i)..             INTQ(i) =E= SUM(j, aad(i,j)*DINTM(j) + aaf(i,j)*FINTM(j)) ; 
                 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑄! = (𝑎𝑎𝑑!,! ∗ 𝐷𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑀!! + 𝑎𝑎𝑓!,! ∗ 𝐹𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑀!)  
 
15. TTMEQ(i)..              TTM(i)   =E= DTTM(i) + FTTM(i) ; 
               𝑇𝑇𝑀! = 𝐷𝑇𝑇𝑀! + 𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑀!  
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16. TTMXEQ(i)..             TTMX(i)  =E= ttx(i)*SUM(j, TTM(j)) ; 
               𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑋! = 𝑡𝑡𝑥! ∗ 𝑇𝑇𝑀!!   
 
17. DTAXEQ(gin,din)..       DIRTAX(gin,din) =E= dtax(gin,din)*INC(din) ; 
               𝐷𝐼𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑋!"#,!"# = 𝑑𝑡𝑎𝑥!"#,!"# ∗ 𝐼𝑁𝐶!"#  
 
 
 
 
Income Block 
 
1. YFEQ(f)..         YF(f)    =E= SUM(i, WF(f)*WFDIST(i,f)*FACDEM(i,f)) + SUM(fr, 
YFROW(f,fr)) ; 
                 𝑌𝐹! = (𝑊𝐹!! ∗𝑊𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇!,! ∗ 𝐹𝐴𝐶𝐷𝐸𝑀!,!) + 𝑌𝐹𝑅𝑂𝑊!,!"!"   
 
2. DINCOME(ngi)..    INC(ngi) =E= SUM(f, factoin(ngi,f)*YF(f)) + SUM(in2, 
ITRAN(ngi,in2)) + SUM(as,rn.l(as)*Assets.l(as,ngi)); 
 𝐼𝑁𝐶!"# = (𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑖𝑛!"#,!! ∗ 𝑌𝐹!) + 𝐼𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁!"#,!"!!"! + 𝑨𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒕𝒂𝒔,𝒏𝒈𝒊 ∗ 𝑹𝑵𝒂𝒔𝒂𝒔  
 
3. GINCOME(gin)..    INC(gin) =E= SUM(f, factoin(gin,f)*YF(f)) + SUM(in2, 
ITRAN(gin,in2)) 
                                 + gishr(gin)*SUM(i, INDTAX(i) + TARIFF(i)) 
+SUM(as,rn.l(as)*Assets.l(as,gin)) ;  
 𝐼𝑁𝐶!"# = (𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑖𝑛!"#,!! ∗ 𝑌𝐹!) + 𝐼𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁!"#,!"!!"! + (𝑔𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑟!"# ∗ (𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑇𝐴𝑋!! + 𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐼𝐹𝐹!)+ 𝑨𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒕𝒂𝒔,𝒈𝒊𝒏 ∗ 𝑹𝑵𝒂𝒔𝒂𝒔   
4. YDISTRU0 = (INC0("HHH1")+INC0("HHH2"))/(INC0("HHH3")+INC0("HHH4")); 
5. YDISTLH0 = (INC0("HHH1")+INC0("HHH3"))/(INC0("HHH2")+INC0("HHH4")); 
 
 
 
 
Transfer Block 
 
1. ITRANEQ(in,in2)..     ITRAN(in,in2)  =E= GTRAN(in,in2) + OTRAN(in,in2) ; 
               𝐼𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁!",!"! = 𝐺𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁!",!"! + 𝑂𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁!",!"!  
 
2. GTRANEQ(gin,din)..    GTRAN(gin,din) =E= DIRTAX(gin,din) ; 
               𝐺𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁!"#,!"# = 𝐷𝐼𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑋!"#,!"#  
 
3. RTRANEQ(h,in2)$RTRAN0(h,in2)..     RTRAN(h,in2)  =E= RNshare(h)*SUM(asrn, 
RN(asrn)*LiabSLag(in2,asrn)) ; 
             𝑅𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁!,!!! = 𝑅𝑁𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒! ∗ (𝑅𝑁!"#$ ∗ 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑆𝐿𝑎𝑔!"!,!"#$)!"#$   
 
4. RNShrEQ(in)..          RNshare(in) =E= SUM(asrn, 
RN(asrn)*AssetSLag(asrn,in))/SUM((asrn,in2), RN(asrn)*AssetSLag(asrn,in2)) ; 
                 𝑅𝑁𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒!" = !"!"#$∗!""#$%&'(!"#$,!"!"#$ (!"!"#$!"!!"#$ ∗!""#$%&'(!"#$,!"!)  
  134 
 
 
RTRAN.FX(in,in2) = RTRAN.L(in,in2) ; 
RTRAN.LO(h,in) = -INF ; RTRAN.UP(h,in) = +INF ; 
RTRAN.FX(h,in2)$(RTRAN0(h,in2)=0) = RTRAN.L(h,in2) ; 
Expenditure Block 
 
1. YCONEQ(h)..       YCONS(h) =E= ( INC(h) - SUM(gin, DIRTAX(gin,h)) )*(1-mps(h)) - 
SUM(ngi, ITRAN(ngi,h)) - SUM(fr, ITRAN(fr,h)) ; 
               𝑌𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆! =𝐼𝑁𝐶! − 𝐷𝐼𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑋!"#,!!"# (1 −𝑚𝑝𝑠!) − 𝐼𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁!"#,! − 𝐼𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁!",!!"!"#   
 
2. HEXPEQ(h)..       EXP(h)   =E= YCONS(h) + SUM(gin, DIRTAX(gin,h)) + SUM(ngi, 
ITRAN(ngi,h)) + SUM(fr, ITRAN(fr,h)) ; 
               𝐸𝑋𝑃! = 𝑌𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆! + 𝐷𝐼𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑋!"#,!!"# + 𝐼𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁!"#,! + 𝐼𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁!",!!"!"#   
 
3. GEXPEQ(gin)..     EXP(gin) =E= ggshr(gin)*SUM(i, PQ(i)*GD(i)) + SUM(in, 
ITRAN(in,gin)) + gsshr(gin)*SUM(i, SUB(i)+SUBE(i)+SUBM(i)) ; 
               𝐸𝑋𝑃!"# = 𝑔𝑔𝑠ℎ𝑟!"# ∗ (𝑃𝑄! ∗ 𝐺𝐷!)! + 𝐼𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁!",!"# +!" 𝑔𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑟!"# ∗ (𝑆𝑈𝐵!! +𝑆𝑈𝐵𝐸! + 𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑀!)  
 
4. OEXPEQ(nno)..     EXP(nno) =E= SUM(in, ITRAN(in,nno)) ; 
               𝐸𝑋𝑃!!" = 𝐼𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁!",!!"!"   
 
5. SAVEQ(din)..       SAV(din)  =E= INC(din) - EXP(din) ; 
               𝑆𝐴𝑉!"# = 𝐼𝑁𝐶!"# − 𝐸𝑋𝑃!"#  
 
6. SAVINGEQ..         SAVING    =E= SUM(in, SAV(in)) +sum(bank,CFLOW(bank)) ;                   𝑆𝐴𝑉𝐼𝑁𝐺 = 𝑆𝐴𝑉!"!" + 𝐶𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊!"#$!"#$   
 
7. ROWSAV..            FSAV*EXR   =E= SUM(fr, SAV(fr)); 
               𝐹𝑆𝐴𝑉 ∗ 𝐸𝑋𝑅 = 𝑆𝐴𝑉!"!"   
 
8. CDEQ(i)..       CD(i)       =E= SUM(h, alphaq(i,h)*YCONS(h))/PQ(i) ; 
               𝐶𝐷! = !"#!!"!,!∗!"#$!! !"!    
9. DKEQ(i)..       PK(i)*DK(i) =E= KSHR(i)*INVEST ; 
               𝑃𝐾! ∗ 𝐷𝐾! = 𝐾𝑆𝐻𝑅! ∗ 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇   
10. IDEQ(i)..       ID(i)       =E= SUM(j, capmat(i,j)*DK(j)) ; 
               𝐼𝐷! = 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑚𝑎𝑡!,! ∗ 𝐷𝐾!!   
 
11. INVESTEQ..      INVEST      =E= SUM((i,in), INVES(i,in)) ; 
               𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇 = 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆!,!"!"!   
 
12. DOMINVEQ(i,fin)..   INVES(i,fin) =E= 
lambda0(i,fin)*(VA(i)**lambda1(i))*((1+avgRN)**lambda2(i))*(EXR**lambda3(i)) ; 
               𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆!,!"# = 𝑙𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑑𝑎0!,!"# ∗ 𝑉𝐴!!"#$%"!! ∗ 1 + 𝑎𝑣𝑔𝑅𝑁 !"#!"#!! ∗ 𝐸𝑋𝑅!"#$%"!!  
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13. AVGREQ..            avgRN =E= SUM((as,in), RN(as)*AssetSLag(as,in))/SUM((as,in), 
AssetSLag(as,in)) ; 
               𝑎𝑣𝑔𝑅𝑁 = !"!"∗!"!" !""#$%&'(!",!"!""#$%&'(!",!"!"!"   
 
 
 
Market Clearing Block 
 
1. EQUIL(i)..      Q(i)    =E= INTQ(i) + CD(i) + GD(i) + ID(i) + TTMX(i)/PQ(i)  ; 
                 𝑄! = 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑄! + 𝐶𝐷! + 𝐺𝐷! + 𝐼𝐷! + !!"#!!"!    
2. FMKTEQ(f)..     FS(f)   =E= SUM(i, FACDEM(i,f)) ; 
               𝐹𝑆! = 𝐹𝐴𝐶𝐷𝐸𝑀!,!!   
 
3. UEMPEQ..  UEMP    =E= LSUP - SUM(fl, sum(i,FACDEM(i,fl))); 
               𝑈𝐸𝑀𝑃 = 𝐿𝑆𝑈𝑃 − 𝐹𝐴𝐶𝐷𝐸𝑀!,!"!!"   
 
4. CAEQ(fr)..    SAV(fr)   =E= (SUM(f, factoin(fr,f)*YF(f)) + SUM(in2, ITRAN(fr,in2)) 
+ mrshr(fr)*SUM(i, PWM(i)*EXR*M(i))) - (ershr(fr)*SUM(i, PWE(i)*EXR*E(i)) + SUM(f, 
YFROW(f,fr)) + SUM(in, ITRAN(in,fr))) -sum(bank,CFLOW(bank)) ; 
               𝑆𝐴𝑉!" = ( (𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑖𝑛!",!! ∗ 𝑌𝐹!) + 𝐼𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁!",!"!!"! +𝑚𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑟!" ∗ (𝑃𝑊𝑀!! ∗ 𝐸𝑋𝑅 ∗𝑀!))  
                                   −(𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑟!" ∗ (𝑃𝑊𝐸! ∗ 𝐸𝑋𝑅 ∗ 𝐸!)! + 𝑌𝐹𝑅𝑂𝑊!,!" +! 𝐼𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁!",!")!"  − 𝐶𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊!"#$!"#$  
 
 
 
 
Gross National Product & Utility 
 
1. GDPY..          GDP  =E= SUM(i, PV(i)*VA(i) + INDTAX(i) + TARIFF(i) - SUB(i) - 
SUBM(i) ) ; 
               𝐺𝐷𝑃 = (𝑃𝑉! ∗ 𝑉𝐴! + 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑇𝐴𝑋! + 𝑇𝐴𝑅𝐼𝐹𝐹! − 𝑆𝑈𝐵! − 𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑀!)!   
 
2. GDPR..          RGDP =E= SUM(i,CD(i) + ID(i) + GD(i)) + SUM(i,E(i)) - SUM(i,(1 - 
TMREAL0(i))*M(i)) ; 
               𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃 = (𝐶𝐷! + 𝐼𝐷! + 𝐺𝐷! + 𝐸!! − (1 − 𝑇𝑀𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐿0!) ∗𝑀!! )!   
 
 
 
 
Secondary Investment 
 
FixANEQ.. SUM(firm,FixA(firm))=E=  SUM((i,firm), INVES.L(i,firm)) + 
SUM(firm,(jk1(firm)*(Sum(assec,(RNSEC.L-RNSEC0)*ASSET(assec,firm))+Sum(asmd,(RNMD.L-
RNMD0)*ASSET(asmd,firm))+Sum(ascr,(RNCR.L-RNCR0)*ASSET(ascr,firm))) )     ); 
 
AssetNEQ.. Sum((as,firm), Asset(as,firm))=E= SUM((as,firm),Asset(as,firm))-
FixAN+SUM((i,firm), INVES.L(i,firm)); 
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JK1EQ(firm).. jk1(firm)/(1-jk1(firm))  =E= pajk1*( (1-RNCR)/(1+RNNCR) )**pbjk1    ; 
 
 
 
 
Financial Block 
 
1. AssetSQ(as,in)..  AssetS(as,in) =E= AssetSLag(as,in) + Asset(as,in) ; 
     𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑆!",!" = 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑆𝐿𝑎𝑔!",!" + 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡!",!"  
 
2. LiabSQ(in,as)..   LiabS(in,as)  =E= LiabSLag(in,as) + Liab(in,as) ; 
 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑆!",!" = 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑆𝐿𝑎𝑔!",!" + 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏!",!"  
 
3. FixASQ(in)..      FixAS(in)     =E= FixASLag(in) + FixA(in) ; 
 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝐴𝑆!" = 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝐴𝑆𝐿𝑎𝑔!" + 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝐴!"   
4. WealthQ(in)..     Wealth(in)    =E= WealthLag(in) + WEALF(in) ; 
 𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ!" = 𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝐿𝑎𝑔!" +𝑊𝐸𝐴𝐿𝐹!"   
5. FixAQ(in)..       FixA(in)      =E= SUM(i, INVES(i,in)) ; 
 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝐴!" = 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆!,!"!   
 
6. WEALFQ(in)..      WEALF(in)     =E= SAV(in) ; 
 𝑊𝐸𝐴𝐿𝐹!" = 𝑆𝐴𝑉!"  
 
7. AsINBAL(in)..     SUM(as, AssetS(as,in)) + FixAS(in) =E= SUM(as, LiabS(in,as)) + 
Wealth(in) ; 
 (𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑆!",!")!" + 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝐴𝑆!" = (𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑆!",!"!" ) +𝑊𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ!"  
 
 
*#################### Composite Interest Rate ######################### 
 
1. RNA1EQ(in)$SUM(asdp, AssetSLag0(asdp,in))..    rna1(in) =E= SUM(asdp, 
rn(asdp)*AssetSLag(asdp,in)) / SUM(asdp, AssetSLag(asdp,in)) ; 
 𝑟𝑛𝑎1!" = ( (𝑟𝑛!"#$ ∗ 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑆𝐿𝑎𝑔!"#$,!"!"#$ ))/( 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑆𝐿𝑎𝑔!"#$,!"!"#$ )  
 
2. RNA2EQ(in)$SUM(asgb, AssetSLag0(asgb,in))..    rna2(in) =E= SUM(asgb, 
rn(asgb)*AssetSLag(asgb,in)) / SUM(asgb, AssetSLag(asgb,in)) ; 
 𝑟𝑛𝑎2!" = ( (𝑟𝑛!"#$ ∗ 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑆𝐿𝑎𝑔!"#$,!"!"#$ ))/( 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑆𝐿𝑎𝑔!"#$,!"!"#$ )  
 
3. RNA3EQ(in)$SUM(assec, AssetSLag0(assec,in))..  rna3(in) =E= SUM(assec, 
rn(assec)*AssetSLag(assec,in)) / SUM(assec, AssetSLag(assec,in)) ; 
 𝑟𝑛𝑎3!" = ( (𝑟𝑛!""#$ ∗ 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑆𝐿𝑎𝑔!""#$,!"!""#$ ))/( 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑆𝐿𝑎𝑔!""#$,!"!""#$ )  
 
4. RNA4EQ(in)$SUM(ascr, AssetSLag0(ascr,in))..    rna4(in) =E= SUM(ascr, 
rn(ascr)*AssetSLag(ascr,in)) / SUM(ascr, AssetSLag(ascr,in)) ; 
 𝑟𝑛𝑎4!" = ( (𝑟𝑛!"#$ ∗ 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑆𝐿𝑎𝑔!"#$,!"!"#$ ))/( 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑆𝐿𝑎𝑔!"#$,!"!"#$ )  
 
5. RNA5EQ(in)$SUM(aseq, AssetSLag0(aseq,in))..    rna5(in) =E= SUM(aseq, 
rn(aseq)*AssetSLag(aseq,in)) / SUM(aseq, AssetSLag(aseq,in)) ; 
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 𝑟𝑛𝑎5!" = ( (𝑟𝑛!"#$ ∗ 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑆𝐿𝑎𝑔!"#$,!"!"#$ ))/( 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑆𝐿𝑎𝑔!"#$,!"!"#$ )  
 
 
*######################### FOREX Reserve ############################### 
 
 FINA1EQ(asfxr)..  AssetS(asfxr,"PRIV") =E= LiabS("ROW1",asfxr) ; 
 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑆!"#$%,!"#$ = 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑆!"#!,!"#$%  
 
AssetS.FX(asfxr,in) = AssetS.L(asfxr,in) ; 
LiabS.FX(in,asfxr)  = LiabS.L(in,asfxr) ; 
LiabS.LO("ROW1",asfxr) = -INF ; LiabS.UP("ROW1",asfxr) = +INF ; 
RN.FX(asfxr) = RN.L(asfxr) ; 
 
*####################### EQ: Asset ==> Liab ############################ 
 
1. AST1AQ(ast1,in)..    AssetS(ast1,in) =E= 
theta1(ast1,in)*(rn(ast1)/rn0(ast1))**sigma1(ast1,in) ; 
 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑆!"#!,!" = 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑎1!"#!,!" ∗ !"!"#!!"!!"#! !"#$%!!"#!,!"   
2. AST1SH(in,ast1)..    LiabS(in,ast1) =E= ast1shr(in,ast1)*SUM(in2, AssetS(ast1,in2)) 
; 
 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑆!",!"#! = 𝑎𝑠𝑡1𝑠ℎ𝑟!",!"!! ∗ 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑆!"#!,!"!!"!   
 
RN.FX(ast1) = RN.L(ast1) ; 
 
*####################### EQ: Asset <== Liab ############################ 
 
1. AST2AQ(in,ast2).. LiabS(in,ast2) =E= 
theta2(in,ast2)*(rn(ast2)/rn0(ast2))**sigma2(in,ast2) ; 
 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑆!",!"#! = 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑎2!",!"#! ∗ !"!"#!!"!!"#! !"#$%!!",!"#!   
2. AST2SH(ast2,in).. AssetS(ast2,in) =E= ast2shr(ast2,in)*SUM(in2, LiabS(in2,ast2)) ; 
 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑆!"#!,!" = 𝑎𝑠𝑡2𝑠ℎ𝑟!"#!,!" ∗ 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑆!"!,!"#!!"!   
 
RN.FX(ast2) = RN.L(ast2) ; 
 
*####################### EQ: Asset === Liab ############################ 
 
1. ASTEEQ(aste)..  LiabS("GOV1",aste) =E= 
theta2("GOV1",aste)*(rn(aste)/rn0(aste))**sigma2("GOV1",aste) ; 
 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑆!"#!,!!"# = 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑎2!"#!,!"#$ ∗ !"!"#$!"!!"#$ !"#$%!!"#!,!"#$   
AssetS.FX(aste,in) = AssetS.L(aste,in) ; 
LiabS.LO(in,aste) = -INF ; LiabS.UP(in,aste) = +INF ; 
RN.LO(aste) = -INF; RN.UP(aste) = +INF ; 
 
*####################### EQ: Balancing Asset ############################ 
 
1. ASTQEQ(astq)..          SUM(in, LiabS(in,astq)) =E= SUM(in, AssetS(astq,in)) ; 
 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑆!",!"#$!" = 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑆!"#$,!"!"   
 
LiabS.FX(in,astq) = LiabS.L(in,astq) ; 
AssetS.FX(astq,in) = AssetS.L(astq,in) ; 
AssetS.LO(astq,"PRIV") = -INF ; AssetS.UP(astq,"PRIV") = +INF ; 
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RN.FX(astq) = RN.L(astq) ; 
 
 
 
Currency and Demand Deposit Block 
1. MONEYD(in)..         MD(in)   =E= (alpha1(in))*(INC(in)**alpha2(in))*(rnv1(in)**(-
alpha3(in))) ; 
 𝑀𝐷!" = 𝑎𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎1!" ∗ 𝐼𝑁𝐶!"!"#!!!!" ∗ (𝑟𝑛𝑣1!"!!"#!!!!")   
2. RNV1EQ(in)..         rnv1(in) =E= SUM(nasmd, rn(nasmd)*AssetSLag(nasmd,in)) / 
SUM(nasmd, AssetSLag(nasmd,in)) ; 
 𝑡𝑛𝑣1!" = ( (𝑟𝑛!"#!" ∗ 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑆𝐿𝑎𝑔!"#$%,!"!"#$% ))/( 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑆𝐿𝑎𝑔!"#$%,!"!"#$% )  
 
3. MDEQ(asmd,in)..      AssetS(asmd,in) =E= mdshare(asmd,in)*MD(in) ; 
 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑆𝐿𝑎𝑔!"#$,!" = 𝑚𝑑𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒!"#$,!" ∗𝑀𝐷!"  
 
4. MSSHR(in,asmd)..     LiabS(in,asmd) =E= mdshr(in,asmd)*SUM(in2, AssetS(asmd,in2)) ; 
 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑆!",!"#$ = 𝑚𝑑𝑠ℎ𝑟!",!"#$ ∗ ( 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑆!"#$,!"!!"! )  
 
RN.FX(asmd) = RN.L(asmd) ;  
 
CCEQ..       CC =E= SUM((ascc,in),ASSETS(ascc,in))/ SUM((asmd,in),ASSETS(asmd,in)); 
MULTEQ..     MULT =E= 1/(CC+(rr*(1-CC))) ; 
MDINEQ(in).. MDIN(in) =E= SUM(asmd, AssetS(asmd,in)); 
M2DEQ..      M2D =E= SUM(in,MDIN(in))+SUM((asdp,in),ASSETS(asdp,in)); 
M2SEQ..      M2S =E= MULT*RM ; 
M2EQILEQ..   M2S =E= M2D; 
MDEQ1(in)..       MDIN(in)=E=MD(in); 
 
 
 
Tobin 
*##### Portfolio allocation ##### 
GH1EQ(rh)..      gh1(rh)/(1-gh1(rh)) =E= phih1(rh)*((1+RNDP)/(1+RNNDP))**esph1(rh); 
GH3EQ(urrh)..    gh3(urrh)/(1-gh3(urrh)) =E= 
phih3(urrh)*((1+RNEQ)/(1+RNNEQ))**esph3(urrh); 
*##### Calculating RN ###### 
RNFXREQ.. RNFXR =E= SUM((asfxr,in), RN(asfxr)*ASSET(asfxr,in)) / SUM((asfxr,in), 
ASSET(asfxr,in))  
RNCREQ..        RNCR =E= SUM((ascr,in), RN(ascr)*ASSET(ascr,in)) / SUM((ascr,in), 
ASSET(ascr,in))  
RNSECEQ..       RNSEC =E= SUM((assec,in), RN(assec)*ASSET(assec,in)) / SUM((assec,in), 
ASSET(assec,in)) ; 
RNDPEQ..        RNDP  =E= SUM((asdp,in), RN(asdp)*ASSET(asdp,in))/ SUM((asdp,in), 
ASSET(asdp,in)); 
RNEQEQ..        RNEQ  =E= SUM((aseq,in), RN(aseq)*ASSET(aseq,in))/ SUM((aseq,in), 
ASSET(aseq,in)); 
RNSBIEQ..       RNSBI  =E= SUM((assbi,in), RN(assbi)*ASSET(assbi,in))/ SUM((assbi,in), 
ASSET(assbi,in)); 
RNGBEQ..        RNGB  =E= SUM((asgb,in), RN(asgb)*ASSET(asgb,in))/ SUM((asgb,in), 
ASSET(asgb,in)); 
RNNEQEQ..       RNNEQ =E=  (SUM((assec,in), RN(assec)*ASSET(assec,in))+SUM((asgb,in), 
RN(asgb)*ASSET(asgb,in)))/(SUM((assec,in), ASSET(assec,in))+SUM((asgb,in), 
ASSET(asgb,in))); 
RNNDPEQ..       RNNDP =E=  (SUM((aseq,in), RN(aseq)*ASSET(aseq,in))+(SUM((assec,in), 
RN(assec)*ASSET(assec,in))+SUM((asgb,in), RN(asgb)*ASSET(asgb,in))))/(SUM((aseq,in), 
ASSET(aseq,in))+(SUM((assec,in), ASSET(assec,in))+SUM((asgb,in), ASSET(asgb,in)))); 
*##### Assets Allocation ###### 
HDPEQ(rh)..       Sum(asdp, Asset(asdp,rh)) =E= gh1(rh)*(WEALH(rh)- MDH(rh) -FIXA(rh) 
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-Sum(asgb,ASSET(asgb,rh)) -Sum(ascr,ASSET(ascr,rh))-Sum(assbi,ASSET(assbi,rh))-
Sum(aso,ASSET(aso,rh))); 
HEQEQ(rh)..       Sum(aseq, Asset(aseq,rh)) =E= gh3(rh)*(1-gh1(rh))*(WEALH(rh)- 
MDH(rh) -FIXA(rh) -Sum(asgb,ASSET(asgb,rh))- Sum(ascr,ASSET(ascr,rh))-
Sum(assbi,ASSET(assbi,rh))-Sum(aso,ASSET(aso,rh))); 
HSECEQ(rh)..      Sum(assec, Asset(assec,rh)) =E= (1-gh3(rh))*(1-gh1(rh))*(WEALH(rh)- 
MDH(rh) -FIXA(rh) -Sum(asgb,ASSET(asgb,rh))-Sum(ascr,ASSET(ascr,rh))-
Sum(assbi,ASSET(assbi,rh))-Sum(aso,ASSET(aso,rh))); 
*##### Balance Sheet Equations ###### 
IDHHEQ(h)..       WEALH(h) =E= Sum(as,ASSET(as,h))+FIXA(h); 
IDGOVEQ(gin)..    WEALGOV(gin) =E= Sum(as,ASSET(as,gin))+FIXA(gin); 
IDCBEQ(cbank)..   WEALCB(cbank) =E= Sum(as,ASSET(as,cbank))+FIXA(cbank); 
IDBANKEQ(bank)..  WEALBANK(bank) =E= Sum(as,ASSET(as,bank))+FIXA(bank); 
IDFIRMEQ(firm)..  WEALFIRM(firm) =E= Sum(as,ASSET(as,firm))+FIXA(firm); 
IDROWEQ(fr)..     WEALROW(fr) =E= Sum(as,ASSET(as,fr))+FIXA(fr); 
 
 
 
Poverty Line 
 
PDAVGEQ..      PDAVG =E= SUM(i,PD(i)*D(i))/SUM(i,D(i)); 
POVEQ(ph)..    PL(ph) =E= (PINDEX/PDAVG)*SUM(i,alphapov(i,ph)*PD(i)); 
TOTPOVEQ..     PLTOT =E= (PINDEX/PDAVG)*SUM(i,alphapovt(i)*PD(i)); 
 
 
Migration 
 
1. MIGEQ(fl,ffl)..    MIGMATR(fl,ffl) =E= 
gamma0(fl)*((((SUM(i,FACDEM(i,fl))/SUM(i,FACDEM0(i,fl)))/(SUM(i,FACDEM(i,ffl))/SUM(i,F
ACDEM0(i,ffl)))))**GAMMA1(fl)); 
2. MIGEQ1(fl)..       SUM(ffl, MIG(fl,ffl)) =E= SUM(ffl, LSUP0*(MIGMATR(fl,ffl)-
ONE(fl,ffl))); 
3. MIGEQEQ..          SUM(ffl, SUM(fl, MIG(fl, ffl))) =E= SUM(fl, SUM(ffl, 
MIG(fl,ffl)))  
 
 
Static Credit Channel 
1. Bank’s Safe Asset	    
BB1EQ..      BB1 =E= 
SUM((assbi,bank),ASSETS(assbi,bank))/SUM((as,bank),ASSETS(as,bank))+SUM((asgb
,bank),ASSETS(asgb,bank))/SUM((as,bank),ASSETS(as,bank)); 
 
2. Bank’s Avaialble fund	    
BANKFEQ..    BANKF =E= (1-BB1)*SUM((as,bank),ASSETS(as,bank)); 
 
3. Static Credit Channel 
BANKLOANEQ..  BANKLOAN =E= 
ss*(BANKF*((sum(firm,WEALF(firm))/(SUM((as,firm),ASSET(as,firm))+ 
sum(firm,FIXA(firm))))**ss1)                             
*((SUM((asgb,bank),ASSETS(asgb,bank))/(SUM((as,bank),ASSETS(as,bank))+ 
SUM(bank,FIXA(bank))))**ss2)                                  
*((SUM((assbi,bank),ASSETS(assbi,bank))/(SUM((as,bank),ASSETS(as,bank))+ 
SUM(bank,FIXA(bank))))**ss2)                                  
*((SUM(bank,WEALF(bank))/(SUM((as,bank),ASSET(as,bank))+ 
SUM(bank,FIXA(bank))))**ss3)); 
 
4. Bank’s loan = Bank’s credit asset 
SECLOANEQ..   BANKLOAN =E= SUM((ascr,bank),Asset(ascr,bank)); 
 
5. Bank-led Inflow (CFLOW)  
CLIAEQ(bank).. SUM(as,Liab(bank,as))=E= sum(as,Liab.L(bank,as))+CFLOW(bank);  
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Dynamic Credit Channel 
 
1. WEALFF.L(firm)$(years(t) ge 2)=(EXR0/EXR.L)*WEALF.L(firm); 
 
2. BANKLOAN.L$(years(t) ge 2) = 
ss*(BANKF.L*((sum(firm,WEALFF.L(firm))/(SUM((as,firm),ASSET.L(as,firm))+ 
sum(firm,FIXA.L(firm))))**ss1)                                   
*((SUM((asgb,bank),ASSETS.L(asgb,bank))/(SUM((as,bank),ASSETS.L(as,bank))+ 
SUM(bank,FIXA.L(bank))))**ss2)                                   
*((SUM((assbi,bank),ASSETS.L(assbi,bank))/(SUM((as,bank),ASSETS.L(as,bank))+ 
SUM(bank,FIXA.L(bank))))**ss2)                                   
*((SUM(bank,(EXR0/EXR.l)*WEALF.L(bank))/(SUM((as,bank),ASSET.L(as,bank))+ 
SUM(bank,FIXA.L(bank))))**ss3)); 
 
3. BANKLOAN.L$(years(t) ge 2)  =    SUM((ASCR,BANK),ASSET.L(ASCR,BANK))    ; 
Equation of Motion 
1. KSTOCK.L$(years(t) ge 2) = (1-DEPREC)*FS.L("FACT2") + 0.1*sum(i,DK.L(i)); 
2. FS.FX("FACT2")$(years(t) ge 2) = KSTOCK.L ; 
 
  
 
 
PARAMETERS 
alpha2(in)  EXPONENT FOR INCOME IN MONEY DEMAND FUNCTION 
alpha3(in)  EXPONENT FOR INTEREST RATE IN MONEY DEMAND FUNCTION 
alphah(h)   HOUSEHOLD MONEY DEMAND PARAMETER  
aad(i,j)  DOMESTIC GOOD I-O COEFFICIENT 
aaf(i,j)  IMPORTED GOOD I-O COEFFICIENT 
ai(i)   OUTPUT PARAMETER 
alpha1(in)  MONEY DEMAND PARAMETER 
alphapov(i,ph) CONSUMPTION PATTERN MATRIX 
alphapovt(i)  TOTAL CONSUMPTION PATTERN MATRIX 
alphaq(i,h)  C-D EXPONENT IN CONSUMER DEMAND FOR COMPOSITE GOODS 
aq(i)   COMMODITY PARAMETER 
ast1shr(in,ast1) ASSET SHARE PARAMETER FOR AST1 
ast2shr(ast2,in) ASSET SHARE PARAMETER FOR AST2 
astqshr(in,astq) ASSET SHARE PARAMETER FOR ASTQ 
at(i)   INTERMEDIATE INPUTS PARAMETER 
av(i)   VALUE-ADDED PARAMETER 
avx(i)   PRODUCTIVITY DISTORTION 
ax(i)   OUTPUT PARAMETER 
bi(i)   OUTPUT PARAMETER 
bmh0(h)  FINANCIAL ELASTICITY PARAMETER 
bmh1(h)  EXPONENT FOR DIRECT TAX FROM HOUSEHOLDS 
bmh2(h)  EXPONENT FOR DEMAND DEPOSIT 
bmh3(h)  EXPONENT FOR PRICE INDEX 
bq(i)   COMMODITY PARAMETER 
bt(i)   INTERMEDIATE INPUTS PARAMETER 
bv(i,f)  VALUE-ADDED PARAMETER 
bx(i)   OUTPUT PARAMETER 
capmat(i,j)  CAPITAL MATRIX 
DEPREC         CAPITAL DEPRECIATION 
dtax(gin,din)  DIRECT TAX (from domestic institution to the government) 
ershr(fr)     EXPORT SHARE OF ROWS BY EXPORTED COMMODITY  
esph1(h)  RISK PARAMETER FOR DEMAND DEPOSIT 
esph3(h)  RISK PARAMETER FOREQUITY  
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factoin(in,f)  ALLOCATION MATRIX--FACTORS TO INSTITUTION'S INCOME 
GAMMA0(f)  COEFFICIENT OF MIGRATION 
GAMMA1(f)  ELASTICITY OF MIGRATION 
ggshr(gin)  Government agency share of Expenditure 
gishr(gin)  Government agency share of collected indirect tax 
gsshr(gin)  Government agency share of subsidy paid 
impf(i)   IMPERFECT DISTORTION 
kshr(i)  CAPITAL INVESTMENT SHARE 
lambda0(i,firm) FIRM INVESTMENT PARAMETER 
lambda1(i)  EXPONENT FOR BUSINESS CYCLE 
lambda2(i)  EXPONENT FOR INTEREST RATE 
lambda3(i)  EXPONENT FOR EXCHANGE RATE 
lgrow(f)  GROWTH RATE OF LABOR FORCE (LABOR SUPPLY) 
lnshare  LOAN SHARE OF FIRMS 
mdshare(asmd,in) MONEY SHARE TO MONEY 
mdshr(in,asmd) MONEY SHARE FROM MONEY 
MIG0(F,FF)  INITIAL MIGRATION 
MIGMATR0(f,ff) MATRIX OF MIGRATION 
mrshr(fr)     Import share of ROWs by imported commodity 
ONE(f,ff)  PARAMETER FOR MIGRATION 
pajk1   SECONDARY INVESTMENT PARAMETER 
pbjk1   EXPONENT FOR CREDIT INTEREST RATE 
PDAVG0   AVERAGE DOMESTIC PRICE 
phi(i)   WAGE FUNCTION ELASTICITY OF AVG PRODUCTIVITY 
phih1(h)  TOBIN PARAMETER FOR HOUSEHOLD DEPOSIT 
phih3(h)  TOBIN PARAMETER FOR HOUSEHOLD EQUITY 
PL0(ph)  POVERTY LINE 
PLTOT0   POVERTY LINE OF SOCIETY 
psube(i)  EXPORT SUBSIDY Share 
psubm(i)  IMPORT SUBSIDY Share 
rhoi(i)  EXPONENT FOR OUTPUT (X) PRODUCTION FUNCTION  
rhoq(i)  EXPONENT FOR ARMINGTON FUNCTION  
rhot(i)  EXPONENT FOR CES FUNCTION  
rhov(i)  EXPONENT FOR VALUE ADDED  FUNCTION  
rhox(i)  EXPONENT FOR CET  FUNCTION  
sigma1(as,in)  FINANCIAL BALANCE 
sigma2(in,as)  FINANCIAL BALANCE 
ss   BANK LOAN PARAMETER 
ss1   EXPONENT FOR FIRM'S WEALTH  
ss2   EXPONENT FOR BANK'S SAFE ASSET 
ss3   EXPONENT FOR BANK'S WEALTH 
subr(i)  SUBSIDY Share PARAMETER ( i.e. SUB(i) = subr(i)*EXP(gov) 
) 
sumcapmat(i)  TOTAL ROW OF CAPITAL MATRIX 
tdom(i)  INDIRECT DOMESTIC TAX RATES 
theta1(as,in)  FINANCIAL BALANCE 
theta2(in,as)  FINANCIAL BALANCE 
tm(i)   TARIFF RATES ON IMPORTS 
ttd(i)   DOMESTIC TRADE AND TRANSPORT MARGINS 
ttf(i)   IMPORTED TRADE AND TRANSPORT MARGINS 
ttx(i)   TTM coefficient (received) 
vp(i)   WAGE FUNCTION ELASTICITY OF PINDEX 
wlshare(i,fl)  SECTORAL WEIGHT OF LABOR WAGES 
 
 
 
VARIABLES 
Ashare(as,in)  SHARE OF ASSET STOCK VALUE 
Asset(as,in)  ASSET (FLOW) VALUE 
AssetS(as,in)  ASSET STOCK VALUE (END-OF-PERIOD) 
AssetSLag(as,in) ASSET STOCK VALUE (BEGINNING-OF-PERIOD) 
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avgRN   AVG INTEREST RATE 
BANKF   BANK AVAILABLE FUND 
BANKLOAN  BANK LOAN FROM BANKS 
BB1   SHARE OF SBI IN BANK FUNDS 
CC   COEFFICIENT OF CURRENCY TO MONEY DEMAND 
CD(i)   INITIAL PRIVATE CONSUMPTION DEMAND 
CFLOW(bank)  FOREIGN CAPTIAL  
D(i)   INITIAL DOMESTIC GOOD SOLD DOMESTICALLY 
DINTM(i)  INITIAL DOMESTIC INTERMEDIATE INPUT 
DIRTAX(gin,din) INITIAL DIRECT-INCOME TAX 
DK(i)   INITIAL QUANTITY OF CAPITAL BY SECTOR OF DESTINATION 
DTTM(i)  INITIAL TRADE & TRANSPORT MARGIN ON IMPORT (PAID) 
E(i)   INITIAL EXPORT QUANTITY 
EXPD(in)  EXPENDITURE  
EXR   INITIAL EXCHANGE RATE 
FACDEM(i,f)  INITIAL FACTOR DEMAND 
FDISTLH  FINANCIAL DISTRIBUTION BETWEEN RICH AND POOR 
FINTM(i)  INITIAL IMPORTED INTERMEDIATE INPUT 
FixA(in)  FIXED ASSET (FIXED INVESTMENT) 
FixAN   FIRM'S FIXED ASSET (SECONDARY) 
FixAS(in)  FIXED ASSET STOCK VALUE (END-OF-PERIOD) 
FixASLag(in)  FIXED ASSET STOCK VALUE (BEGINNING-OF-PERIOD) 
FOREXM2  M2/RESERVE 
FS(f)   INITIAL FACTOR SUPPLY 
FSAV   INITIAL ROW SAVING IN FOREIGN CURRENCY 
FTTM(i)  INITIAL TRADE & TRANSPORT MARGIN ON IMPORT (PAID) 
GD(i)   INITIAL GOVT CONSUMPTION DEMAND 
GDP   INITIAL GDP 
GTRAN(in,in2)  INITIAL INSTITUTIONAL TRANSFERS (to gov or direct tax) 
ID(i)   INITIAL INVESTMENT DEMAND 
IMPERFECT(i)  INITIAL INPERFECT COMPETITION DISTORTION  
INC(in)  Institution's Revenue ^ Income ^ Receipt 
INDTAX(i)  INITIAL TOTAL INDIRECT TAX 
INTM(i)  INITIAL INTERMEDIATE COMPOSITE 
INTQ(i)  INITIAL SUPPLY OF INTERMEDIATE Goods or Services 
INVES(i,in)  INVESTMENT 
INVEST   INITIAL TOTAL INVESTMENT 
ISGAP   INCOME SAVING GAP 
ITRAN(in,in2)  INITIAL INSTITUTIONAL TRANSFERS (Total) 
ITRANB(h,gin)  INITIAL INSTITUTIONAL TRANSFERS (to gov from households) 
IY   HOUSEHOLD INVESTMENT 
jk1(firm)     ALLOCATING FINANCIAL LIQUID ASSETS INTO REAL SECTOR 
INVESTMENT 
KSTOCK   CAPITAL STOCK 
Liab(in,as)  LIABILITY (FLOW) VALUE 
LiabS(in,as)  LIB STOCK VALUE (END-OF-PERIOD) 
LiabSLag(in,as) LIAB STOCK VALUE (BEGINNING-OF-PERIOD) 
Lshare(in,as)  SHARE OF LIAB STOCK VALUE 
LSUP   LABOR SUPPLY (TOTAL) 
M(i)   INITIAL IMPORT QUANTITY 
M2D   M2 SUPPLY 
M2S   M2 DEMAND 
MD(in)   Money Demand 
MDH(h)   MONEY DEMAND OF HOUSEHOLDS (FLOW) 
MDIN(in)  MONEY DEMAND OF INSTITUTIONS (FLOW) 
MIG(f,ff)  MIGRATION 
MIGMATR(F,FF)  MIGRATION MATRIX 
MPS(h)   INITIAL MARGINAL PROPENSITY TO SAVE 
MULT   RESERVE REQUIREMENT 
OTRAN(in,in2)  INITIAL INSTITUTIONAL TRANSFERS (others) 
PD(i)   INITIAL PRICE OF D 
PDAVG   AVERAGE DOMESTIC PRICE 
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PDINTM(i)  INITIAL PRICE OF DOMINTM 
PDL(i)   INITIAL SECTORAL AVG PRODUCTIVITY 
PE(i)   INITIAL PRICE OF E 
PFINTM(i)  INITIAL PRICE OF FORINTM 
PINDEX   INITIAL PRICE INDEX 
PINTM(i)  INITIAL PRICE OF INTM 
PK(i)   INITIAL PRICE OF CAPITAL BY SECTOR OF DESTINATION 
PL(ph)   POVERTY LINE 
PLTOT   POVERTY LINE OF SOCIETY 
PM(i)   INITIAL PRICE OF M 
PQ(i)   INITIAL PRICE OF Q 
PV(i)   INITIAL PRICE OF VA 
PWE(i)   INITIAL WORLD PRICE OF EXPORTS 
PWM(i)   INITIAL WORLD PRICE OF IMPORTS 
PX(i)   INITIAL PRICE OF X 
Q(i)   INITIAL COMPOSITE GOOD QUANTITY 
RER   REAL EXCHANGE RATE 
RGDP   INITIAL REAL GDP 
RM   MONEY MULTIPLIER 
RN(as)   RATE OF RETURN ON ASSET 
rna1(in)  FINANCIAL RETURN ON DEPOSIT 
rna2(in)  FINANCIAL RETURN ON GOVERNMENT BOND 
rna3(in)  FINANCIAL RETURN ON SECURITIEIS 
rna4(in)  FINANCIAL RETURN ON CREDIT 
rna5(in)  FINANCIAL RETURN ON EQUITY AND SHARE 
RNCR   RETURN ON CREDIT 
RNDP   RETURN ON DEPOSIT 
RNEQ   RETURN ON EQUITY AND SHARE 
RNFXR   RETURN ON FOREX 
RNGB   RETURN ON GOVERNMENT BOND 
RNLag(as)  LAG of RN 
RNNDP   RETURN ON NON-DEPOSIT 
RNNEQ   RETURN ON NON-EQUITY AND SHARE 
RNSBI   RETURN ON CENTRAL BANK CERTIFICATE 
RNSEC   RETURN ON SECURTITIES 
RNshare(in)  SHARE OF ASSETS IN INSTITUTION 
rnv1(in)  AVERAGE INTRESTRATE #1 (NON-MONEY) 
RTRAN(in,in2)  INITIAL INSTITUTIONAL TRANSFERS (financial returns) 
SAV(in)  INSTITUTION'S SAVING 
SAVDOM   DOMESTIC SAVING 
SAVING   INITIAL TOTAL SAVING 
SECLOAN  BANK LOAN 
SUB(i)   INITIAL SECTORAL SUBSIDY 
SUBE(i)  SUBSIDY FOR EXPORT 
SUBM(i)  SUBSIDY FOR IMPORT 
SY   HOUSEHOLD SAVINGS 
TARIFF(i)  INITIAL TARIFF 
TAssetS(in)  TOTAL ASSET STOCK VALUE 
TLiabS(in)  TOTAL LIAB STOCK VALUE 
TMREALV(i)  TTM REAL TERMS INITIAL VALUE 
TTAssetS(as)  TOTAL ASSET STOCK VALUE 
TTLiabS(as)  TOTAL LIABILITY STOCK 
TTM(i)   INITIAL TRADE & TRANSPORT MARGIN (PAID) 
TTMX(i)  INITIAL TRADE & TRANSPORT MARGIN (RECEIVED) 
UEMP   UNEMPLOYMENT (TOTAL) 
UEMPR   UNEMPLOYMENT RATE 
VA(i)   INITIAL VALUE-ADDED 
WAGES(i)  INITIAL SECTORAL WAGE 
WDISTLH  WEALTH DISTIRBUTION BETWEEN RICH AND POOR 
WEALBANK(bank) BANK'S WEALTH 
WEALCB(cbank)  CENTRAL BANK'S WEALTH 
WEALF(in)  FLOW OF WEALTH 
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WEALFF(firm)  FIRM'S WEALTH THAT IS AFFECTED BY THE EXR 
WEALFIRM(firm) FIRM'S WEALTH 
WEALGOV(gin)  GOVERNMENT'S WEALTH 
WEALH(h)  HOUSEHOLD'S WEALTH 
WEALROW(fr)  FOREIGN WEALTH 
Wealth(in)  WEALTH STOCK VALUE (END-OF-PERIOD) 
WealthLag(in)  LAG OF WEALTH STOCK VALUE 
WF(f)   INITIAL FACTOR PRICE 
WFDIST(i,f)  INITIAL FACTOR PRICE SECTORAL PROP RATIOS 
wtq(i)   WEIGHT FOR CPI 
X(i)   INITIAL DOMESTIC OUTPUT 
YCONS(h)  INITIAL CONSUMPTION BY HOUSHOLDS 
YDISTLH  INCOME DISTRIBUTION BETWEEN RICH AND POOR 
YDISTRU  INCOME DISTRIBUTION BETWEEN RURAL AND URBAN 
YF(f)   INITIAL FACTOR INCOME 
YFROW(f,FR)  DOMESTIC'S EARNING ABROAD(ROW TO FACTORS) IN FOREIGN 
CURRENCY 
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CHAPTER 3 
ANALYZING THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF BANK-LED INFLOWS 
WITH POLICY OPTIONS: THE USE OF AHP AND ANP  
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
With the growing frequency and risk of financial crisis, macroprudential policy 
has become the cornerstone of macro policy. The boom-and-bust cycle analyzed in 
Chapter 2 is an example of a phenomenon that results from financial crises. Two 
major components of macro-prudential policies are surveillance (for crisis prevention) 
and crisis management – both of which may be conducted using bottom-up or top-
down approaches. The bank stress test, which is the central aspect of macro-prudential 
surveillance, is applied by an international organization like the IMF through its 
Article IV, as well as by national authorities. This test aims to assess system-wide 
resilience to shocks over the medium term, uncovering vulnerabilities to any rapid 
deterioration in the macroeconomic environment and identifying potential threats to 
overall financial stability. 
While financial-prudential policy aims to examine the soundness of individual 
financial institutions (i.e., whether or not they require recapitalization or 
restructuring), macro-prudential policy aims primarily to restore and sustain market 
confidence in the financial system. With a broader goal than that of financial-
prudential policy, the standard capital adequacy ratio (CAR) is usually raised by 
adding a countercyclical capital buffer to absorb losses arising from the business 
cycles and a capital surcharge for “systemically important financial institutions” 
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(SIFI).  
The types of problems that macro-prudential policy addresses can be classified 
into solvency problems and liquidity problems. The type of issues that become the 
focus of such policy depends on the prevailing trend that threatens financial stability, 
e.g., credit boom, house price increase, property bubble, surging consumers’ debt.  
The link between monetary policy (interest rate) and the balance sheets of 
agents is central to macroprudential policy, highlighting the importance of monetary 
authorities focusing not only on price stability but also on financial stability. Many 
countries in recent years have tried to link the goals of maintaining price stability and 
securing financial stability. Some countries have amended the central bank’s law, 
which typically only emphasizes the importance of price stability, by explicitly adding 
financial stability as another goal.22   
To reflect such a reality, when an economy suffers from a boom-and-bust cycle 
as discussed in Chapter 2, one should expect a macro-prudential policy to be adopted; 
therefore, this chapter’s analyses focus on the choices of macro-prudential policy that 
are most appropriate in such circumstances. We use the information acquired from the 
FCGE simulations under the bank-led flows in the previous chapter as a guide in 
selecting the policy. In those simulations, where banks invest in risky financial assets, 
it is shown that such a scenario brings some risks as well as potential benefits. In 
particular, we conduct a Benefits (B), Opportunity (O), Costs (C), and Risks (R) 
analysis of three alternative policies, upon which basis we propose a policy to 
                                                
22 Korea is one such example – in 2011, the Bank of Korea (central bank) amended its law by 
explicitly specifying the importance of achieving financial stability in addition to price 
stability. 
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maximize the benefits and opportunities and minimize the costs and risks. The 
quantitative measures of BOCR are derived according to a model structure the 
strategic goal of which is to achieve a balanced development that takes social issues 
into account along with macroeconomic and financial issues.  
 
 
3.2. Methodology 
In selecting policies, the decision-making often centers around the thorough 
consideration of goals or objectives, criteria and alternatives. A good decision-making 
model must quantify the perspective and priority of every element in the structure. In 
this study, we use the analytical hierarchy process (AHP) and analytical network 
process (ANP) to quantitatively measure the priority ranking of those elements by 
making pairwise comparisons of the elements in each level (i.e., the goals, criteria and 
alternatives) with respect to the elements in the level above it.  
 
 
Figure 3.1. Basic Structure of ANP and AHP Models 
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As shown in Figure 3.1, the starting point of applying AHP and ANP is to 
construct the relevant hierarchy (for AHP) and network (for ANP).23  The goal is to 
describe the decision-making problem at hand. The multi-criteria in the level below 
the goal consist of choices relevant to the goal (i.e., there can be multiple levels of 
criteria and sub-criteria in the model). The alternatives, at the bottom level of the 
hierarchy, are the ultimate components of which we are seeking the priority rankings. 
The lines/arrows between the levels show the direction of pairwise comparisons. The 
AHP structure in Figure 1 shows the relationships among elements in criteria and 
between criteria by which each element in the upper level (Criteria) is connected to 
elements in the level below it (Alternatives). 
Unlike in AHP, the problem in ANP is structured as a hierarchy with feedback 
effects; it therefore forms a network rather than a hierarchy. ANP is a mathematical 
theory that allows one to deal systematically with dependence and feedback. It is a 
counterpart of influence diagrams in statistical decision analysis that are based on 
Bayes theorem. Unlike influence diagrams, however, ANP captures influences of 
feedback and interactions among all elements. Note in Figure 1 that the arrows rising 
from alternatives to criteria have been added compared to the one-way arrow from 
criteria to alternatives in AHP. This is the case of outer dependence. Results from the 
ANP are expected to be more accurate and robust than those of AHP (Saaty, 2005). 
In our analysis, the goal is to find the most preferred policy that will achieve a 
                                                
23 AHP and ANP, developed by Thomas Saaty, represent the general theory of measurement intended 
to capture people’s experience and judgment by using ratio scales from both discrete and continuous 
paired comparisons in multilevel hierarchic/network structures. Measuring the degree of their relative 
importance, the quantification of criteria or elements, thus, yields the results that the people’s 
perception and judgment are involved. A general form of AHP structure is shown in Figure 1. 
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balanced development by ensuring social and macro-financial stability. Given the 
impacts of bank-led flows on different economic and social variables revealed in 
Chapter 2, we propose three alternative policies: aggressive monetary policy, 
assigning levies on bank-led flows, and encouraging capital outflows. These policies 
will be weighted by taking into account the priority rankings of strategic goals, 
criteria, and sub-criteria. 
 
3.2.1. The Analytical Hierarchy Process  
This section illustrates how the policies are weighted by the priority rankings 
of strategic goals, criteria, and sub-criteria. The Figure 3.2 shows a model structure of 
the “chances” component under the “Benefits” in the AHP model. As one of the 
benefits of the increased bank-led inflows, the increased business and investment 
opportunities for the economic agents (“chances”) are represented by four elements: 
investment (ID), consumption (CD), financial income (FIN INC), and imported 
intermediate goods (FINTM). The four variables are listed by row and column in 
Table 3.1. The numbers in the off-diagonal are the weights based on the results of the 
FCGE simulations in Chapter 2. The diagonal elements are all one because there 
should be no preference of one element over itself. The cell value where CD (row) and 
FIN INC (column) intersect is 22; this indicates that, compared to the impact of bank-
led flows in generating FIN INC, the impact of increased bank-led flows on 
stimulating CD is far more significant. Given the pairwise nature of the comparisons, 
the cell value where CD (column) and FIN INC (row) intersect is therefore its 
reciprocal, i.e., 1/22.  The other elements are derived similarly.  
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Table 3.1. Relative Intensity of Impact of CFLOW24 
	  	   CD	   FIN	  INC	   FINTM	   ID	  
CD	   1	   22	   "1/18"	   "1/26"	  
FIN	  INC	   "1/22"	   1	   "1/398"	   "1/579"	  
FINTM	   18	   398	   1	   "1/1.5"	  
ID	   26	   579	   1.5	   1	  
 
To acquire consistent weights for the four variables, each priority value is 
divided by the sum of the column. In this case, the sums are 45.05, 1000, 2.56, and 
1.71 for the first, second, third, and fourth column, respectively (see Table 3.2).  
 
Table 3.2. The Normalized Results 
 
Chances	   CD	   FIN	  INC	   FINTM	   ID	  
CD	   1.00	   1/45.05	  =	   0.022	   22.00	   0.02	   0.06	   0.02	   0.04	   0.02	  
FIN	  INC	   0.05	   0.05/45.05	  =	   0.001	   1.00	   0.00	   0.00	   0.00	   0.00	   0.00	  
FINTM	   18.00	   18/45.05	  =	   0.400	   398.00	   0.40	   1.00	   0.39	   0.67	   0.39	  
ID	   26.00	   26/45.05	  =	   0.577	   579.00	   0.58	   1.50	   0.59	   1.00	   0.59	  
Total	   45.05	   	  	   	  	   1000.00	   	  	   2.56	   	  	   1.71	   	  	  
 
 
Table 3.3. Relative Impact of The Four Variables With Respect To Chances 
	  Chances	   CD	   FIN	  INC	   FINTM	   ID	   Weights	  
CD	   0.22	   0.022	   0.022	   0.023	   0.023	  
FIN	  INC	   0.001	   0.001	   0.001	   0.001	   0.001	  
FINTM	   0.4	   0.398	   0.391	   0.391	   0.391	  
ID	   0.58	   0.579	   0.586	   0.586	   0.586	  
 
                                                
24 The relative intensity among the four variables is entered in the direct data input area in the 
model as shown in Figure 3.8 in Appendix II. The model then interprets and changes the 
values to be suitable for the alternative data input formats such as the matrix (Figure 3.9 in 
Appendix II), graphical and verbal formats. Table 3.1 shows the relative intensity of the 
impact of CFLOW among the four variables that the model expressed in the matrix format.  
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To derive the weights in Table 3.3, pick any column, and divide an entry by 
the total of the column. Table 3.4 is acquired from the comparisons among alternatives 
with respect to the level of each variable such as CD and FIN INC (see Figure 3.8 in 
Appendix II for the CD case) 
 
Table 3.4. Relative Importance of The Alternatives With Respect To Each Variable 
CD	   1	  Aggressive	  Monetary	   2	  Assigning	  Levies	   3	  Encouraging	  Outflows	   Weights	  
1	  Aggressive	  Monetary	   0.05	   0.05	   0.05	   0.05	  
2	  Assigning	  Levies	   0.80	   0.80	   0.80	   0.80	  
3	  Encouraging	  Outflows	   0.15	   0.15	   0.15	   0.15	  
FIN	  INC	   1	  Aggressive	  Monetary	   2	  Assigning	  Levies	   3	  Encouraging	  Outflows	   Weights	  
1	  Aggressive	  Monetary	   0.60	   0.60	   0.60	   0.60	  
2	  Assign	  Levy	   0.35	   0.35	   0.35	   0.35	  
3	  Encourage	  Outflows	   0.05	   0.05	   0.05	   0.05	  
FINTM	   1	  Aggressive	  Monetary	   2	  Assigning	  Levies	   3	  Encouraging	  Outflows	   Weights	  
1	  Aggressive	  Monetary	   0.60	   0.60	   0.60	   0.60	  
2	  Assigning	  Levies	   0.10	   0.10	   0.10	   0.10	  
3	  Encouraging	  Outflows	   0.30	   0.30	   0.30	   0.30	  
ID	   1	  Aggressive	  Monetary	   2	  Assigning	  Levies	   3	  Encourage	  Outflows	   Weights	  
1	  Aggressive	  Monetary	   0.05	   0.05	   0.05	   0.05	  
2	  Assigning	  Levies	   0.80	   0.80	   0.80	   0.80	  
3	  Encourage	  Outflows	   0.15	   0.15	   0.15	   0.15	  
 
Table 3.5. Jointly Displaying The Relative Importance of All Elements 
	  
1	  Aggressive	  Monetary	   2	  Assigning	  Levies	   3	  Encouraging	  Outflows	  
CD	  (0.023)	   0.05	   0.80	   0.15	  
FIN	  INC	  (0.001)	   0.60	   0.35	   0.05	  
FINTM	  (0.391)	   0.60	   0.10	   0.30	  
ID	  (0.586)	   0.05	   0.80	   0.15	  
 
 
Multiplying each row in Table 3.5 by each weight of the four variables (Table 
3.3) yields the following results in Table 3.6. 
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Table 3.6. Joint Priorities of All Elements and Final Priorities of Alternatives 
 
	  	   1	  Aggressive	  Monetary	   2	  Assigning	  Levies	   3	  Encouraging	  Outflows	  
CD	   0.00115	   0.0184	   0.00345	  
FIN	  INC	   0.0006	   0.00035	   0.00005	  
FINTM	   0.2346	   0.0391	   0.1173	  
ID	   0.0293	   0.4688	   0.0879	  
TOTAL	   0.26565	   0.52665	   0.2087	  
 
 
The normalized weights or priorities shown in Table 3.1 to Table 3.6 are, 
however, only approximations for demonstrative purposes. Given any pair-wise matrix 
in Table 3.1, a more precise ranking can be obtained by normalizing the eigenvector of 
each matrix (see Saaty, 2005). The eigenvector is based on the maximum eigenvalue 
of the matrix. The derivation of the eigenvector and eigenvalue is as follows: 
 
 
Figure 3.2. AHP Model Structure of “Chances” 
 
Let A! ,   A!,A! , and  A!  be investment (ID), consumption (CD), financial 
income (FIN INC), and foreign intermediate goods (FINTM), respectively, in the 
“criteria” level under “chances” of the benefits (see Figure 3.2). The quantified impact 
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from the FCGE model on pairs of elements (A!,  A!,A!,  and  A!) are represented by 
4x4 matrix A = (a!"), where i,j = 1 to 4. A set of numerical weights  w!,  w!,  …  w!, 
represents the quantified impact of bank-led inflows on each. In assigning the weights, 
we use the results from the FCGE simulations in Chapter 2. In matrix form, the 
absolute scales are as follows:  
 
            A!     A!      A!      A! 
       A!     w!/w!      w!/w!     w!/w! w!/w!                                                    
              . 
    A =      .       .                .                                                A!         w!/w!      w!/w!      w!/w!  w!/w! 
 
Consider the “Criteria” level in the hierarchy in Figure 3.2.  The four 
elements A1, A2, A3, and A4 are compared in a pairwise manner.  By multiplying A 
with the vector of weights w, we obtain a homogeneous system of linear equations (1), 
 
           A!    A!     A!     A! 
             A!  w!/w!    w!/w!   w!/w! w!/w!         w!         w!                       
              .                             
Aw = ..       .                .           X       = n       = nw 
                   A!      w!/w!  w!/w!    w!/w! w!/w!        w!                              w! 
 
Aw = nw                                                    (1) 
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Solving the homogenous system of linear equations to find w is a trivial 
eigenvalue problem. Since every row is a constant multiple of the first row, A has unit 
rank.  To recover the scale from the matrix ratios, the following system should be 
solved: 
 
(A-nI)w = 0 
 
A nontrivial solution can be obtained if and only if det(A-nI) = 0 , i.e., the 
characteristic equation of A.  Hence, n is an eigenvalue and w is an eigenvector of A. 
Given A having unit rank, all its eigenvalues except for one are zero, and the only 
nonzero eigenvalue is therefore a maximum. Thus, the trace of A is equal to n.   
One of the most important factors in the pairwise comparison is consistency, 
which is associated with the assumption of transitivity: if A > B and B > C, then A > 
C. In the model, the transitivity required for the consistency of impacts is represented 
as a consistency index, aij· ajk = aik for all i,j,k. If each entry in A is denoted by aij, 
then aij = 1/aji, the reciprocal property, holds, and so does ajk = aik / aij, which is 
consistency property, where aii = aij = 1. Therefore, if we are to rank n number of 
elements, i.e., A is the size n-by-n, then the required number of inputs (from the 
paired comparison) is less than n2; it is equal to only the number of entries of the sub-
diagonal part of A. Hence, when there are four elements in the hierarchy, only six 
input judgments are required.   
In the general case, though, the precise value of   w!/  w! is hardly given, because the 
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input judgment is only an estimate. This suggests that there are some perturbations 
when the judgment does not perfectly satisfy the consistency, resulting in (2) while the 
reciprocal property still holds. By taking the largest eigenvalue of A’ = (aij)’, denoted 
by λmax,  
A’ w’ = λmax . w’                                     (2) 
 
where A’ is the actual, or the given, matrix which is perturbed from matrix A.  
The solution is obtained by the following procedure of calculations: (i) raise the matrix 
to a sufficiently larger power (Power Method), (ii) sum over rows and normalize it to 
obtain the priority vector w’ = (w1’, … wn’)T, and (iii) stop when the difference 
between the priority vector at the kth power and the priority vector at k-1th power is 
sufficiently insignificant. 
Despite the difference between (1) and (2), if w’ is obtained by solving (2), the 
matrix whose entries are  w!/  w!  is still a consistent matrix; it is a consistent estimate of 
A, even though A itself does not need to be consistent. A’ will be consistent if and 
only if  λmax = n. As long as the precise value of  w!/  w!  cannot be given, due to bias 
in the judgment, λmax is always greater than or equal to n. Hence, a measure of 
consistency can be derived based on such deviation of λmax from n.  
A consistency index (CI) is acquired by (λmax - n)/(n -1). Comparing CI with 
random index (RI), which is the same index calculated from a randomly generated 
reciprocal matrix using the scale 1/9, 1/8, …1, …8, 9, one can generate a consistency 
ratio (CR), which is the ratio of CI to average RI. This ratio can also be considered as 
the overall inconsistency index; however, in solving for w, the transitivity is not a 
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strict assumption in the model, reflecting an inconsistent tendency of human 
preference and judgment. The model allows the threshold point, CR = 0.10, that is 
shown whenever the ranking of the elements at the bottom level of each hierarchy is 
computed.  
 
3.2.2. The Analytical Network Process  
Both AHP and ANP use the abovementioned procedure to derive the ratio 
scales. ANP requires a large matrix called the supermatrix that contains a set of sub-
matrices. This supermatrix captures the influence of elements on other elements in the 
network. Denoting a cluster by Ch, h = 1, …N, and assuming that it has nh elements 
eh1, eh2, eh3 …, ehmh, Figure 3.3 shows the supermatrix of the network, i.e., ANP model 
in…... With all elements and clusters that affect each other, the feedback influences 
are presented as in the supermatrix in Figure 3.3 (left) that is formed by assigning W 
values for all the clusters and all the elements in each cluster both vertically on the left 
and horizontally.  
 
Figure 3.3. Supermatrix of ANP(left) and Entry in the Supermatrix (right)25 
                                                
25 Saaty, 2006 
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where i and j denote the influenced and influencing cluster, respectively, and n is the 
element of the respected cluster. A typical entry in the supermatrix (unweighted) is 
shown in Figure 3.3 (right).  The entries of sub-matrices in Wij are the ratio scales 
derived from paired comparisons from outer dependence or inner dependence.  To 
obtain priorities from the supermatrix, the resulting unweighted supermatrix is then 
transformed into a matrix where each of the columns sums to unity to generate a 
stochastic supermatrix, i.e., a weighted supermatrix. If the matrix is stochastic, the 
limit priorities can be viewed in such a way so as to depend on the concepts of 
reducibility, primitivity, and cyclicity of the matrix (Saaty, 2001).  Then, the 
weighted matrix needs to be powered to capture indirect influences as well as the 
direct influences that the weighted supermatrix renders.  For example, squaring the 
weighted matrix captures the indirect influence. An element influences the second 
element directly and indirectly through its influence on some third element; the second 
element can be influenced also by every such possibility of influence of a third 
element. . The influences by which the third element also affects the fourth, which in 
turn influences the second can be obtained from the cubic power of the weighted 
supermatrix. As the process is performed continuously, one will have an infinite 
sequence of influence matrices denoted by Wk, k = 1,2…n. If one takes the limit of the 
average of a sequence of N of these powers of the supermatrix, the resultant limiting 
super matrix must converge, thereby showing the existence of a limit.26 Thus, the 
                                                
26 Saaty (2001) shows the existence of a limit given the stochastic nature of the weighted supermatrix. 
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powers of the supermatrix do not converge unless it is stochastic. In practice, by 
raising the stochastic supermatrix to large powers, we produce the final priorities in 
which all columns of the matrix are identical and each gives the relative priorities of 
the elements. Note that the priorities of the elements in each cluster are normalized to 
one.  
The priorities in the ANP model are acquired from the model by the three 
sequential orders (see Table 3.7 for an example): (1) the original unweighted 
supermatrix of column eigenvectors obtained from pairwise comparison matrices of 
elements; (2) the weighted supermatrix in which each block of column eigenvectors 
belonging to a cluster is weighted by the priority of influence of that cluster, rendering 
the weighted supermatrix column stochastic; and (3) the limiting supermatrix obtained 
by raising the weighted supermatrix to large powers (Azis, 2003). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                       
When a convergence is not achieved, the average of the successive matrices of the entire cycle gives the 
final priorities in which the limit cycles in blocks and the different limits are summed and averaged and 
again normalized to one for each cluster. 
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Table 3.7. Supermatrices for “Chances” under Benefits from ANP model:  
Unweighted, Weighted, and Limit Matrices 
Unweighted	  
1	  
Aggressive	  
2	  
Assigning	  
3	  
Encouraging	   Chances	   CD	   FIN	  INC	   FINTM	   ID	  
	   Monetary	   	   Levies	   Outflows	  
1	  Aggressive	  
Monetary	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0.05	   0.6	   0.6	   0.05	  
2	  Assigning	  Levies	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0.8	   0.35	   0.1	   0.8	  
3	  Encouraging	  
Outflows	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0.15	   0.05	   0.3	   0.15	  
Chances	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	  
CD	   0.13	   0.13	   0.25	   0.022	   0	   0	   0	   0	  
FIN	  INC	   0.35	   0.35	   0.13	   0.001	   0	   0	   0	   0	  
FINTM	   0.25	   0.25	   0.35	   0.39799	   0	   0	   0	   0	  
ID	   0.27	   0.27	   0.27	   0.57901	   0	   0	   0	   0	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Weighted	  
1	  
Aggressive	  
2	  
Assigning	  
3	  
Encouraging	   Chances	   CD	   FIN	  INC	   FINTM	   ID	  
	   Monetary	   	   Levies	   Outflows	  
1	  Aggressive	  
Monetary	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0.05	   0.6	   0.6	   0.05	  
2	  Assigning	  Levies	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0.8	   0.35	   0.1	   0.8	  
3	  Encouraging	  
Outflows	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0.15	   0.05	   0.3	   0.15	  
Chances	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	  
CD	   0.13	   0.13	   0.25	   0.022	   0	   0	   0	   0	  
FIN	  INC	   0.35	   0.35	   0.13	   0.001	   0	   0	   0	   0	  
FINTM	   0.25	   0.25	   0.35	   0.39799	   0	   0	   0	   0	  
ID	   0.27	   0.27	   0.27	   0.57901	   0	   0	   0	   0	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Limit	  
1	  
Aggressive	  
2	  
Assigning	  
3	  
Encouraging	   Chances	   CD	   FIN	  INC	   FINTM	   ID	  
	   Monetary	   	   Levies	   Outflows	  
1	  Aggressive	  
Monetary	  
0.18477	   0.18477	   0.18477	   0.18477	   0.18477	   0.18477	   0.18477	   0.18477	  
2	  Assigning	  Levies	   0.23605	   0.23605	   0.23605	   0.23605	   0.23605	   0.23605	   0.23605	   0.23605	  
3	  Encouraging	  
Outflows	  
0.07918	   0.07918	   0.07918	   0.07918	   0.07918	   0.07918	   0.07918	   0.07918	  
Chances	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	   0	  
CD	   0.0745	   0.0745	   0.0745	   0.0745	   0.0745	   0.0745	   0.0745	   0.0745	  
FIN	  INC	   0.15758	   0.15758	   0.15758	   0.15758	   0.15758	   0.15758	   0.15758	   0.15758	  
FINTM	   0.13292	   0.13292	   0.13292	   0.13292	   0.13292	   0.13292	   0.13292	   0.13292	  
ID	   0.135	   0.135	   0.135	   0.135	   0.135	   0.135	   0.135	   0.135	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3.2.3. BOCR under Bank-led Inflows 
The AHP and ANP models provide pairwise comparison of impacts; deriving 
priorities from these different impacts, synthesizing the priorities to determine the best 
alternative –in this case, the policy – in order to achieve the balanced development. 
Each of the variables is evaluated to determine which of the variables are more 
influenced by the capital inflows and by how much. The intensities are determined 
according to the outcome of the FCGE simulations under bank-led inflows in the 
previous chapter. Finally, each policy will be evaluated given socio-economic 
variables with respect to the goal, yielding the most important policy that generates 
benefits and opportunities and reduces costs and risks to achieve balanced 
development. 
Figure 3.4 and Figure 3.5 show the AHP and ANP model respectively used in 
this chapter to determine which policy is most likely to achieve the balanced 
development given the impacts of bank-led inflows on the variables. The specific 
numbers representing the impacts are acquired from the FCGE model. Achieving 
balanced development is the goal, and benefits (B), opportunities (O), costs (C), and 
risks (R) are set to evaluate each criterion: the BOCRs of having bank-led inflows in 
the emerging economies.  
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3.2.3.1. Benefits and Opportunities 
In the short term, the bank-led inflows are beneficial to the recipient economies 
because they allow the economic agents to have more liquidity (Liquidity). One way 
to measure the increase in liquidity is by examining the changes in the volume of 
financial assets such as short-term security and equity assets (Short-term security & 
equity) available in the FCGE model. Also, the increase in the financial income of the 
agents (FIN INC) due to the bank-led inflows can provide a good measure of the 
increased liquidity.  Bank-led inflows can also be beneficial in the short term because 
they provide more investment options (Chances) by which various financing sources 
and financial instruments are made available. Having more options for financing can 
boost investment (ID) and consumption (CD). Increased ID and CD are associated 
with increased demands for more products and more intermediate inputs, particularly 
imported ones (FINTM). The capital inflows can also be favorable to the financial 
income (FIN INC) as more people can become more involved in financial investment, 
providing more income.  
Furthermore, in the long run, the bank-led inflows can be beneficial because 
they can strengthen the capital market (Stronger Capital Market) given the financial 
market development. The return on financial assets (RN) will be increased as well as 
the boom in short-term securities (Short-term security) and equity market (Equity). 
Also, the bank-led inflows can be opportunities for ensuring resilience (Resilience). 
Under the development of the financial sector, households have more access to the 
market and their net worth (HH Net Worth) can be benefited. In this situation, the 
banking sector would have more capital for credit (BANKF). The economy would also 
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gain opportunities from the increased property prices. In the long run, the capital 
inflows can increase the ratio of M2 to reserve.  Finally, the bank-led inflows can 
improve the welfare (Welfare) of the society. With an increase in the financial income 
of households (FIN INC), more jobs (UEMP) can be created, which in turn helps the 
poor (Poverty line). 
 
 
Figure 3.6. ANP Model Structure of “Welfare” under Opportunities27 
 
Under each category of Benefits and Opportunities, the socio-economic 
variables are placed in a hierarchy and in a network, consisting of the variables and 
impact data acquired from the FCGE model simulations. Figure 3.6 depicts the 
structure of one of the opportunities – namely, welfare – consisting of goals, criteria, 
sub-criteria, and alternatives. The networks are ranked by the following questions: (1) 
[between goal and criteria] Which of the welfare variables would be more influenced 
positively by the increased debt flow through the banking sector given the goal to 
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achieve balanced development, the financial income from short-term security and 
equity or unemployment rate, or poverty?; (2) [between criteria and sub-criteria] 
which is more affected by the capital flows, short-term security income or equity 
income; and (3) [between criteria and alternatives] For capital flows to be beneficial to 
the economy in the long run with respect to increasing financial income, decreasing 
unemployment, or decreasing poverty, which policy would be more preferred?; and 
(4) [between alternatives and criteria (sub-criteria)] which of the variables would be 
more positively affected by the policy? The latter is a feedback question found only in 
the ANP model. 
 
3.2.3.2. Costs and Risks 
The inflows, however, can create costs and risks in the economy as well. The 
bank-led inflows can cause a loss of competitiveness (Competitiveness) of the export 
products in the global market by making the price of domestic currency expensive 
(RER), yielding a trade account deficit (Trade Account). Excess saving? Also foreign 
capital inflows through the banking sector can worsen the income distribution 
(Worsening income distribution) because the beneficiaries of financial market 
development are mostly the rich.28 It is expected that income distributions between 
poor and rich (Poor/Rich), and between rural and urban areas (Urban/Rich), will be 
exacerbated. Furthermore, the inflows can carry risks, especially in the long run: this 
can provide some incentives to the banking sector to become involved in risky 
                                                                                                                                       
27 See Appendix III for this example in the ANP model using Super Decision software. 
28 In the previous chapter, it was shown that CFLOW worsens the income distribution especially when 
the banking sector involves risky investments. 
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investments, which makes the banks vulnerable (Bank’s vulnerability). Risky 
investment decreases banks’ ratio of capital to risky assets (CAR). According to credit 
channel theory, as explained in the previous chapter, the banking sector will be 
reluctant to extend credit in such a highly uncertain environment, thereby decreasing 
the availability of loans in the economy, and possibly leading to a credit crunch 
(Credit Crunch). Due to the nature of bank-led capital inflows, i.e., volatility, banks’ 
wealth can be vulnerable depending on the fluctuations of the financial market, 
especially when the banking sector is actively involved in risky investments. The 
bank-led inflows can also create a risk of deflationary (Deflationary Pressure) 
pressure. Price (PINDEX) and asset prices (Asset Price) are decreased, negatively 
affecting the income of the economic agents. The flows create volatility (Volatility) in 
the overall economy, depending on the fluctuations of capital flows. Massive outflows 
due to the external shock (e.g., GFC and Euro zone crisis) bring high volatility – 
volatility in financial assets and non-household incomes. Banks’ available funds will 
decline as capital leaves that was previously intermediated through the banking sector.  
 
 
  172 
 
Figure 3.7. ANP Model Structure of “Worsening Income Distribution” under Costs 
 
Figure 3.7 depicts the structure of one of the costs – namely, worsening income 
distribution– consisting of goals, criteria, sub-criteria, and alternatives. The networks 
are ranked by the following questions. (1) [Between goal and criteria] with the 
increased debt flow through the banking sector, and given the goal to achieve balanced 
development, the cost in terms of worsening income distribution is measured by 
income distribution between poor and rich, and rural and urban areas. Which is more 
negatively affected by capital inflows? (2) [Between criteria and sub-criteria] which is 
more affected by capital flows, factor income or financial income? (3) [Between 
criteria (sub-criteria) and alternatives] where will the negative impact of capital flows 
be directed, and how much is the impact measured from the FCGE simulation under 
bank-led capital inflows? Also, given the bank-led capital flows to achieve the 
balanced development, which policy will be more costly with respect to worsening 
factor income distribution and financial income distribution? (4) [Between alternatives 
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and criteria (sub-criteria)] which variables will be more negatively affected by the 
policy? This last question is a feedback question only found in the ANP model. 
 
3.2.3.3. The Alternatives 
For the model summarized in Figure 3.4 and Figure 3.5, the three policy 
measures being proposed are all parts of the macro-prudential policy aiming at 
maintaining financial stability amidst increased bank-led flows.  
Aggressive Monetary Policy: Given the presence of the credit channel and the 
amplified effect of the flows described in Chapter 2, the policy response needs to be 
more forceful, i.e., greater in magnitude and intensity. When credit growth is 
excessive, for example, interest rates must be raised higher than under a standard 
assumption of an overheating economy without considering credit channels and 
amplification of the effects. On the other hand, when downward pressure on economic 
growth is strong, or deflationary pressure is imminent, interest rates ought to be 
reduced much more than under a standard assumption (e.g., what the US Fed, Bank of 
Japan, and the ECB have been doing during the current global financial crisis).    
Assigning Levies: To the extent that bank-led inflows can create vulnerability 
(see Chapter 2), capital controls have been implemented in many flow-receiving 
countries; however, across-the-board capital control of various sorts can create 
distortions, the negative effects of which can offset the potential benefits to the 
economy. It is therefore preferable to impose targeted controls. Since the type of 
inflows we are dealing with here is bank-led flows that will augment banks’ balance 
sheets through rising non-core liabilities, the controls should focus precisely on 
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accounts. One of the policies widely proposed in this regard is imposing levies on non-
core liabilities. The idea is not to prevent the inflows entirely but to make banks more 
cautious about both receiving the flows and using the funds. It is expected that, with 
such a levy, banks would be more cautious and not take excessive risks. 
Encouraging Outflows: As with all inflows, the immediate repercussion is on 
the exchange rate. For many emerging economies that rely on exports, an appreciated 
exchange rate spells bad news as it can have a negative price-effect on exports. In 
response, the monetary authority usually intervenes in the foreign exchange market to 
prevent the currency from appreciating, but the intervention can be inflationary as it 
raises the amount of the money supply. Under normal circumstances, such a policy is 
followed by some sterilization measures; however, this may lead to higher interest 
rates that attract even more capital inflows. Absence of sterilization policy, on the 
other hand, implies a loss of monetary control. This well-known “impossible trinity” 
problem can be mitigated when the supply-demand balance of foreign exchange does 
not change much, in which case the need for the monetary authority to intervene is 
also less. To the extent that capital inflows cannot be stopped, this can be made 
possible only by countering the inflows with outflows. This is why some emerging 
economies that receive massive amounts of capital inflows have made efforts to 
encourage capital outflows or investment abroad.     
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3.3. Analysis 
3.3.1. The AHP Model 
 
Table 3.8. Inputs from FCGE Simulations for BOCR 
	   	  
	  
Percentage	  
Change	  
Normalized	  Percentage	  
Change	  
Benefits	  
Liquidity	  (0.65)	  
Short-­‐term	  security	  &	  
equity	   0.219	   0.801	  
Financial	  income	   0.054	   0.199	  
Chances	  (0.35)	  
ID	   29.092	   0.579	  
CD	   -­‐1.096	   0.022	  
Financial	  income	   0.054	   0.001	  
FINTM	   20.007	   0.398	  
Opportunities	  
Stronger	   	  
Capital	  Market	  (0.5)	  
RN	   0.045	   0.087	  
Short-­‐term	  security	   0.285	   0.556	  
Equity	   0.183	   0.357	  
Resilience	  
(0.3)	  
HHH	  net	  worth	   0.008	   0.000	  
BANKF	   0.016	   0.001	  
Property	  price	   -­‐16.776	   0.994	  
M2/RESERVE	   -­‐0.076	   0.005	  
Welfare	  
(0.2)	  
Financial	  income	  (Rn*asset)	   0.054	   0.000	  
UEMP	   -­‐143.311	   0.895	  
PL	   -­‐16.809	   0.105	  
Short-­‐term	  security	  income	   0.360	   0.663	  
Equity	  income	   0.183	   0.337	  
Costs	  
Competitiveness	  
(0.65)	  
Excess	  saving	   -­‐168.690	   0.263	  
RER	   -­‐5.454	   0.009	  
Trade	  account	   -­‐467.476	   0.729	  
EXR	  (P-­‐Import)	   -­‐17.000	   0.500	  
EXR	  (P-­‐Export)	   -­‐17.000	   0.500	  
Trade	  Account	  (import)	   30.651	   0.800	  
Trade	  Account	  (export)	   7.640	   0.200	  
Worsening	  
Income	  
Distribution	  
(0.35)	  
Poor/Rich	   -­‐0.391	   0.807	  
Rural/Urban	   -­‐0.093	   0.193	  
Poor/Rich	  (factor)	   -­‐0.183	   0.976	  
Poor/Rich	  (financial)	   -­‐0.004	   0.024	  
Rural/Urban	  (factor)	   -­‐0.058	   0.738	  
Rural/Urban	  (financial)	   -­‐0.021	   0.262	  
Risks	  
Deflationary	  
Pressure	  
(0.2)	  
PINDEX	   -­‐16.814	   0.997	  
Asset	  Price	   0.045	   0.003	  
Asset	  price	  (equity)	   0.366	   0.270	  
Asset	  price	  (short-­‐term	  
security)	   0.989	   0.730	  
Bank's	  
Vulnerability	  (0.5)	  
CAR	   -­‐0.020	   0.009	  
Credit	  crunch	  (bank	  loan)	   2.121	   0.989	  
Wealth	   -­‐0.003	   0.001	  
Volatility	  
(0.3)	  
Equity	   0.057	   0.236	  
Short-­‐term	  security	   0.135	   0.565	  
BankF	   -­‐0.010	   0.042	  
Non-­‐HHH	  Income	   	   -­‐0.038	   0.157	  
Income	  (bank's	  Income)	   -­‐0.018	   0.083	  
Income	  (Fin	  Firm's	  Income)	   -­‐0.001	   0.006	  
Income	  (non	  Fin	  Firm's	  
Income)	   -­‐0.100	   0.451	  
Income	  (gov's	  Income)	   -­‐0.103	   0.461	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Table 3.9. Overall Ranking for Each BOCR using AHP Model  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
AHP	   Benefits	   Ranking	   Opportunities	   Ranking	   Costs	   Ranking	   Risks	   Ranking	  
Aggressive	  
Monetary	   0.375	   2	   0.489	   1	   0.760	   1	   0.653	   1	  
Assigning	  Levies	   0.466	   1	   0.380	   2	   0.061	   3	   0.081	   3	  
Encouraging	  
Outflows	   0.159	   3	   0.131	   3	   0.180	   2	   0.266	   2	  
 
Looking at the benefits cluster, the two immediate benefits that can be reaped 
from increased CFLOWs are higher liquidity and opportunities to stimulate 
investment (ID), consumption (CD), and financial income (FIN INC), and to import 
intermediate goods (FINTM). Based on the model simulation in Chapter 2, the most 
likely effects occur in short-term security and equity market (weight = 0.801; see 
Table 3.8). Given that information, the policy that will most likely realize those 
benefits is assigning levies on capital flows and an aggressive monetary policy (ranked 
0.466 and 0.375, respectively; see Table 3.9). Some of the potential benefits from 
increased capital flow may be realized in the short run but not in the long run. In the 
AHP model, this is labeled ‘Opportunities’ (future benefits). Of the three components 
under Opportunities that increase, CFLOW will have the potential to make the capital 
market stronger, particularly in the short-term security market (0.556 in Table 3.9). 
Indeed, in most emerging market economies, one of the key sources for capital market 
development is improved liquidity. When the CFLOW is intermediated by the banking 
sector and those flows are invested in the financial market, this will help to improve 
the liquidity of the capital market.  
The second most likely type of future benefit is improved resilience for the 
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economy. There are two possible scenarios of increased CFLOW: (1) Most of the 
flows go to domestic assets, including those in the property market, or (2) most of the 
flows go strictly to the financial market. Due to the weak linkage between 
housing/property market and the financial market in many emerging market 
economies, these two scenarios are likely unrelated. Thus, increase CFLOW raises 
either the price of property or the prices in the financial market. The latter implies that 
property prices will not only be unaffected but will likely even decline. From the 
model simulation in Chapter 2, it is revealed that this second scenario applies. The 
decline in the property price helped to strengthen the macroeconomic stability of the 
country. Thus, it also improves the resilience of the country’s economy. As shown in 
Table 3.8, lower property price is the most significant component that helps improve 
the resilience of the economy (0.994). Moving to the cost side, the most immediate 
adverse impact of the CFLOW is stronger currency, which will damage the country’s 
competitiveness. This is supported by the result from the AHP model, where the 
competitiveness factor is ranked bigger than other component (worsening income 
distribution). The future adverse impact, represented by the risk in the AHP model, 
consists of three components – deflationary pressure, increased vulnerability of the 
banks, and increased income and financial volatility. Of these three components, 
banks’ vulnerability is the most significant since CFLOWs are intermediated by the 
banking sector. As discussed in Chapter 2, increased CFLOW may lead to riskier 
behavior in the banking sector or higher bank credit. In the current scenario, the 
increased funding in the non-core liabilities of the banking sector is mostly spent on 
risky financial assets. That alone will raise banks’ vulnerability. Even if most of the 
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increased non-core liabilities are spent on bank loans, there remains a risk of credit 
crunch when there is deleveraging, similar to what happened during the Eurozone 
Crisis. Either way, the increased CFLOW will potentially increase banks’ 
vulnerability. Among the three sub-components of banks’ vulnerability, a possible 
credit crunch is most significant. Increased CFLOW may also cause an increase in 
financial market and income volatility, because such inflows are of the portfolio flows 
category, which by nature are volatile. The volatility of the flows is usually detected 
by the sudden reversal from inflows to outflows. The results shown in Table 3.8 are 
based on the model simulation under the scenario of such sudden reversal. Among the 
sub-components, volatility in the short-term security market is the most likely to be 
followed by volatility in equity. Given the above ranking of components and sub-
components for BOCR, we rank the relevance of the three policies as follows: 1) 
aggressive monetary policy, 2) assigning levies on bank-led flows, and 3) encouraging 
capital outflows. The resulting priority of the policies under the benefits cluster is thus 
as follows: 1) assigning levies, 2) aggressive monetary, and 3) encouraging outflows 
as shown in Table 3.9. The following ranking is obtained under the opportunities 
cluster: 1) aggressive monetary, 2) assigning levies, and 3) encouraging outflows; 
however, when we do the ranking for the cost and risk cluster, the nature of the 
question must be reversed, i.e., given a certain component ‘which policies are more 
costly (or risky)’. The results indicate that while the aggressive monetary policy is 
beneficial in the long run, it is also most costly and most risky, followed by 
encouraging outflows and assigning levies. Thus, it is interesting to note that some 
policies that are potentially beneficial can also potentially be damaging, while some 
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policies that are most beneficial may also be the least damaging to the economy. It is 
in this context that one must compare the benefits and opportunities with the costs and 
risks in order to achieve a more balanced perspective. In this study, I use two 
approaches to develop a measure for such a balanced perspective: (B*O)/(C*R) or 
multiplicative and bB+oO-cC-r or additive. The latter method is preferable and 
suggested by Saaty.  
 
Table 3.10. Overall Ranking using ANP through Mutiplicative and Additive Synthesis 
AHP	  
Benefits	  
Opportunitie
s	   Costs	   Risks	  
(B*O)/(C*R)	   bB+oO-­‐cC-­‐rR	  
Rankin
g	  
b=0.25	   o=0.25	  
c=0.2
5	  
r=0.2
5	  
Aggressive	  Monetary	   0.375	   0.489	   0.760	   0.653	   0.370	   -­‐0.137	   3	  
Assigning	  Levies	   0.466	   0.380	   0.061	   0.081	   36.332	   0.176	   1	  
Encouraging	  
Outflows	   0.159	   0.131	   0.180	   0.266	   0.434	   -­‐0.039	   2	  
 
 
The overall results indicate that, in this particular case, either measure will 
yield the same ranking. Such an outcome, however, cannot be generalized. In some 
cases, they show different rankings, while in other cases, they even show rank 
reversal. From Table 3.10, it is clear that after considering BOCR and the importance 
of each of the policies with respect to each component, which is an additive method, 
the preferred policy is to assign levy to bank-led flows. At this juncture, it is important 
to emphasize that such results are based on the overall strategic goals that include not 
just macroeconomic issues but also financial and social issues. Had the goal been 
merely to maintain macroeconomic stability, for example, the priority ranking of the 
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policy would have been different. In most cases, when there is capital flow reversal, 
aggressive monetary policies are strongly recommended and widely implemented, as 
with the tightening that occurred during the AFC in 1997. In the current scenario, in 
contrast, such a policy is ranked the lowest. 
 
Table 3.11.  Overall Ranking using AHP through Mutiplicative and Additive 
Synthesis under Different Weights on BOCR 
AHP	  
Benefits	   Opportunities	   Costs	   Risks	  
(B*O)/(C*R)	   bB+oO-­‐cC-­‐rR	   Ranking	  b=0.25	   o=0.1	   c=0.35	   r=0.3	  
Aggressive	  Monetary	   0.375	   0.489	   0.760	   0.653	   0.370	   -­‐0.319	   3	  
Assigning	  Levies	   0.466	   0.380	   0.061	   0.081	   36.332	   0.109	   1	  
Encouraging	  Outflows	   0.159	   0.131	   0.180	   0.266	   0.434	   -­‐0.090	   2	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
AHP	  
Benefits	   Opportunities	   Costs	   Risks	  
(B*O)/(C*R)	   bB+oO-­‐cC-­‐rR	   Ranking	  b=0.35	   o=0.3	   c=0.25	   r=0.1	  
Aggressive	  Monetary	   0.375	   0.489	   0.760	   0.653	   0.370	   0.0227	   3	  
Assigning	  Levies	   0.466	   0.380	   0.061	   0.081	   36.332	   0.2540	   1	  
Encouraging	  Outflows	   0.159	   0.131	   0.180	   0.266	   0.434	   0.0233	   2	  
 
 
In some cases, we may wish to assign different weights for BOCR. As shown 
in the first table in Table 3.11, we particularly inflate the weight for the Costs and the 
Risks; however, in the second part, we inflate the weight for the Benefits and 
Opportunities while the overall ranking still favors the policy of assigning levies. 
Either when the cost and risk are weighted higher or when the benefits and 
opportunities are weighted higher, encouraging outflows are ranked second. In sum, 
we can safely conclude that the results in terms of preferred policy (i.e., assigning 
levies) are robust. Under normal circumstances, one needs to also conduct a sensitivity 
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analysis for each of the components discussed earlier. For example, one could evaluate 
whether the ranking of the sub-components in the benefits cluster will change if we 
alter the priority ranking of Liquidity and Chances. The same could have been done in 
the Opportunities, Costs, and Risk clusters. Since the majority of the inputs that we 
used in this AHP exercise are based on the quantitative results of the FCGE 
simulations, however, there is no additional value that one can gain from running 
additional sensitivity analyses. Looking at the experience in a number of emerging 
market economies, the economies are indeed seriously discussing the possibility of 
imposing some levy on capital flows. Some countries, such as South Korea, have 
already imposed levies on capital flows. Thus, the results of the AHP in this chapter 
provide some supporting arguments for what most emerging market economies are 
currently doing. 
 
3.3.2. The ANP Model 
Table 3.12. Overall Ranking using ANP through Mutiplicative and Additive Synthesis 
ANP	  
Benefit	   Opportunities	   Costs	   Risks	  
(B*O)/(C*R)	   bB+oO-­‐cC-­‐rR	   Ranking	  b=0.25	   o=0.25	   c=0.25	   r=0.25	  
Aggressive	  
Monetary	   0.438	   0.477	   0.724	   0.487	   0.593	   -­‐0.074	   3	  
Assigning	  Levies	   0.436	   0.340	   0.066	   0.155	   14.626	   0.139	   1	  
Encouraging	  
Outflows	   0.126	   0.182	   0.210	   0.359	   0.305	   -­‐0.065	   2	  
 
 
Further advancing the analysis of AHP by incorporating the possible feedback 
affects, we apply the analytical network process to the same problem in order to 
determine whether the results of the AHP are consistent with those of the ANP. There 
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are many priority rankings that run contrary (opposite in direction) to the order we 
used in the hierarchical model to represent the feedback influence i.e., going upward 
from the alternative to the criteria, sub-criteria, and goals. As described in the 
methodology section, however, taking these feedback effects into account requires 
different a mathematical approach to come up with consistent rankings. In particular, 
one needs to generate a supermatrix where all goals, criteria, sub-criteria, and 
alternatives depend on themselves (or each other). For example, Table 3.7 shows 
resulting supermatrices of the Chances cluster under Benefits. Following Saaty (2001), 
taking the stochastic form of such matrix and multiplying it on itself exponentially 
will lead to an equilibrium that yields consistent rankings of the alternatives. Thus, by 
using such an approach, one can derive the priority rankings of the three policies. The 
results in Table 3.12 clearly show that the conclusion derived from AHP earlier 
remains unchanged – that is, assigning levies is the most preferred policy followed by 
encouraging outflows and adopting an aggressive monetary policy. When we alter the 
weight of the BOCR, the resulting ranking is also identical to those generated by the 
AHP model. Since the weights assigned in the feedback model are not necessarily 
based on the results of the FCGE simulation, however, a sensitivity analysis is 
warranted.  
As shown in Figure 3.11 in Appendix IV, given the weight of the consumption 
spending (CD), the policy of assigning levies is most preferred, followed by the 
adoption of an aggressive monetary policy, assigning levies, and encouraging outflows. 
This ranking remains the same as we increase the weight of the CD up to slightly 
higher than 0.8; however, when we assign CD a weight higher than that, encouraging 
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outflows becomes more preferred than an aggressive monetary policy. In contrast, if 
the weight of the CD is drastically reduced to close to zero, then an aggressive 
monetary policy is most preferred.  
When components other than CD are more significant, such as investment (ID), 
while the increased CFLOW will help to further stimulate the investment, the 
effectiveness of such stimulus pressure will be strengthened if the monetary authority 
also adopts a monetary policy, by lowering either the interest rate or the reserve 
requirement. Yet, in light of the broad range of weights for CD within which it is most 
preferred to assign levies, it is reasonable to suggest that the results in Figure 3.11 are 
robust. Similar to the sensitivity analysis for CD, if we raise the weight for investment 
(ID), the ranking of aggressive monetary policy tends to decline while that of 
assigning levies increases. In other words, even if we assign greater importance to the 
investment component, the strong preference for the policy, assigning levies, not only 
remains intact but becomes even more preferred. Consistent with the simulation 
results in Chapter 2, under the scenario of capital outflows, imposing levies would 
have yielded similar results as such a scenario under the outflows. Under such a 
scenario, banks’ allocation of assets indicates an increase in bank loans, implying a 
higher level of investment. This is why Figure 3.11 shows that giving higher weight to 
investment results in giving greater weight to the assigning of levies. In the sensitivity 
analysis for FINTM imported and FIN INC, as shown in Figure 3.11, the dominance 
of assigning levies is clearly observed. Only when the weight of FINTM and FIN INC 
are raised to an extremely high level will aggressive monetary policy become 
dominant. Moving to the liquidity component in Figure 3.11 in Appendix IV clearly 
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shows that the highest priority is monetary policy. No matter what weight is assigned 
to either short-term security and equity or financial income, the superiority of 
aggressive monetary policy remains intact. These results yield an interesting 
conclusion with respect to the overall priority rankings for the three alternative 
policies – as can be seen in the earlier sensitivity analysis of the components of 
chances, assigning levies is superior while, from the perspective of liquidity, 
aggressive monetary policy is most preferred. In this kind of trade-off situation, one 
must rank the importance of the two components under the Benefits cluster, the results 
of which are shown in Table 3.13 where the weight of Liquidity is higher than that of 
Chances (0.65 vs. 0.35). Taking into account such a comparison, overall, there is a 
slightly higher preference for aggressive monetary policy than for assigning levies 
(0.438 vs. 0.436) as shown in Figure 3.12. The sensitivity analysis is largely similar 
for the Opportunities cluster in which the final ranking indicates that the aggressive 
monetary policy is considered capable of providing greater future benefits 
(opportunities) than assigning levies (0.477 vs. 0.340). 
It is essential to note, however, the importance of priority ranking under the 
Cost and Risk clusters. Looking at Figure 3.13 in Appendix IV, given the weight of 
excess saving, an aggressive monetary policy would have been most costly since it 
could damage the competitiveness of the economy through an appreciated exchange 
rate. This result is robust irrespective of the weight assigned to excess saving. Similar 
results are observed for other sub-components under the competitiveness component 
in the Cost cluster, in which the aggressive monetary policy is considered to be most 
costly to the economy (see Figure 3.13 in Appendix IV). From the perspective of 
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income distribution, the results are even more robust – the finding that an aggressive 
monetary policy would be most costly to the economy is unchallenged no matter what 
weights are assigned to the different sub-components (see Figure 3.13 and Figure 3.14 
in Appendix IV).  
The robustness of the finding that aggressive monetary policy would be most 
costly is equally apparent when we examine long-term cost (risk) under the 
deflationary pressure component (Figure 3.14). Sensitivity analysis yielded slightly 
different results for the components of banks’ vulnerability. Although aggressive 
monetary policy remains the most costly, if we inflate the weight or importance of 
CAR as one of the indicators affected by increased CFLOW, encouraging outflows 
eventually becomes more preferred than aggressive monetary policy. The inflection 
point occurs roughly at 0.6 (see Figure 3.14 in Appendix IV). In the case of a credit 
crunch component, the inflection point occurs at around 0.43, whereas for the wealth 
component it occurs at around 0.47. Looking at the broad range of the weights, 
however, it is reasonable to conclude that the sensitivity analysis of banks’ 
vulnerability yields robust results in its finding that aggressive monetary policy is 
considered the costliest.   
There are several sub-components under the volatility component in the Risk 
cluster. The sensitivity analysis shows that, with respect to different sub-components, 
the preferred policies are either aggressive monetary policy or encouraging outflows. 
None of the cases indicate that assigning levies is considered costly except when the 
weight of “bankF” is greatly inflated from the current rate 0.021 to above 0.6 (see 
Figure 3.14 in Appendix IV). Such a scenario, however, is highly unlikely. Taking the 
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overall comparisons into consideration (Figure 3.14 and Figure 3.15), the net outcome 
shows that, in the volatility component, the policy that is considered most costly is 
encouraging outflows. This is expected because the boom-and-bust episode from 
capital inflows to capital outflows indeed reflects the risk of volatility that may be 
damaging to the economy; however, since volatility is considered to be only the 
second most important risk, such a result may be offset by the dominance of an 
aggressive monetary policy as it is a most costly policy. Table 3.13 confirms that an 
aggressive monetary policy under the Risk cluster indeed remains the most costly. 
Encouraging outflows is ranked the second most costly.  
 
Table 3.13. Overall Ranking for Each BOCR using ANP  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Benefits	   Ideals	   Normals	   Raw	   Ranking	  
Aggressive	  Monetary	   1.000	   0.438	   0.859	   1	  
Assigning	  Levies	   0.995	   0.436	   0.854	   2	  
Encouraging	  Outflows	   0.288	   0.126	   0.247	   3	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Opportunities	   Ideals	   Normals	   Raw	   Ranking	  
Aggressive	  Monetary	   1.000	   0.477	   0.826	   1	  
Assigning	  Levies	   0.713	   0.340	   0.589	   2	  
Encouraging	  Outflows	   0.382	   0.182	   0.316	   3	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Costs	   Ideals	   Normals	   Raw	   Ranking	  
Aggressive	  Monetary	   1.000	   0.724	   1.000	   1	  
Assigning	  Levies	   0.091	   0.066	   0.091	   3	  
Encouraging	  Outflows	   0.290	   0.210	   0.290	   2	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Risks	   Ideals	   Normals	   Raw	   Ranking	  
Aggressive	  Monetary	   1.000	   0.487	   0.981	   1	  
Assigning	  Levies	   0.318	   0.155	   0.312	   3	  
Encouraging	  Outflow	   0.737	   0.359	   0.723	   2	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Taking the four clusters together (i.e., BOCR), an interesting outcome emerges. 
While aggressive monetary policy is considered most beneficial as it can make the 
effect of increased CFLOW in stimulating economy more effective, it is also 
considered the most risky and costly as the economy can experience losing 
competitiveness and worsening income distribution. As shown in Table 3.13, that 
policy is ranked the highest from the perspective of benefits and opportunities, but at 
the same time it is also ranked highest as the most costly and risky. On the other hand, 
from the perspective of benefits and opportunities, assigning levies is the second most 
preferred policy, but at the same time, it is considered the least costly and risky. Thus, 
assigning levies is expected to be the ultimate ‘winner’. Table 3.12 confirms this 
expectation. Whether one uses the multiplicative or additive approach of BOCR, 
assigning levies is considered the most preferred policy for responding to increased 
CFLOW.  
 
Table 3.14. Overall ranking using ANP through mutiplicative and additive synthesis 
under different weights on BOCR 
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
AHP	  
Benefit	   Opportunities	   Costs	   Risks	  
(B*O)/(C*R)	   bB+oO-­‐cC-­‐rR	   Ranking	  b=0.25	   o=0.1	   c=0.35	   r=0.3	  
Aggressive	  
Monetary	   0.438	   0.477	   0.724	   0.487	   0.593	   -­‐0.242	   3	  
Assigning	  Levies	   0.436	   0.340	   0.066	   0.155	   14.626	   0.074	   1	  
Encouraging	  
Outflows	   0.126	   0.182	   0.210	   0.359	   0.305	   -­‐0.131	   2	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
AHP	  
Benefit	   Opportunities	   Costs	   Risks	  
(B*O)/(C*R)	   bB+oO-­‐cC-­‐rR	   Ranking	  b=0.35	   o=0.3	   c=0.25	   r=0.1	  
Aggressive	  
Monetary	   0.438	   0.477	   0.724	   0.487	   0.593	   0.0668	   2	  
Assigning	  Levies	   0.436	   0.340	   0.066	   0.155	   14.626	   0.2227	   1	  
Encouraging	  
Outflows	   0.126	   0.182	   0.210	   0.359	   0.305	   0.0105	   3	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In some cases, one would wish to give a different weight to each BOCR. For 
example, those with optimistic inclinations may wish to assign higher weights to the 
Benefits and Opportunities, while those with more pessimistic inclinations may wish 
to assign higher weights to Cost and Risk. In this context, we tried to examine the 
problem by comparing the results representing those two possibilities. When Costs 
and Risks are given higher weights, the rankings in the first part of the table remain 
the same. That is, assigning levies is still most preferred, while encouraging outflows 
and aggressive monetary policies are second and third, respectively. When the weights 
for Benefits and Opportunities are inflated, as in the second part of Table 3.14, 
assigning levies is again the preferred measure regardless of the approach taken 
(whether additive or multiplicative), although the second and third ranks change when 
the additive approach is used. In particular, under the multiplicative approach, 
encouraging outflows is ranked second, and aggressive monetary policies third; 
however, under the additive approach, aggressive monetary policies ranks second, and 
encouraging outflows third. To clarify further, each of the four factors of BOCR is 
weighted differently to generate a chart in the Appendix (i.e., sensitivity analysis for 
BOCR). It is clear that the dominance of the aggressive monetary policies in the 
benefits and opportunities remains intact regardless of the weights assigned to the 
Benefits and Opportunities clusters, and the same policy is considered the costliest and 
riskiest regardless of the weights assigned to the cost and risk. In sum, the results 
shown in Tables 3.12 and 3.14 are robust. 
It is important to re-emphasize here that this result takes into account the 
macro, financial, and social issues simultaneously as they are represented in the 
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networks under each of the clusters, as shown in Figure 3.5. For example, macro 
issues are captured through variables such as ID, CD, PINDEX, and RER, while 
financial issues are reflected in variables such as short-term security, equity, RN, and 
CAR. Social issues include household income originating from the financial sector 
(e.g., short-term security income and equity income) and from factor incomes (e.g., 
wages), as well as unemployment and poverty line, income distribution between poor 
and rich and between rural and urban areas.  
 
 
3.4. Concluding Remarks 
The complexity of the economy as elaborated in Chapters 1 and 2 is analyzed 
through the use of CGE and FCGE models. Using such models, we have run a 
scenario where the ultra-easy monetary policy in an advanced economy following the 
global financial crisis has raised massive capital flows to emerging market economies. 
Focusing on bank-led flows (i.e., flows intermediated by the banking sector), the 
analysis in chapter 2 reveals that increased bank-led flows can produce some risks as 
well as potential benefits. In this chapter, we went further by exploring the question of 
what policy response that would be most appropriate in such circumstances. In 
addition, to incorporate some elements of reality, we classified the overall strategic 
goals into macro issues, financial issues and social issues. While increased bank-led 
flows may provide benefits (B) in the short run and potential benefits in the future 
(opportunities, O), they may also create some short-run costs (C) as well as potential 
costs (risk, R). All of these BOCR are taken together and linked with three policy 
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measures: aggressive monetary policy, assigning levies, and encouraging outflows. To 
generate consistent priority rankings of those policies, while at the same time 
capturing the dynamics and the feedback effects of the system, including some 
intangible factors, we used the analytic network process (ANP) and analytic hierarchy 
process (AHP). Unlike AHP, the ANP explicitly takes into account the feedback 
effects. Most of the inputs we used are derived from the pairwise comparison and 
taken from quantitative numbers derived from the model simulations in Chapter 2. In 
cases where the relations are non-existent, or the implied coefficients are either not 
measured by the model or intangibles in nature, inputs are made based on informed 
perceptions. The overall conclusion points to the superiority of assigning levies on 
bank-led flows. The preference for this policy passes several sensitivity tests, implying 
that the result is robust.  
Indeed, the primary function of a bank is to intermediate customers’ funds such 
as saving deposits (the core liabilities of banks) by allocating those funds to some uses 
through loans. That is, bank’s role is to conduct financial resource allocation such that 
savers gain benefits from the interest rates, while the economy grows from the loan-
funded investment. This is the essence of bank’s intermediation function.  With the 
increased bank-led flows (banks’ non-core liabilities), that function is somehow 
disrupted, where most financial resources are used by banks to invest in risky financial 
assets rather than for loans that can help stimulate the economy. It is therefore 
important to propose policies that can mitigate such a possibility. Assigning levies to 
banks’ non-core liabilities is intended for precisely that purpose.  Some emerging 
market economies have either already implemented or seriously considered 
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implementing this policy. This is part of what is known as macro-prudential policy.  
This chapter’s analysis not only provides support for such a policy but can also 
help policymakers to explore alternative policies given the prevailing conditions. This 
is important because different countries have different situations and sensitivities 
towards each of the issues (i.e., macro, financial, and social).  
When time and resources permit, one can conduct the analysis by using the 
approach and model in this chapter through direct interviewing. The respondents can 
be selected experts or policymakers who can express their perceptions regarding the 
relations among variables in the model. In this way, the resulting priority ranking from 
the model simulation can be compared with, or tested against, policymakers’ 
perceptions, from which new insights may emerge. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix I: Fundamental Scale of Absolute Numbers 
Intensity 
of 
Importan
ce 
Definition Explanation 
1 Equal importance Two activities contribute equally to the objective. 
2 Weak or slight  
3 Moderate importance Experience and judgment slightly favor one activity over another. 
4 Moderate plus  
5 Strong importance Experience and judgment strongly favor one activity over another. 
6 Strong plus  
7 Very strong or demonstrated importance 
An activity is favored very strongly over 
another; its dominance is demonstrated in 
practice. 
8 Very, very strong  
9 Extreme importance 
The evidence favoring one activity over 
another is of the highest possible order of 
affirmation. 
1.1-1.9 
When activities are very close, a 
decimal is added to 1 to show their 
difference as appropriate. 
A better alternative to assigning the small 
decimals is to compare two close 
activities with other widely contrasting 
ones, favoring the larger one a little more 
than the smaller one when using the 
values 1-9.   
Reciproca
ls of 
above 
If activity i has one of the above 
non-zero numbers assigned to it 
when compared with activity j, then 
j has the reciprocal value when 
compared with i. 
A logical assumption 
Measure
ments 
from ratio 
scales  
 
When it is desired to use such numbers in 
physical applications. Alternatively, one 
often estimates the ratios of such 
magnitudes by using one’s judgment. 
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Appendix II: Data Input Methods To Acquire Relative Intensities in AHP and ANP 
Models using Super Decision Software 
 
Figure 3.8. Direct Data Input Method 
 
 
 
Figure 3.9. Matrix Method  
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Figure 3.10. Questionnaire –Pairwise Comparison -- Method 
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Appendix III: Analytical Network Process In Super Decision Software 
 
 
 
Sub-network For “Opportunities” 
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Sub-Sub-network For “Welfare” Under “Opportunities” 
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Appendix IV: Sensitivity Analysis Graphs for Each Variable under BOCR in ANP 
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